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Mapping Crisis: a reflection on 
the Covid-19 pandemic
This book is being published in the midst of the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, 
an event that was beyond the imagination of most people at the time that the 
project started, but one that now grips the world and is one of the principal 
factors in how we presently organise our daily existence. It was suggested that 
we might add some information to the book about these changes and how 
they relate to the stories and research contained within. After much thought, 
it was felt that this preface was a more suitable space for such reflection. While 
there is no doubt at all that many of the chapters within this book could have 
easily been about the response to the Covid-19 outbreak, to insert this new 
narrative would have been to erode the experiences of those people who feature 
in these chapters. While the pandemic has rightly become a focus of much of 
the planet, it has already drawn our attention away from other inequalities and 
struggles around the world. This book though, despite being almost entirely 
finished before the pandemic was declared, has much to teach us about how 
we might respond to this global crisis. The pandemic, and our response to this 
crisis, has thrown up a great many questions in relation to how we use, collect, 
map and understand data, many of which are explored in these chapters.
Epidemiology and mapping have a long history, with early examples being 
Shapter’s 1832 maps of cholera in Exeter, UK, and then the more famous maps 
of cholera deaths produced by John Snow in London. These maps and their 
authors were credited with bringing new understanding of waterborne disease 
and saving many lives. While now we often look back on these maps as being 
unquestionably useful and accurate, the results of the map production, rather 
than their process is what is what sticks in our minds. Yet, it is important 
to remember that at the time these maps were widely dismissed, and often 
misinterpreted as supporting the prevailing thoughts of the time that cholera 
was airborne. Indeed, Snow’s maps become more famous than Shapter’s not 
only because they were of London, but because of the evocative story of him 
striding in to Broad Street and tearing off the handle of the community water 
pump – an act required precisely because his data and mappings were not 
initially well received. As the world grapples with mapping and tracing the 
Covid-19 pandemic, the data and maps produced are also questioned by those 
who observe them. Data is being used to drive the daily movements of billions 
 
MAPPING CRISISxiv
of people in a way that we have never before seen, but the interpretations and 
collection of this data are wholly problematic – doctors and politicians looking 
at the same data draw wildly different conclusions about the course of action. 
People are being instructed to stay home, go to work, wear masks, or send 
their children to school based on the invisible hand of data. While I do not 
suggest we shouldn’t be harnessing all the tools we can in the fight to save lives 
during this pandemic, it has also brought many issues of ‘mapping crisis’ to the 
fore. Issues of privacy, control, vicarious mapping, the datafication of people, 
incomplete data, dark data, prejudice in reading data, and inequality of access – 
even in the richest countries, those without a smartphone will be omitted from 
any digital tracing apps designed to protect people.
This book is not about epidemiology, it is about mapping many other 
moments of crisis, but the stories within foretell these issues. Throughout the 
book the authors explore and challenge the way in which people are mapped 
and turned into data when they are at their most vulnerable – in moments of 
crisis. These chapters explore the politics within data and ask why there is such 
uneven distribution. In asking these questions though, this book also offers 
solutions and hope. From active counter-mapping projects that show how to 
include voices and peoples often marginalised, to warnings of where things 
can so often go wrong, there are many lessons within these pages to guide us 
through using data to tackle the Covid-19 crisis.
Covid-19 has brought the world of data-driven crisis management to the 
doorstep of the whole world, but these are not new experiences. People around 
the world have already been reduced to data points, and had their lives dictated 
by algorithm, computation, and the biases built into these technologies. Many 
more are also pushing back with counter mapping and participatory practices 
that aim to force the inclusion of subjugated voices and knowledge. This book 
then is about those who have already been mapped or made maps in times of 
crisis, and through these pages lie many of the critical questions, and some of 
the answers, to mapping the Covid-19 pandemic.
Doug Specht
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Introduction: mapping in times of crisis
Doug Specht
We are in the middle of a revolution, or so the mantra goes, our world having been reinvented through digital technologies, changing mapping techniques and the aerospace industry. Data are at the 
heart of this revolution, one that, according to the United Nations (UN) 
Secretary General’s report A World That Counts, is a revolution for equality 
(cited in Satterthwaite, 2015). The coupling of vast data sets with geographic 
information systems (GIS) has already and will continue to change the world 
through knowledge sharing and codification (Hendriks, 1999). Increased 
computer penetration and ever- increasing speeds of internet access are 
transforming the world into an e- society, allowing more people to provide data 
about their lived experience, potentially improving the health and well- being 
of all whom it embraces (Fife and Pereira, 2008). Tim Berners- Lee’s vision of 
a connected world with easy knowledge sharing for the benefits of humankind 
seems within grasping distance (O’Hara, 2004) and geospatial technologies 
are playing an increasingly large role in the way in which we understand and 
also create the world around us (Specht, 2018). We are witnessing an ongoing 
globalisation of space and a reshaping of the local through the accumulation 
and deployment of such technologies, leading to a situation in which space is 
not only homogenised (and global), but also always fragmented (Kirsch, 1995). 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the humanitarian sector, where the rise 
of digital humanitarianism has seen a huge shift in the processes of mapping, 
now viewed as a vital tool in moments of crisis. These changes have themselves 
created a crisis in the humanitarian sector, which must now wrestle more than 
ever with the dualities of datafication, ‘Othering’ and the participation of some 
of the most vulnerable people in the world.
Geotagged digital photos, aid requests posted on Twitter, aerial imagery, 
Facebook posts, Short Message Service (SMS) messages, drones and many 
other tools now form part of the digital landscape of the humanitarian sector. 
These new and rich data streams are often brought together through mapping 
practices that are in many ways able to offer unprecedented depictions of 
communities’ needs within a crisis. Yet, it is also understood that the 
cartographic order of the world has forced many peoples into an imperial 
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logic under the no- win situation often referred to as ‘map or be mapped’ 
(Edney, 2019; Paglen, 2008). Maps and data are not only poor at describing 
the qualities of the relationships of everyday life, but are also born of power 
that has traditionally been used as an instrument of both colonialism and the 
contemporary geopolitical ordering of the world (Paglen, 2008; Specht and 
Feigenbaum, 2018). These issues are both alleviated and compounded by the 
growth in the amount of data being collected, not only harnessing global 
positioning systems (GPS), but also sound- level, light and accelerometer 
sensors, as well as a wealth of ‘social’ data collected through means such 
as social media. Aggregating data from these diverse and plentiful sensors 
enables new forms of monitoring societal change and have become a mainstay 
of humanitarian responses (Buckingham Shum et  al., 2012). The kind of 
abstract scientific knowledge collected in this way may seem universal, but in 
the real world, it is always integrated with supplementary assumptions that 
render it culture bound and parochial. The mode of communication itself 
also conveys a set of tacit cultural and social assumptions or prescriptions 
(Wynne, 1992). These issues are accentuated through digitisation, in which 
information is converted to bits  – malleable, electronically stored bits that 
can erode cultural objects, information cultures and politics. As we attempt 
to manage information, information itself mutates into new forms that often 
require new types of management (Jordan, 2015).
This book concerns itself with one particular type of management, that is 
data management and codification undertaken through the use of GIS and 
other mapping practices such as citizen sciences and aerial mapping with 
drones. PGIS, and its related practices, evolved from the bringing together of a 
number of fields including geography, cartography and database management 
(Haklay and Tobón, 2003). These kinds of systems have been around since the 
1960s, and can even be traced back to the early days of computing in the 1950s 
when the military began to see the importance of connecting geography with 
the new power of computing (Haklay, 2010). Despite Esri,1 one of the most 
powerful mapping companies, emerging in the 1970s, and software that would 
allow personal computers to develop GIS products appearing in the 1980s, the 
term GIS itself was not coined until 1992 (Haklay, 2010). The 1990s then saw 
a great deal of development in relation to GIS with companies such as Garmin 
(est. 1989)  developing ever- more powerful GIS- and GPS- based systems. 
However, these remained out of reach of most people. The level of complexity 
and multidisciplinary knowledge required to operate them was too significant a 
barrier to entry. This also meant that the control over these maps, and the power 
they represent, has always rested with organisations connected to the military or 
1 Formerly known by its full title, the Environmental Systems Research Institute.
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state, for example Ordnance Survey in the United Kingdom (Ballatore, 2014; 
Evans, 2013). Yet, more recent changes in web- based geo systems and open- 
source GIS have reduced both the technical and financial entry points into 
digital map- making (Goodchild, 2009). These new resources initially included 
Google Earth and Google Maps, introduced in 2005 (Crampton, 2009), but 
now encompass a huge range of tools, including OpenStreetMap (OSM) (est. 
2004), and allow maps to be built from the bottom up, by people and not 
governments, mapping alternative visions of society (Evans, 2013).
The bringing together of GIS and the Web 2.0 has created a new space, 
termed the ‘Geoweb’ (Atzmanstorfer et al., 2014). This has allowed many more 
individuals, organisations and companies to make their own maps, but more 
importantly, like the Web 2.0 itself, this has also allowed for crowdsourcing of 
information and collective map- building through what is often referred to as 
volunteered geographic information (VGI) (Walker and Rinner, 2013). Many 
humanitarian projects rely heavily on the volunteered information provided 
by the public in order to build their maps, and in an ‘app economy’2 more 
and more people are contributing to VGI, knowingly or unknowingly (Tene 
and Polonetsky, 2012, p. 267). VGI data is most often used to make ‘mash- 
ups’3 of maps where data is drawn from multiple sources, including base maps 
made available by the historical custodians of geographic information and 
other state- owned data sets (Atzmanstorfer et al., 2014; Ballatore, 2014; Brown 
et al., 2013; Crampton, 2009).
These changes to the way in which humanitarian work has been carried 
out has resulted in a very different landscape of response. While much of the 
work is carried out by traditional players, to only examine these would be a 
mistake. It must be also acknowledged that there is a multitude of ‘minor’ 
figures at all stages of codification and legitimisation who all play a part in 
the transformation of information and data within the humanitarian context 
(Lorimer, 2003). Digital humanitarianism has seen not only more non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) and volunteer organisations enter the 
field, but also many more corporations and private, for- profit, businesses who 
are set on making humanitarianism their business model (Burns, 2019). This, 
coupled with what United Nations Global Pulse (UNGP) (2012) have termed 
a ‘data deluge’, has seen a significant change in who is employed in information 
management processes, as well as the collecting of ever- more data (Hunt and 
Specht, 2019).
2 ‘App economy’ refers to the range of economic activity surrounding mobile applications. 
Mobile apps created new fortunes for entrepreneurs and changed the way business is done.
3 Mash- ups is a colloquial term used to describe maps created by combining multiple, perhaps 
classically incompatible maps or data sets to create a new map. Much like mash- up tapes 
(Miller, 2006).
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Despite all these new actors in the humanitarian sector, the basic entry 
requirements for utilising GIS have not actually moved all that much 
(Elwood, 2006); fast internet, a computer or tablet are still required for 
producing the map tools themselves, even if a mobile phone is sufficient 
to provide the data. Indeed, the power and knowledge needed to process 
the vast amounts of data now available have become increasingly out of 
the reach of much of the world. This means that the control over the data 
produced is still in the hands of tech companies and larger humanitarian 
organisations (Haklay, 2013). Furthermore, what lies at the heart of a 
mapping project is the classification and codification of real- world objects 
into taxonomies and terminology, this again is done by those trained elites 
or corporations who make the software (Brown et  al., 2013). It is then 
important to explore and examine these contradictions, which suggest, on 
the one hand, that people are better represented and aided in moments of 
crisis as more data is produced about and by them. And, on the other hand, 
that the codification of this data remains the task of a small number of 
people and organisations often from outside the situation itself.
Latour, in his work on the non- human, notes that as technology increasingly 
mediates society, the interconnections of humans and non- humans become 
increasingly complex (Latour, 1988; Kirsch, 1995). The idea that this is 
a simple transformation is, however, clearly a myth (Jordan, 2015). The 
appropriateness of these technologies to carry out this mediation is a complex 
issue, as they are designed by people with various degrees of understanding of 
sociology and technologies (Haklay, 2010) and are positioned within Western 
scientific patriarchal capitalism (Kirsch, 1995). When it comes to the world as 
experienced by humans, objects and their values can also be tied to complex 
sets of concepts and conventional rules governing their use, so there is an 
important sense in which we can, and indeed must, learn about some of the 
affordances that these new humanitarian technologies and interventions offer 
(Hutchby, 2001).
Affordances are functional and relational aspects that frame, while not 
determining, the possibilities for agentic action in relation to an object. In 
this way, technologies can be understood as artefacts that may be both shaped 
by and that shape the practices humans use in interaction with, around and 
through them (Hutchby, 2001). If the innovation, integration and stabilisation 
of a technology in society are processes moulded by the actions of scientists, 
workers, capitalists, commuters and mayors, and thus a wide range of social 
contingencies, then where does society end and technology begin? Theoretical 
analyses have constructed a divide that places humans on one side and their 
technologies on the other, thus representing an artificially folded society 
(Latour, 1988). Conversely, Latour offers a process- oriented definition of high 
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technology as a complex and dialectical association of humans and ‘non- human 
actors’. In Hutchby’s (2001) words, high technology is ‘a shifting network of 
actions redistributing competencies and performances either to humans or 
non- humans to assemble in a more durable whole an association of humans 
and things and to resist the multiple interpretations of other actors that tend 
to dissolve away the set up’ (p. 445). Technology, in this light, is a means of 
eliciting specific ends, but one that is always open to interpretation, resistance 
and change (Kirsch, 1995). In choosing our technology we become what we 
are, which in turn shapes our future choices (Feenberg, 1991).
It is then important to examine in detail these contradictions (Parker, 2006). 
To detach newer processes of humanitarian mapping from their background in 
GIS would be unwise (Weiner et al., 2002). The whole practice is somewhat 
of a movable feast, with both geospatial and data infrastructure technologies 
changing rapidly and with more people being connected to the resources that 
allow them to engage, many of these new practices are now somewhat removed 
from the critical discourses of the 1990s (Elwood, 2006). Approaching 
mapping as a spatial practice helps us to better understand them as a form 
of reframing societies rather than just remapping them (Bryan, 2011). In the 
same vein, these tools must not be examined as a tool that can be picked up and 
then put down again; rather these mappings become an intrinsic part of the 
fabric of everyday life, even after a crisis has passed (Johnson et al., 2005). It is 
certain that the role of citizens has shifted from being purely the object of maps 
to being increasingly involved in the creation of maps, but this has not turned 
maps into neutral objects separated from power, nor has it moved power to the 
citizen (Pánek, 2016). Regardless of the size of our data sets, any representation 
will necessarily exclude (Verplanke et al., 2016). Furthermore, the process of 
mapping has long been seen as instrumental in the forming of the Other, and 
with that the subjugation of the Other (Specht and Feigenbaum, 2018). Quite 
clearly an ever- more salient issue within the context of humanitarianism. It 
is essential too then that while collecting more data, it should be understood 
that this does not solve the deep psychological issue of feeling watched and 
tracked, which may well reduce the desire of people to participate in their 
own development and politics. Without additional safeguards and regulation 
around the way that data is used, collected, shared and then used for resource 
allocation, all these technological innovations become self- defeating in the face 
of the human desire for privacy (Dumbill, 2013).
The problem then is that codified expertise is really about speaking for 
others, and is not based upon a lived experience (Gaventa and Cornwall, 2008). 
The contradictions are deep and complex. There is a notion that scientific 
knowledge has much to contribute to the humanitarian sector; at the same 
time, local knowledge needs to be conveyed in a way that is understandable, 
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but that also respects its tacit nature, and this is a gap that is hard to bridge 
(Coletta and Raftopoulos, 2016; Compton, 1989; Sillitoe, 1998). These issues 
of legitimisation are compounded by the small number of actors and gate 
keepers through which knowledge passes. The knowledge that so greatly affects 
people’s lives is held in the hands of a monopoly (Gaventa and Cornwall, 
2008), a situation that often forgets, or ignores, the importance of knowledge 
in relation to who created it (Rose, 1997). So, while there has been a significant 
rise in the level of participation within the humanitarian sector (Tufte and 
Mefalopulos, 2009), the power of knowledge ultimately remains with the 
planners, the technicians and Western scientists. It has been accepted that more 
consultation needs to take place with beneficiaries (Sillitoe, 2000), but this has 
become a constant seeking of universalism of knowledge through the Western 
discourse, which often fails to account for the non- linear nature of alternative 
knowledges leading to deep ethnocentrism (Rose, 1997; Sillitoe, 1998). These 
issues are hard- baked into the notion of legitimisation (Forester, 1982). At 
every stage of information- seeking, searching with algorithms, interpretation 
and use, data are passing through stages of mediation, contextualisation and 
codification (Newsom and Cassara, 2011). If these mediated stages are based 
upon the historic prejudices and colonial power structures of old, then access 
to data in and of itself does not create equality, but instead drives a further 
divide between peoples (Catlett and Ghani, 2015). In order to overcome this 
issue, there needs to be a great deal of understanding and willingness to work 
through these problems. While there are many who might wish to do so, in 
the face of the juggernaut of what Burns (2019) terms ‘philanthro- capitalism’ 
within digital humanitarianism, finding community members and activists 
who can spare enough time and who are suitably motivated and knowledgeable 
is difficult at best, and their motivations can hardly be separated from their 
personal needs (Harlow, 2012; Mercea and Funk, 2016). Tools that bring 
people together are needed, but this is not a solution itself, and empowerment 
remains a complex issue (Perkins, 2007). People have a desire to be better 
informed generally (Carver, 2003), but no population is homogenous in the 
way data often present and the goals and aims of a community are often diverse 
(Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Weiner et al., 2002), yet the new digital divide 
of algorithms and big data seeks homogenisation, which conversely leads to 
bigger divides between the haves and the have- nots and can also manifest as 
increased divides within a community.
The use of geographical information has changed dramatically since 
around 2010 and continues to do so; in particular users themselves are being 
encouraged to crowdsource data in moments of acute need. This though only 
serves to heighten questions over ease of data access. The digital divide then 
is not gone, and where it has been reduced, much like Hydra it has grown 
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more heads. Large humanitarian organisations risk a ‘Tower of Babel’ moment 
in the way they present the success of reducing the digital divide without 
acknowledging these emerging issues (McFarlane, 2006).
One can wear a dozen powerful sensors, own a smart mattress and even 
do a close daily reading of one’s poop, but [the world’s] injustices would 
still be nowhere to be seen, for they are not the kind of stuff that can be 
measured with a sensor. The devil doesn’t wear data. Social injustices are 
much harder to track than the everyday lives of the individuals whose lives 
they affect. (Morozov, 2014)
Data are meaningful because of how someone collects, interprets and forms 
arguments with it. Data are not neutral. This is why Lisa Gitelman calls raw 
data an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms that hides the reality of the work 
involved in creating it (cited in Neff, 2013).
This is a worrying prospect when it is considered that the humanitarian sector 
is increasingly engaged in a process of datafication in low- and middle- income 
countries, where the use of new communications and database technologies 
is generating digital data that are machine readable and computationally 
manipulable, particularly for big data analytics (Taylor and Broeders, 2015). 
Whether this data collection technology is driven by economic, military- 
strategic, scientific or apparently altruistic motives, it is subject to a variety of 
influences during its innovation, diffusion, regulation and codification (Bijker 
and Law, 1992; Latour, 1988). The forms and functions of a technology are 
transformed by its innovators, market strategists, government regulators and 
through social use (Kirsch, 1995). It is also worth noting again that many of the 
key components of the networked society – the digital computer, the Internet, 
GPS – all have military origins and have been developed within capitalist social 
relations of production and unequal gender relations, they therefore build upon 
and reinforce existing spatial and social divisions (Perrons, 2004; Potts, 2015). 
We live immersed in representation, be it digital or through the cartographic 
gaze, it is how we understand each other, and in turn how we understand 
ourselves (Webb, 2009). These new modes of information lead to a globalised 
notion of self and other and this newly established worldwide scale is leading 
in turn to new conflicts, crises, wars and even catastrophes (Lefebvre, 2009), to 
which the world’s poorest are most susceptible.
This book, then, aims to bring together critical perspectives on the role that 
mapping people, knowledges and data now plays in humanitarian work, both 
in cartographic terms and through data visualisations. Since the rise of Google 
Earth in 2005, there has been an explosion in the use of mapping tools to 
quantify and assess the needs of the poor, including those affected by climate 
change and the wider neoliberal agenda. Yet, while there has been a huge 
upsurge in the data produced around these issues, the representation of people 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAPPING CRISIS8
remains questionable. Some have argued that representation has diminished in 
humanitarian crises as people are increasingly reduced to data points. In turn, 
this data becomes ever- more difficult to analyse without vast computing power, 
leading to dependency on the old colonial powers to refine the data of the poor, 
before selling it back to them. These issues are not entirely new, and questions 
around representation, participation and humanitarianism can be traced back 
beyond the inauguration speech of Truman – which divided the world into the 
‘developed’ and ‘under developed’ – but the digital age throws these issues back 
to the fore, as machine learning, algorithms and big data centres take over the 
process of mapping the subjugated and subaltern in moments of crisis. This 
book questions whether, as we map crises, it is the map itself that is in crisis.
In Chapter  1, Tamara Bellone, Salvatore Engel- Di Mauro, Francesco 
Fiermonte, Emiliana Armano and Linda Quiquivix provide us with an 
introduction to critical cartography. Born from decolonial movements of 
the 20th century, critical cartography has helped scholars reflect on the 
relationship between power and knowledge within colonial contexts of spatial 
representation and surveillance. The chapter engages with concerns of non- 
Western cartography, technological innovation and representation of territory 
and notes that even as the field of critical cartography has grown, Western 
cartography continues to be a powerful instrument in colonialist policies, even 
within postcolonial contexts.
In Chapter 2, Gregory Asmolov builds upon these ideas and introduces us 
to the counter concepts of participatory mapping and volunteered geographic 
information (Goodchild, 2009), as well as a proliferation of crowdsourcing 
practices and new online mapping tools. The chapter offers a critical examination 
of digital mapping and its role in crisis mapping, as well as in solutions to 
social problems that draw on the notion of activity systems (Engeström, 1987). 
Asmolov also provides us with an analysis of a number of empirical cases of 
online mapping from the field of emergency response and social development 
to illustrate how we must distinguish between two major forms of activity 
that have been associated with online mapping:  ‘mapping as activity’ versus 
‘mapping- enabled activity’. The analytical framework also highlights how the 
location of digital maps in the context of activity systems is associated with a 
set of actors that has been included in/ excluded from the system.
Maria Rosaria Prisco also explores the diffusion of Web 2.0 and geospatial 
technologies in Chapter  3. Building on Harvey’s three- dimensional 
conceptualisation of space (absolute– relative– relational) with the spatial 
trialectic (experienced– conceptualised– lived space) proposed by Lefebvre 
(1974), the chapter explores the possibilities and the real strength of the 
bottom- up production of local data (VGI, collaborative mapping, citizen 
science, etc.) in counteracting the technoscientific epistemology provided by 
the growing and pervasive datafication in the representation of the reality. 
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The  case of representation of space is then examined through some of the 
most well- known systems of indicators like the sustainable development goals 
(SDGs) (especially in relation to urban poverty and environmental justice in 
the Italian context) in order to provide ideas and thoughts on the way forward.
Faine Greenwood takes these notions further in Chapter  4, examining 
data colonialism, surveillance capitalism and an increasingly prevalent new 
technology in the humanitarian sector, drones. Building on theories of the 
politics of verticality and surveillance, this chapter explores how inexpensive 
civilian drones can simultaneously enforce and subvert asymmetric power 
structures, by providing both historically underrepresented and historically 
powerless groups with access to high- quality aerial imagery. At the same 
time, vulnerable populations can be harmed by humanitarian drone users 
who participate in the system of data colonialism by extracting and sharing 
their spatial data without seeking their consent or collaboration. While many 
aid workers hold strong opinions about the potential harms or benefits that 
humanitarian drone use presents to affected populations, this chapter is 
one of the first to fully explore these contradictions. The chapter also puts 
forward a preliminary model of humanitarian unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) use that is conscious of the dangers of data colonialism and calls for 
more collaborate research work on the impact and benefits of drone data 
collection in aid work.
In Chapter  5, Giovanna Astolfo, Ricardo Marten Caceres, Garyfalia 
Palaiologou, Camillo Boano and Ed Manley explore the use of data analytics 
and statistics since the start of the 2015 Europe refugee crisis. The chapter sheds 
light on the methodological and ethical challenges posited by the collection, 
analysis and representation of data on migration and refugees. The chapter 
asks who is benefiting from such data- driven politics and to what extent it 
is harming individuals, organisations and society at large. The chapter builds 
upon the findings of a two- year data project called Refugee Spaces and argues 
that data analytics and statistics are often used as a ‘discursive practice’ to 
construct and uncritically reproduce narratives of crisis and threat and as a 
‘governmental technology’ to invest political agendas on migration by ideals of 
evidence, rationality, progress and nationhood grounded in disputable truths.
Monika Halkort builds on this work in Chapter 6, exploring how the rising 
death toll of irregular migrants in the Mediterranean has conjured up a dense 
matrix of geospatial intelligence aimed at reducing the number of destitute 
bodies crossing the sea. Measured by the mere amount of data generated 
through the combined force of real- time tracking devices, image satellites and 
big data mining, she argues that Europe’s alleged refugee ‘problem’ is one of 
the best documented and well- mapped ‘crises’ in recent history. Against this 
backdrop the chapter asks why information about the dead and missing is 
widely absent or scarce. Mapping the critical blind spots in the data repositories 
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of state and humanitarian actors against the technoscientific and juridico- 
political protocols underpinning big data regimes, this chapter interrogates the 
key factors contributing to the substantive gaps that assign dead and missing 
migrants the liminal status of ‘known unknowns’.
While there are many factors that drive migration, changing climate 
is expected to become an increasingly salient factor. In Chapter  7, Bogna 
M. Konior explores mapping crisis in the Anthropocene, a socio- geological era 
in which the uneven allocation of environmental risk follows global industrial 
development and denotes its own civilisational origin: capitalism and the global 
slave trade, the Great Acceleration, the fossil fuel economy and nuclear war. 
The chapter asks if climate capital and its uneven distribution can be mapped. 
The incomprehensibility of climate narratives forces a shift from analogue to 
digital and then computational media, where the processing of large data sets 
corresponds to the collective structures of feeling as defined cultural forms, 
a move central to all climate capital mapping:  the blurring of realism and 
fiction and the paradoxical relation between the local and the commons. As a 
survey of these emerging digital climate fictions, this chapter examines post- 
global climate mapping in virtual reality projects such as the Stanford Ocean 
Acidification Experience and Melting Ice as well as digital cartography projects 
such as Italian Limes and the Welcome to the Anthropocene map by the 
Stockholm Resilience Center.
In Chapter 8, Aleš Završnik and Pika Šarf provide us with the first of two 
chapters on fighting back. This chapter explores the potential of ‘sous- veillance’ 
for individual autonomy and dignity, fairness and due process, community 
cooperation, empowerment and social equality. Examining numerous examples, 
such as the Satellite Sentinel Project, which tracks troop movements and 
warns civilians of attacks in Sudan; Virtual Community Watch, a service that 
crowdsources surveillance of the Texas– Mexican border; and citizen ‘cop- 
watching’ programmes, which film and counter- film police with wearable 
cameras at protests, the authors argue that we are witnessing a new wave 
of computerised technologically enhanced counter- surveillance or ‘sous- 
veillance’. The chapter focuses on three aspects:  ‘datafication’ (the use and 
reuse of data), ‘resistance’ (from passive avoidance to active subversion) and 
the ‘empowerment’ of the user, applying these categories to three specific 
‘sous- veillance’ visualisation tools:  (1) Erar, an online business transaction 
application created by the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption of 
the Republic of Slovenia, which provides citizens with data on the business 
transactions of public sector bodies and government spending (awarded the 
‘2013 United Nations Public Service Award’); (2)  the Slovenian platform 
named ‘Kdo vpliva?’ (literally ‘Who Influences?’), which shines a light on the 
connections between lobbyists, companies, politicians and state institutions 
through visualisations of three different kinds of networks: lobbying contacts, 
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the network of transactions between the companies represented by the 
lobbyists and the public sector; and (3) traffic- ticket monitoring with Redaar, a 
smartphone application that helps users identify where and when traffic tickets 
were issued.
In the final chapter, Rupert Allan draws upon his experiences working as 
country manager for the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT) in 
Uganda, overseeing interventions such as CrowdSourcing Non- Camp Refugee 
Data (USSD (unstructured supplementary service data) BPRM (Bureau of 
Population, Refugees, and Migration)), the Uganda Open- Mapping Project 
(World Bank/ OpenDRI), Data for Resilience in Refugee Settings (GPSDD 
(Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data)) and Drone Data for 
Refugee Context National Risk Atlas Methodology (Embassy of Japan). Rupert 
also represented HOT/ Missing Maps on the Uganda Ministry of Health 
Emergency Operations Committee (EOC) in developing the Ebola Data 
Resilience Strategy for preparedness and outbreak following cross- border events 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This chapter brings together many of 
the issues discussed throughout this book and works to explore ways through 
each, both via the experiences of working in Uganda as well as examining their 
theoretical underpinnings, leading to the conclusion that we are all part of a 
united statelessness.
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1. Mapping as tacit representations 
of the colonial gaze
Tamara Bellone, Salvatore Engel- Di Mauro, Francesco Fiermonte,  
Emiliana Armano and Linda Quiquivix
It took Frantz Fanon just a few pages into his book The Wretched of the Earth ([1961] 2005) to expose the colonial order as one built and fuelled by violent compartmentalisation and exclusion, calling into question 
Europe’s pretensions as the universal standard of culture and civilisation. 
Fanon’s intervention hoped to awaken the consciousness of the colonised, 
causing them to rise up and reclaim both their lands and human dignity – 
a project that could radically transform the notion of humanity into one 
no longer premised on domination and the negation of the Other. Fanon’s 
decision to craft the moral core of decolonisation theory as a commitment 
to valorise ‘the wretched’ stands as his enduring legacy. Similarly, Paulo 
Freire in Pedagogy of the Oppressed ([1970] 2005) analysed the oppressor– 
oppressed binary to propose a path that, through ‘conscientisation’ or 
consciousness raising, could lead the oppressed to emancipation. Both 
Fanon the psychiatrist and Freire the educator captured the core of the 
modern world’s alienation process; they argued that the mechanism of 
domination remains feasible as long as the oppressed continue identifying 
themselves with their oppressor, therefore making emancipation also a 
possibility when the oppressed come to identify otherwise (Goussot, 2012).
That the world in which we live has been produced and can thus be produced 
differently was a prominent focus of 20th- century continental philosophers 
and theoreticians who lived through colonialism’s ‘boomerang effect’ on 
Europe as exercised by fascist Germany (Césaire, [1955] 2001). These thinkers 
included the Frankfurt School as well as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, 
whose writings geographers have come to adopt in recent decades to expose 
the work that conceptions of space do to produce and reproduce the modern 
world. Within statecraft, for example, Foucault’s writings have helped show 
how maps do work similar to that done by institutions such as mental hospitals 
and prisons: the map contributes to controlling territory as the state controls 
its inhabitants through those institutions, tools that transform inhabitants into 
subjects for the state’s reproduction (Foucault, 1977). As another example, 
Derrida’s suggestion that the literal is ‘intensely metaphorical’ has similarly 
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been adapted to suggest the science of the map itself also serves as metaphor 
(cited in Harley, 1989).
Drawing from such insights, geographers today argue that rather than simply 
revealing knowledge about the world, maps help create the world, leading scholars 
within the discipline to abandon any notion of space as a container or stage 
within which the world proceeds, and instead to now favour notions of space 
as undergoing continual construction (Massey, 2005; Thrift, 2003). Scholars 
engaging with critical cartography in particular have become cautious of the work 
that modern maps do in situating the viewer above and outside space, for such 
a view has been key in fostering a false sense of separateness between the viewer 
and what is viewed, promoting the notion of space as an object and engendering 
a geographical imagination where nature and its local inhabitants have become 
merely resources for settlement, domination and exploitation (Gregory, 1994).
To thus rewrite the relationship between periphery and centre from an anti- 
colonial perspective entails the deconstruction of the colonialist and imperialist 
ideology that has long dominated the system of Western knowledge and that 
remains today, in the age of globalisation, assuming more pervasive and occult 
forms (Ardito, 2007). Therefore, attempts at emancipation must aim to debunk any 
idea that the given situation is natural and what must be shown instead is that what 
is presented to us as necessary is, in fact, absolutely not inevitable (Fisher, 2009).
This chapter assesses the effectiveness of critical cartography in raising a broader 
anti- colonial consciousness since the field began, not only critiquing maps, but 
calling for movements to ‘counter- map’. We begin by providing a brief overview of 
the cultural context that gave rise to Western cartography in order to denaturalise it, 
and we then expand on how critical theory helped develop theoretical frameworks 
for scholarship on critical cartography following the decolonial movements 
of the 20th century. We then illustrate how, in spite of the growth of critical 
cartography and the call to counter- map in the face of settlement, domination and 
exploitation, neocolonialism continues to advance the use of maps for its purposes 
in new, inventive forms. We conclude by suggesting that the dramatic rise in the 
gathering, storing, processing and delivering of geographic information today 
continues to influence neocolonial cartographic practices and suggest throughout 
that attention to competing worldviews is central if a critical cartography is to be 
effective in dismantling colonial impositions of time and space.
The rise of Western cartography in cultural context
European colonialism has famously imposed a notion of a universal human 
civilisation that negates or absorbs difference, aiming towards a universal 
sameness among those it considers civilised. Nikolai Trubeckoj (1982) traces 
this spirit to Roman- Germanic culture, a cultural context where a notion of 
cartography was born proclaiming itself as a universal conception of space. 
A  characteristic trait of Roman civilisation, for example, was the pursuit of 
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well- being in daily life, which it considered to be a central aspect of humanity. 
This was a pursuit maintained through the military administration of territory, 
as illustrated by its Tabula Peutingeriana, a third- century ancient Roman map 
that carefully listed and described the empire’s military access roads.
The 13th- century Germanic Ebstorf world map (Figure  1.1) integrated 
biblical and classical elements and illustrated the world as a circular construction. 
Lands outside Europe and beyond North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean 
were understood as terra incognita, and like other medieval maps at the time, 
it followed the T- O construction with Jerusalem at its centre. The O depicted 
the outer ring of the ocean and the T the dividing lines of three continents as 
related to the biblical story of Noah’s three sons: Shem who mapped on to Asia, 
the birthplace of Christianity; Japheth who mapped on to Europe, the realm of 
Christianity’s expansion and domination; and Ham, the so- called ‘cursed’ son, 
who mapped on to Africa, Europe’s most devalorised location.
Figure 1.1. Ebstorf map (c.13th century).
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These medieval worldviews were clearly related to the views of Augustine’s 
City of God, which suggested that the will of God placed Christians at the centre 
of the known world and relegated non- Christian peoples to the outer spaces, 
even along the boundary of non- human beings, or ‘monsters’, whose brilliant 
and decorative effects were often relegated to the margins of maps (Figure 1.2).
Meanwhile, for the civilisations of Abya Yala (the Americas), which 
Christendom had yet no place for, understandings of the world developed 
Figure 1.2. Detail of the upper- right edge of the Ebstorf map.
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quite differently. In Abya Yala, space and time were often intimately linked, 
rendering the map and almanac calendar one and the same (Milbrath, 1999). 
Time was cyclical; its study was mainly intended to predict future events, and 
scaled on enormous durations based on repetitive cycles. For example, Maya 
calendars and almanacs like the Dresden Codex (Figure 1.3) were shaped by 
astronomical observations and refined mathematical calculations. Maya maps 
might thus be seen as a cross between history, cosmology and descriptions of 
territory: when they marked their borders, they added information on how 
they had conquered those areas.
Medieval Western maps were often illustrations designed to clarify concepts 
of space and time based on the pre- Ptolemaic model. Their value lay not so 
much in their practical use but in how they depicted concepts that corresponded 
to sacred texts. These were illustrations of history, philosophy or encyclopedic 
references, not points that referenced the earth’s surface. Columbus himself 
followed a medieval spirituality in many ways; he had intended to meet the 
Great Khan of China, about whom Marco Polo spoke at the time, in order to 
convert the Khan to Christianity. He also understood that the great purpose of 
all his voyages was to eventually undertake a new crusade to liberate the ‘Holy 
Land’ (Watts, 1985).
At the same time, Columbus was influenced by Toscanelli’s calculations of 
the distance between Europe and Asia from the west, suggesting it might be 
relatively shorter if travelled at higher latitudes. Toscanelli had spoken with the 
king of Portugal and written to Columbus, and he was a friend of Nicholas of 
Cusa, the mathematician and astronomer who referred to experience, nature 
and the human condition rather than to tradition and the authority of the 
sacred texts. Thus, for Columbus, the earth was a terrestrial globe – that is to 
say, the totality of ocean and land, rather than a medieval flat disc.
Columbus believed in the significance and aptness of his names: Cristobal 
(bearer of Christ, from the Greek) and Colon (coloniser). He himself changed 
the names of the places ‘discovered’: Guanahani became San Salvador (God), 
and then in order of importance: Santa Maria de la Concepción, Ferdinandina, 
Isabela and Juana (the Virgin Mary, the sovereigns of Spain and the Infanta, 
respectively). He later renamed a vast number of places, as Tzvetan Todorov 
(1999) notes, which fell in line with Europe’s problem with the Other.
In the mid 16th century, following Columbus’s ‘discovery’ of Abya Yala, 
geographers and cosmographers in Europe would come to shape cultural 
worldviews that used science to legitimise conquest. Those in the Netherlands 
would become an important group in this history. Their practices came to 
focus on depicting the earth’s surface by adopting the Cartesian reference 
system, Euclidean geometry and Galilean physics. Among the group was 
Gerardus Mercator, a mathematician and cosmographer who had studied 
at the Catholic University of Leuven where the Christian humanist and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. The Dresden Codex, the oldest surviving Mayan manuscript (c.13th or 14th century).
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Renaissance scholar Erasmus had been a student. Mercator became known 
for his treatise on triangulation and would later become known as the father 
of a cartography that came to treat the globe as a scientific instrument and 
the world as a physical surface to be scientifically measured (Figure 1.4). Also 
among the group was Willem Blaeu, a pupil of the astronomer Tycho Brahe, 
who drew high- quality maps of various states, created important atlases and, 
notably, became cartographer to the Dutch East India Company.
In the following century, Newton would come to assume that space was 
absolute in nature – a type of container of objects and facts – whose dimensions 
Figure 1.4. The Geographer by Johannes Vermeer (c.1668– 9).
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he also based on Euclidean geometry. He founded his mechanics on the idea 
that space was distinct from bodies and that time would pass uniformly. 
Newton’s universe was an infinite space in which bodies move in a straight line 
unless deviated by another body exerting a force. Meanwhile, his contemporary 
Leibniz would anticipate Einstein, arguing against the Newtonian absolute 
conceptions of time and space in favour of relational ones.
Kant came to legitimise Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics along 
the way, arguing that space and time were inner conditions of the human, 
allowing for perceptions that would subsequently be ordered by logical 
categories, thus rejecting religious assumptions that had previously been sacred. 
Kant, a professor of physical geography, argued that space and time were not 
objective realities but subjective constraints allowing for the sensory- cognitive 
capacity of the human mind to represent objects (e.g. a priori forms of sensory 
intuition). Appearances were phenomena; things in themselves were noumena; 
space and time were a priori forms of intuition, both transcendental and 
universal. Kant’s conception of the universal was quite specific:  the capacity 
to exercise the human mind in this way belonged to those beings his society 
determined to be endowed with reason, thus excluding those deemed incapable 
of assimilating into this imposed- upon ideal.
In the same century, the Cassini family would map France using geodetic 
triangulation for the first time, then a technical innovation. Mapping by 
using a measurement apparatus with precision fell in line with the spirit of 
the Enlightenment, the esprit de géometrie, without adding ornaments or frills, 
setting a standard for cartography thereafter (Figure 1.5).
Mercator’s projection of the world, which, in privileging distance over 
area, emphasised the size of the global North and de- emphasised the size of 
the global South, was to become hegemonic. Lambert’s cylindrical equal- area 
projection (1772) became the first to privilege area over distance and was 
followed by others, including James Gall’s projection (1855), which critiqued 
Mercator’s map for privileging the needs of navigators while sacrificing form, 
polar distance and proportionate area. Arno Peters would later build on Gall 
with the Gall– Peters projection (1973), presenting a highly unconventional 
representation of the earth’s surface and aiming to eliminate the ‘normal’ 
Eurocentric image of the world found in common atlases.
These alternative views of the world were controversial and even referred to 
as ‘ugly’, for Mercator’s representation had become so familiar to Westerners 
that his map was often taken simply to represent what was true and natural, 
even though what was ‘natural’ turned out to be merely ‘conventional’, the 
result of tradition and ethnocentrism.
Just as the conditions of possibility for a (Eurocentric) Mercator projection are 
important to consider, so too are those related to  the Gall– Peters projection. The 
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Gall– Peters projection was born in the era of decolonisation, a time of hope for 
a more equitable and, above all, more peaceful world. The Bandung Conference 
of 1955 had marked the beginning of the efforts of non-North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation ( NATO) and non- Soviet countries during the Cold War to seek 
their own paths of development. Shortly thereafter in 1961, the Non- Aligned 
Movement (NAM) was born in Belgrade, one of whose fundamental principles 
was pacifism in relations between states, with India’s Nehru, Egypt’s Nasser 
and Yugoslavia’s Tito as its major advocates. Later in 1989, Arno Peters would 
Figure 1.5. Cassini map of Paris (1750– 1818).
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publish the only atlas at the time to represent all areas on about the same scale, 
a historical context that also saw the release of the Brandt Report’s map of the 
unequal relationship between the global North and global South (Figure 1.6).
New map families such as anamorphic maps would also come to 
relative prominence (Gastner and Newman, 2004; Tobler, 2004), in which 
cartographical techniques were able to conserve the relative proximity of areas 
even as the parameter under study involved an increase or decrease in spatial 
area. For example, cartograms allowed viewers to quickly grasp great differences 
for a wide range of practices in different societies and countries, irrespective of 
area and distance. In one specific case, for example, which maps daily income 
over 200 USD, the Netherlands appears much larger than its relative spatial 
area than India or Mexico (Figure 1.7).
Geography’s shift?
Decolonial movements and the counter- maps they inspired were key in the rise 
of critical cartography within geography by the 1990s,1 which continues to the 
present day. As a subfield, critical cartography has helped theoretically situate 
maps as discourses of ‘power/ knowledge’ (Foucault, 1980), thus displacing 
them as neutral scientific documents. Key works within the literature suggest 
that the traditional manner in which we understand the map and the way it 
fashions knowing and seeing have often been negative and disenabling (Harley, 
1989; Wood, 1992).
The scholarship often draws upon Donna Haraway’s (1988) notion of 
situated knowledges to throw into question the possibility of an all- knowing 
subject. Haraway’s work exposes the problematic notion of an ostensibly 
disembodied scientist in his or her (but often his) claims to objectivity and 
universal knowledge, a phenomenon that her work referred to as a god- trick, 
or ‘view from nowhere’ that ignores our human limitations, convinces us 
objectivity is possible and obscures from us questions concerning who has 
the authority to look and from where. Rather than suggesting that claiming 
knowledge of anything is no longer possible, Haraway asks that we acknowledge 
1 While critical cartography arose to prominence in the 1990s as a subfield, it must be 
understood in the historical context of the development of the cartographic discipline more 
generally along with its link to anticolonial movements, with anarchist geographers Élisée 
Reclus and Pëtr Kropotkin as precursors of this alternative geography.
In his youth, Reclus had worked in Nueva Grenada (present-day Colombia) and was likely 
influenced by memories of the ‘reductions’ the Spanish created in the Andes (reducciones de 
indios) that forcibly relocated indigenous peoples into settlements in order to Christianise, 
tax and govern them more effectively. Kropotkin’s role in compiling Reclus’s monumental 
La Nouvelle Géographie universelle, la terre et les hommes (1875– 94) marked the official birth 
of contemporary geography for many, which was deeply interconnected with new political 
philosophy and dedicated to universal solidarity.
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Figure 1.6. The Brandt Line, dividing the world into the ‘developed’ global North and the ‘developing’ global South.
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that all knowledge claims are embodied and that we recognise that each of our 
positions as observers reflects our positions in society. With these, the best 
we can hope for is a situated knowledge where one can claim only partial 
knowledge of what there is to know. Thus, for the question of map- making, 
the cartographer’s partial knowledge is relevant and interesting, but only as part 
of a bigger picture.
Insights such as these also allow for an understanding that the oppressor and 
oppressed will inevitably have distinct views of the world, leading us to better 
understand how scientific Truth (capitalised here to mark its imposition as 
universal) is intricately linked to power and the social, economic and cultural 
locus of the observer. In exposing this interplay, Edward Said (1978) showed 
how Europe produced and continues to produce ‘the Orient’ – its colonial gaze 
always seeking to ‘know’ the world in order to have power over it. It is a reason 
that sees, dominates and instrumentalises humans and space, developing the 
social sciences not simply to know or even to create the world, but to dominate 
it. This gaze perpetuates colonial institutions and practices even after formal 
colonialism has been dismantled, continuing to frame how the West knows, 
represents and ultimately produces the colonised themselves.
Much like Haraway would later argue, for Said no production of knowledge 
in the human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim scientists’ involvement as 
human subjects in their own circumstances. And it is for this reason why, for 
Fanon ([1961] 2005), it would be the wretched of the earth who could play the 
revolutionary role – their position in society as wretched would have the least 
to lose and most to gain in the creation of the world anew.
From such impactful interventions, within the discipline of geography there 
thus exists a ‘cartographic anxiety’ (Gregory, 1994) about the map’s complicity 
in imperial/ colonial power and the chronic persistence of this relation in 
present assumptions about cartography. This is the case even when choosing 
map projections, as the Mercator/ Gall– Peters controversy attests. These 
histories of the map’s use and of its production itself highlight the complexity 
of cartography as a language of communication with functions that far exceed 
their role as mere bearers of spatial information that are commonly attributed 
to them. Maps are thus never replicas of reality; they interpret and can even 
create a reality laced with the assumptions and logic that guide the construction 
process itself. Indeed, the terrestrial ellipsoid cannot be developed on the 
plane, because the two surfaces have different total curvatures:  the choice of 
the type of deformations (angular, areal, linear) always suggests, but not always 
consciously, a point of view. Ultimately, this choice reflects the prevailing 
cultural climate: the Mercator map of the world was itself produced following 
the invention of perspective by Renaissance painters.
Critiques of modern maps as weapons of the coloniser eventually led 
some scholars to suggest that ‘more indigenous territory has been claimed 
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by maps than by guns … [thus] more indigenous territory can be reclaimed 
and defended by maps than by guns’ (Nietschmann, 1994), which led some 
indigenous movements to ‘counter- map’. It was in the early 1990s when 
Edward Said and Nancy Peluso, writing about different contexts, introduced 
the term to describe grassroots map- making by indigenous peoples in Palestine 
(Said, 1993) and Indonesia (Peluso, 1995). It became immediately evident that 
counter- maps could be effective in disrupting truth claims and are interesting 
in themselves for their ability to engender notions that non- state actors could 
make competing and equally powerful maps (Wood, 1992). Nevertheless, 
counter- mappers did not always recognise that, without a strategy guiding the 
map’s use, even indigenous counter- mapping could come to impose a new 
hegemonic reality that followed colonial logics, reproducing the colonial world 
itself (Wainwright, 2008).
The question for the counter- mapper that has often been overlooked, is 
if non- Western conceptions of space and time are being replaced when 
seeking cartographic recognition from the Western gaze. The points, lines and 
polygons that exist on maps are practically all human artefacts, falling into 
two categories:  engineering works (roads, bridges, dykes, runways, railway 
lines, surveying landmarks) and administrative and property boundaries. As 
Couclelis (1992, p. 67) writes:  ‘Throughout the history of Western culture, 
these two categories of Euclidean features have been essential to the regulation, 
domination and control of the geographic world: the natural world, in the case 
of engineering works; the social world, in the case of boundaries’.
So while the map is not the territory, the map runs the risk of asserting that 
it is the only possible representation of the territory (Dematteis, 1985). We 
must recognise that maps – whether colonial or anti- colonial – are related to 
the cultures to which they belong and to whom they make sense, and in the 
first instance, to those cultures’ metaphysical conceptions of space and time. 
There is no escape from the cartographic paradox:  to provide a functional 
image, maps must lie (Monmonier, 1996) by favouring some elements over 
others, necessarily making invisible other possible stories, other possible ways 
of being, even extinguishing them. As Yves Lacoste states in the title of his 
(1976) book, La géographie, ça sert, d’abord, à faire la guerre, geography exists, 
first of all, to make war.
Maps and the persistence of colonised worlds: 
some examples
Cartography as a whole retains, for the most part, an overwhelmingly 
Eurocentric understanding of the world (Blaut, 1999; Castree, 2003; 
Sheppard et  al., 2013). In mapping regions and continents, the main point 
of view represented continues to be that of colonial powers; they continue 
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to hold control over countries they once formally ruled over directly, with 
present- day political boundaries testifying to this continued order. In settler- 
colonial contexts, conventional mapping conforms to propensities for excising 
racially minoritised and colonised peoples within these boundaries. In both 
cases, whether colonial or settler- colonial, the shared logic that predominates 
is the desire to control, objectify, manipulate and exploit colonised people’s 
environments. Also present is a generalised culture– nature or human– non- 
human dichotomisation that paves the way for separating people from their 
environments and relating to land in terms of its exploitable potential.
The mapping of Africa is a salient example. Africa is typically split into two 
parts, one north and one south of the Sahara. This is a colonial perspective that 
refuses to see continuities, papering over cultural unities among African peoples. 
It is as if centuries of knowledge sharing and trade across the Sahara never 
existed, simply because European colonial authorities either did not acknowledge 
them as historically important, or when they did acknowledge them, it was to 
prevent them from posing a threat to colonial rule. The current French military 
interventions in Mali, Libya and Chad serve as examples:  the Tuareg must be 
forcibly assimilated into a Sahel- centred state (Mali), whose borders were carved 
out by French colonialism and traversing sections of the Sahara; crossings and 
flows from Libya to Chad must be suppressed to ensure the French- supported 
Déby dictatorship remains intact, along with resource control for French capital.
Maps that insist on drawing boundaries across deserts and savannahs 
reinforce the persistence of a colonial world order that remains imposed 
on many African peoples. It reduces space to what colonial powers deem to 
be acceptable, representing ecosystems as if they could be neatly divided by 
administrative fiat. A different map could show instead existing continuities 
(both social and ecological) and political contestation by displaying national 
state boundaries as interrupted lines and showing areas where alternative 
and/ or rival political arrangements exist, such as the Tuareg struggle to 
establish Azawad or the Saharawi struggle for independence from the US- 
and French- supported Moroccan monarchy. To map out these existing 
alternatives and contestations would be a cartographical act that does not 
take colonial and derived national state impositions for granted and that 
speaks to the tenuous nature of boundaries, which are contingent on the 
relative successes of military interventions by colonial powers and the related 
dictatorial capacities of local regimes.
The construct of a sub- Saharan Africa is overwhelmingly common in 
cartography and has repercussions for understanding ecosystems and how 
African life- ways have co- evolved with them. To show the falsity of this 
construct and also the artificiality of separating African peoples, it is possible to 
create maps eliding the divide by showing contiguities of cultural traits (such as 
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the distribution of languages and religions) and of physical environments (the 
regional boundary, after all, rarely coincides with ecosystem differences). As a 
contrast to received mapping imaginaries, such an alternative map can provoke 
an exploration of the ideological underpinnings, involving colonial strategies 
of control by way of division, as Edward Said (1978) pointed out some time 
ago, and long- standing Eurocentric imperialistic obsessions with the spread or 
presence of Islam and/ or Arabs.
The settler- colonial nature of North America can be exposed in similar ways. 
The relationship of ideological constructs with cartographical representation is 
evident in United States Geological Survey (USGS) topographical maps. In 
this case, omissions, obscuration and ethnocentric categories help reproduce 
colonial and racist worldviews. Because they are regarded as neutral and 
objective (authoritative) spatial representations of reality and because they 
continue to be used widely, even in urban and regional planning, USGS maps 
constitute an important process in the reinforcement of colonial processes.
There is much more than mere change over distance being represented in 
such cartographical products of the US state. There are factories, mines, boat 
landings, residential areas, channelised streams, dams, reservoirs and cemeteries 
(usually those of white people), among other features. Ecological processes are 
usually confined to marshes, surface waters, peaks, depressions and vegetation 
reaching heights above two metres, among other representations that focus 
on the layout of the terrain, rather than the distribution of organisms or 
interactions among them. The mapped features are divided between cultural 
and ‘natural’ features, with the latter portrayed in much fewer and more 
general categories and as subservient to the former. For example, marshland 
or forest is more generic than the differentiation shown among a society’s land 
uses (representing a population within a single species, to put it ecologically). 
There are no beaver dams or distinctions between types of grasslands or forests. 
The emphasis is squarely on the ‘cultural’, even though the cartographers 
claim the map to display mainly topography. More than this, the cultural is 
really reflective of just one kind of society, the settler- colonial capitalist society. 
Nature is separated from society and reduced to what is useful to a particular 
social formation.
Every now and then, there are attempts, for example, to signal the importance 
of the historical presence of African diaspora communities, but typically this is 
by way of cemeteries or slave plantations, as if African people never taught whites 
anything, never imparted cropping system knowledge, never contributed to the 
actual shaping of a landscape through such activities as farming, agricultural 
innovations and much else (Carney, 2001). Native Americans also exist, but 
only by way of reservations. The USGS maps erase from view their historical 
reshaping of the landscape, such as large monumental architecture (incorrectly 
called ‘earth mounds’) and the persisting grassland- forest ecotones, the extent 
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of their original territories, their current struggles to regain land stolen from 
them, and the location of their ancient settlements. Such ideological terms 
and silences buttress a view of the world that justifies the annihilation of 
other peoples and, with it, other ways and possibilities of relating to land, 
environment and place. Such a process of settler- colonial indoctrination can 
be exposed by alternative representations showing the extent of conquered 
territories (including those illegally grabbed according to US federal laws), 
much beyond current reservation regimes and the presence of cultural markers 
in the landscape left by all peoples, not just Europeans.
In fact, what is seldom recognised is that USGS maps are landscape 
representations in part for military purposes and in part for partitioning 
conquered land for commerce and state use. Terrain maps have historically served 
military ends, and USGS maps do not depart from this tradition. Aside from 
longitude– latitude, Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) coordinates, which 
are used primarily by the military, feature among the three coordinate systems. 
They are sometimes given prominence by the display of grid lines devoted to that 
coordinate system only. Critical industrial infrastructure is highlighted, such as 
power plants and lines, pipelines, port facilities and major factories, implying 
defensive as well as offensive military priorities. Green areas are used to symbolise 
vegetation but only if it is higher than two metres. As the USGS maps explain, 
the purpose is to identify troop movement or troop- concealing forest canopies. 
Actual US military installations are largely made absent or devoid of the same 
level of detail as other landscape features. Such omission is unsurprising, but 
what is taken for granted is a world of highly armed and belligerent institutions 
that have little care for the security of the vast majority of people.
More than this, USGS maps project a settler- colonial mindset through the 
use of the State Plane Coordinate System (SPCS) in addition to the focus 
(described above) on industrial infrastructure, the underpinnings of commerce. 
The SPCS was introduced in the 1930s to improve records of original land 
surveys by standardising measurements to a single datum (North American 
Datum of 1927), using Cartesian coordinates to divide each state into zones 
and using English imperial units (Stem, 1990). This facilitates and raises the 
accuracy of local and regional land surveying, while obscuring ecological 
and social differences and historical markers. Every surface is rendered into 
an empty, abstract polygon. Such divisions of land are crucial to delineating 
property boundaries. After all, if land is to be fungible – that is, exchangeable 
in the market – it must be eviscerated of meaning and ecological dynamism. 
In other words, in the case of the United States, conquered land (the loot) is 
thereby divided up according to capitalist logic of distribution to those with 
capital. It should be clear that such a topographical map is virtually useless 
to ecologists, botanists, organic farmers (who may, for instance, want to 
know much more about local ecosystems), pastoralists, gatherers or hunters, 
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to name a few other possible alternative imaginaries and actual uses. More 
importantly, such mapping directly pre- empts any notion of Native American 
self- determination and sovereignty. It is thus that USGS maps are specifically 
settler- colonial representations of the earth’s surface.
Conclusion
The rules of Western cartography serve not simply to represent space but to 
impose one way of relating to, seeing and imagining the world – a worldview 
it claims to be superior. This is the case even though the creation of Western 
cartography itself was dependent on non- Western knowledges. As is well 
known, while the first colonisers renamed the lands they wished to conquer 
before even setting foot on them, in order to map those lands they needed 
the support of the indigenous peoples living there (Turnbull, 1998). Today, 
geomatic instruments such as drones equipped with topographic tools map 
from above in order to assist in further wars of dispossession and here again 
their use is never neutral. The technologies may evolve but the assumptions 
that inform Western cartography remain, contaminating if not colonising the 
very ways of being and doing that were previously non- Western.
As the move from paper to digital formats opens new perspectives, the 
dilemmas related to representation and map use have persisted, without solving 
or only partly solving previous conflicts. As smart devices become more map 
driven, users are folded into banal aspects of ‘Where am I?’ and ‘Where would 
I like to go?’ While it is possible to associate a global positioning system (GPS) 
image with a photo, to search for addresses and to follow directions from one 
place to the other, what users often find themselves doing is instead ‘surfing’ 
a reality that becomes more and more virtual. In this way, contemporary 
mapping emphasises the individual over national or collectivist projects. And 
in the meantime, the power the individual holds is itself deluded as social media 
companies capitalise on their map- driven aspects by extracting location data 
and by tracking users. Here we see a very different use for maps: a technology 
that previously sought to conquer territory now seeks to conquer everyday life.
A fundamental notion of critical cartography – that maps are expressions 
of power and desire – led scholars to take seriously the idea that maps can be 
used to show utopian worlds, create alternative social planes and aid groups in 
battles against domination. Nevertheless, late capitalism continues to succeed 
in subsuming and neutralising alternative points of view and protest  – its 
response to ecological catastrophe via a ‘green capitalism’ is a prescient example 
(Leonardi, 2017). For counter- cartography, map- driven smart devices that 
allow one to act alone risk isolating users, further removing them from the 
community and rendering them dependent on a pervasive technology that 
seeks to take control of everyday life.
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As the global liberal order continues replicating the colonial logic of 
asserting itself as the best of all possible worlds, it is important to keep in 
mind that critical cartography is concerned with the social relevance, politics 
and ethics of mapping (Firth, 2015). The order being imposed today follows 
a market- liberal utopia that claims the world will be perfect once market logic 
and human rights are applied, yet that results in ecological catastrophe, new 
forms of apartheid as are apparent in Palestine and in slums worldwide, and 
incentives to privatise intellectual creativity along with water, minerals, wood 
and human DNA. Thus, if we are to do a critical cartography under an ethics 
and politics of anti- colonial liberation, then we must keep in mind that the 
work of critique is to analyse what appears obvious, natural and inevitable in 
order to create the world anew. Critiquing cartography towards this end means 
not simply examining how maps helped colonise the world, but how maps 
continue to create the world in step with the colonial logics and worldviews 
that began being imposed globally over five hundred years ago.
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2. The failures of participatory mapping: 
a mediational perspective
Gregory Asmolov
Since around 2010, we have seen the field of digital mapping flourish. The mapping boom is taking place in three major dimensions: the creation of maps that address a variety of fields and issues, the development 
of new mapping platforms that simplify participation in mapping and the 
emergence of mapping and geographic information system (GIS) volunteer 
communities. The rapid distribution of mapping solutions across a variety of 
fields, as well as the significant increase in the simplicity and accessibility of 
map creation, have turned maps into an omnipresent medium and form of 
communication. A  variety of research projects have investigated the various 
contributions of mapping (see Baruh, 2015; Bott and Young, 2012; Haklay, 
2013a; Hunt and Specht, 2019; Liu and Palen, 2010; Young, 2014). Most, 
however, have considered the functions of these tools in a particular context. 
Some scholars have also highlighted how participatory mapping challenges 
institutional actors by offering the crowd new tools for increasing transparency 
around various social and political problems, in addition to a mechanism for 
holding the actors responsible for these problems accountable.
The celebration of participatory mapping often underlines the successful 
case studies and the empowering role of the maps. Due to the simplification 
in the creation of maps and a number of influential case studies, the idea of 
‘let’s create a map’ has become in many cases a universal solution for a variety 
of issues. However, the creation of an online map cannot ensure the desired 
outcome. The purpose of this chapter is to go beyond the instrumental focus 
on participatory mapping, as well as the discussion about how digital maps 
contribute to the empowerment of users. In order to address these challenges, 
we propose a focus on the triangle of relations between the tools and purposes 
of mapping and the communities engaged in it, by examining maps in a 
context of activity systems (Engeström, 1987).
The first section of the chapter describes the rise of participatory mapping, 
followed by a review of the literature that addresses its social and political role. 
Next, we discuss how digital maps can be conceptualised in the context of 
cultural- historical activity theory (CHAT) and offer a conceptual framework 
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for the analysis of maps in the context of activity systems. On the basis of this 
conceptual framework, we go on to consider case studies from the fields of 
crisis mapping and urban mapping. The analysis section explores the relations 
between various communities related to digital mapping and identifies gaps 
in the structure of activity systems around mapping. The analysis discusses 
the consequences of the simplification of participation in mapping, with more 
internet users taking part in the process, but not necessarily in the solution 
of the issues mapped. It highlights that the symbolic representative value of 
the map in many cases does not necessarily lead to action, despite the claims 
that maps will increase transparency and accountability. The conclusion asks 
if information and communications technologies (ICTs) contribute to shifting 
the balance towards mapping activity, while fewer resources deal with mapping- 
enabled activity.
The rise of participatory mapping
The emergence of Web 2.0 and the increasing dominance of user- generated 
content online can be seen in many platforms, genres and formats. Maps 2.0 
(Crampton, 2009) is a space for the manifestation of user- generated content. 
Goodchild (2007, p.  212) describes ‘the widespread engagement of large 
numbers of private citizens, often with little in the way of formal qualifications, in 
the creation of geographic information’ as volunteered geographic information 
(VGI). VGI is also often linked to a notion of ‘neogeography’, which refers to 
‘people using and creating their own maps, on their own terms, by combining 
elements of an existing toolset’ (Turner, 2006, p. 3). According to Goodchild 
(2009, p. 82), the key feature of neogeography is ‘a blurring of the distinctions 
between producer, communicator and consumer of geographic information’. 
At the same time, this research highlights the potential cooperation between 
traditional geographers and neogeographers when ‘diverse VGI contributed by 
citizens via a bottom- up process complements, and in some cases integrates 
well with, the spatial data infrastructure constructed by authoritative sources 
via a top- down process’ (Elwood et al., 2012, p. 585).
An ‘explosion of participation’ in collaborative map- building is linked to 
the development of a variety of technologies that enable participatory mapping 
(Goodchild, 2007). These enablers can also be addressed as digital affordances 
of participatory mapping (Livingston, 2016). A  first set of affordances is 
related to georeferencing as the ability to detect location by relying on global 
positioning system (GPS) technology and the integration of geolocation 
functions in various devices, platforms and apps. According to Hardy et  al. 
(2012), georeferencing is enabled mainly by the geotagging of various types of 
data, including text messages and photos. Another set of affordances is related 
to the capacity of users to collect, produce and share digital data about their 
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surroundings by relying on networks of participatory sensors, which can also 
be addressed as participatory sensing (Goldman et al., 2009).
Participatory sensing, in turn, can also be addressed as a private case of a 
broad group of affordances related to crowdsourcing (Brabham, 2013). The 
production of digital maps can be approached as an outcome of the digitally 
mediated mobilisation of user resources (Asmolov, 2014), which includes the 
sensors, analytical skills, knowledge and social capital of users. Goodchild 
and Glennon (2010) highlight VGI’s reliance on crowdsourcing and present 
a case where the crowd can potentially solve a problem more effectively than a 
group of experts, as well as how ‘information obtained from a crowd of many 
observers is likely to be closer to the truth than information obtained from one 
observer’ (p. 233).
Different types of affordances lead to the simplification and increased 
accessibility of tools for the creation of maps. These include tools that allow 
the collection of geographical data (e.g. OpenStreetMap – OSM), tools for 
the development of new maps (e.g. Mapbox) and crowdsourcing mapping 
applications that allow the collection of data on different topics and generate 
thematic map ‘mash- ups’ (e.g. Ushahidi or Crowdmap). In addition, tools that 
support mapping include mobile applications that enable participation in the 
process, SMS platforms that allow data collection relying on text messages, and 
a variety of tools for data sharing, data aggregation, data verification and the 
engagement of users in online activities.
The proliferation of participatory mapping technologies with a low entry 
threshold gives rise to different types of mapping projects. Some of these 
projects, such as OSM, have focused on the development of maps in order 
to collect new geographic data about specific areas. Others have introduced 
various types of thematic maps that offer a visualisation of different data sets 
relying on geolocation and geotags. The latter can be addressed as map- based 
web mash- ups that ‘combine or mash up multiple sources of data, which are 
displayed in some geographic form’ (Liu and Palen, 2010, p. 69). One could 
also differentiate between dynamic maps that are frequently updated and used 
as tools for the collection of data from various sources and static maps that are 
used for the visualisation of a particular data set.
Map- based mash- ups have been used in various fields, including citizen 
science projects and environmental monitoring (Connors et  al., 2012), 
as well as mapping for the purpose of news coverage. Urban mapping that 
relies on user- generated information is often used as part of civic applications 
(Ermoshina, 2014) that offer citizens an opportunity to participate in finding 
solutions to problems in their neighbourhood. Participatory mapping is 
also used for public and environmental health surveillance (Kamel Boulos 
et al., 2011) and for the mapping of humanitarian emergencies and conflicts 
(Livingston, 2016).
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Special attention has been dedicated to the role of participatory mapping in 
crisis situations. According to Liu and Palen (2010, p. 70), ‘crisis map mash- ups 
are emerging as interesting artifacts in the practical work of reporting on, assisting 
in, and managing emergencies’. For Meier (2011, p. 1242), crisis mapping has four 
pillars: ‘information collection, visualization, analysis and decision support’. The 
public can also assist in ‘classifying and sorting the large amounts of information’ 
(Simon et al., 2015, p. 614). In this way, mapping platforms help with making 
data sets actionable in a situation of information overload. Liu and Palen (2010, 
p.  89) also highlight the benefits of integrating professional and participatory 
geotechnologies in situations of crisis through relying on ‘hybrid forms of 
informal, participatory systems with professional (or professionalized) systems’.
Ziemke (2012, p. 105) suggests that the mapping of a crisis covers a broad 
range of situations beyond conflicts and natural disasters:
Slow- onset chronic conditions like poverty, homelessness, gender- based 
violence, foreclosures and forced eviction were being mapped alongside 
acute disasters, and disasters can be either natural or man- made … Maps 
can also be leveraged to help monitor elections by allowing citizens a space 
to report intimidation, violence, and fraud at the polling station. Maps also 
may act as a witness to crimes committed by the state, such as harassment, 
detention or torture.
There is also a broad range of views on the functions of participatory maps. 
For instance, Goodchild and Glennon (2010, p. 231) argue that ‘geographic data 
and tools are essential in all aspects of emergency management: preparedness, 
response, recovery, and mitigation’. Digital maps can support ‘situational 
awareness’ (Mark and Semaan, 2008) and supplement traditional information 
sources (Bruns et  al., 2012). Particular attention is dedicated to how crisis 
mapping supports ‘crowdfeeding’, which is the facilitation of peer- to- peer 
mutual aid in emergency situations (Ziemke, 2012). This is particularly 
notable in cases of limited statehood and failure by the emergency services 
to provide emergency response (Asmolov, 2013). Additional functions 
include testing hypotheses, detection of trends and early warning of events, 
as well as using maps as testimony to shed light on different forms of human 
rights violations or abuses by repressive regimes (Livingston, 2016; Ziemke, 
2012). Participatory maps can also be used for data verification by relying on 
crowdsourcing practices.
However, mapping does not necessarily have a specific goal. Maps associated 
with open- data ideology are created on the basis of the assumption that data 
should be available and usable, while no one can predict in advance how a 
particular type of data can be used. For instance, the Wikimapia project seeks 
to respond to a call to ‘describe the whole world’. The same goal is shared by 
OSM activists. Russian GIS expert Maxim Dubinin compares open data to the 
concept of a ‘primordial soup’:
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We work at the level of the nutrient broth. It’s such a mess of elements, 
some fragments of molecules, some things that potentially can give birth 
to life. Life cannot appear without this soup. Speaking in a very simplistic 
way, lightning will strike this soup and life will be born. But without this 
soup, lightning can strike the clear water forever and nothing will happen. 
The beautiful part of creating maps as open data is that when we do it we 
have no idea how it will be used.1
Mapping without a specific purpose resembles a notion of ‘generativity’, as 
conceptualised by Zittrain (2008, p. 70), who defines it as ‘a system’s capacity 
to produce unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions from broad 
and varied audiences’. Generative mapping suggests that the mapping itself 
does not have a specific purpose, but that it contributes to developing an 
environment with better capabilities of attaining a variety of unanticipated 
goals. For instance, data collection on crisis situations in remote areas cannot 
be carried out without an updated geographic map of these areas.
While VGI can be considered as a case of crowdsourcing, where the resources 
of the crowd have been mobilised in order to develop maps, in many cases the 
crowd has also been transformed into a community of digital mappers. Since 
the catastrophic earthquake in Haiti in 2010, the crisis mapping movement 
has gained momentum and included a variety of initiatives (Starbird and Palen, 
2013; Ziemke, 2012). The mapping communities share some neocartographic 
skills and manifest a growing cartographic literacy (Liu and Palen, 2010). The 
increasing range of opportunities for participation in mapping has led to the 
creation of a diversity of communities of mappers around ideas and values 
(e.g. open data), platforms (e.g. micromappers), topics (e.g. crisis mappers or 
citizen scientists), as well as around professional communities (e.g. the GIS 
community). In some cases, these communities transform into various forms 
of organisations that can be considered as intermediaries between institutional 
actors and the digital crowd. The social and political role of new digitally 
enabled actors, however, requires further discussion.
The social and political role of participatory mapping
A number of scholars have celebrated the advantages of participatory mapping. 
Goodchild (2007) presents VGI as a case of a ‘dramatic innovation’. It is also 
considered to be a manifestation of a ‘spatial century’ (Gould, 1999) and ‘an 
unprecedented shift in the content, characteristics, and modes of geographic 
information creation, sharing, dissemination, and use’ (Elwood et al., 2012, 
p. 585). Goodchild and Glennon (2010, p. 238) have also highlighted how 
the crowdsourcing of geographic information allows faster collection and 
1 From an interview conducted in Russian in September 2013. Translated by the author.
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verification of information, while ‘authoritative information is much slower to 
appear than VGI’.
Analysis of the role of participatory mapping goes beyond the instrumental 
value of mapping. It explores how liberalising access to maps and their 
development changes the power relations between different actors and 
democratises the medium of mapping (Gartner, 2009, p. 74). For instance, 
increasing access to satellite imagery has limited the capacity of authoritarian 
regimes to conceal violations of human rights (Livingston, 2016). There 
are arguments that celebrate participatory mapping as a practice that can 
significantly contribute to solving many social or political problems (Fairbanks, 
2013) and as ‘a tool for social transformation’ (Roberts, 2012).
Mapping can also be approached as one of the manifestations of what 
Manuel Castells (2007) calls ‘mass self- communication’. A reality where anyone 
can participate in geographic mapping, add layers of information to maps or 
create dedicated thematic maps, as well as using the process as a tool for social 
mobilisation and agenda setting, has contributed to increasing transparency 
and accountability. When emergency situations occur in authoritarian political 
environments, crisis mapping is considered a source of alternative framing 
(Entman, 1993) of the disaster, which can challenge the authorities’ control of 
the construction and dissemination of information about the crisis.
At the same time, there are scholars who question whether participatory 
mapping can substantially contribute to empowerment and democratisation. 
Haklay (2013b) examines the exclusion from participation in the production 
of maps and suggests a ‘hierarchy of hacking’ that defines different degrees of 
capacity to participate in the mapping process. He argues that only bounded 
groups of experts can fully explore the potential of mapping (Haklay, 2013b, 
p. 63). These skills tend to be less available to those who are less well represented.
Critical research on Web 2.0 cartographies questions the way reality is 
represented through maps and approaches maps as symbolic constructions that 
reflect the power relation between various actors. According to Bittner et al. 
(2013, p. 946), critical cartography suggests ‘explorations that question given 
social realities and sensitize for patterns of marginalization and exclusion’, a 
consideration of ‘the social contexts in which maps are produced and further, 
the way maps (re)produce social realities’. In addition, the new technologies of 
mapping allow new affordances for the construction of a reality that can favour 
traditional institutions (Asmolov, 2014).
Optimism about the democratic potential of participatory mapping can 
also be approached as a case of solutionism, as conceptualised by Morozov 
(2013, p. 6):  ‘Recasting all complex social situations either as neat problems 
with definite, computable solutions or as transparent and self- evident processes 
that can be easily optimized – if only the right algorithms are in place!’ Some 
empirical research highlights the challenges related to participatory mapping. 
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For instance, a report titled Mapping the Maps has demonstrated how only a 
small percentage of the maps created on the basis of the Crowdmap platform 
were actively used (Bailard et al., 2012). About 93 per cent of the more than 
12,000 Crowdmaps analysed in the research sample had fewer than ten reports, 
while 61 per cent were identical to the default Crowdmap setting.
In some cases, mapping initiatives fail to engage a local community due 
to technological challenges, social or gender norms, as well as the apathy and 
political risks that can affect reporting. Monitoring and evaluation of crisis 
mapping projects, for example in the case of the deployment of Ushahidi 
following the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 (Heinzelman and Waters, 2010), 
also raise some questions about the extent to which the platform contributed 
to the response on the ground (Morrow et al., 2011).
The celebration of participatory mapping often underlines the successful 
case studies and the empowering role of maps. Due to the simplification of 
the creation of maps and a number of influential case studies, the idea of ‘let’s 
create a map’ has become in many cases a universal solution for a variety of 
issues. However, the creation of an online map cannot ensure the desired 
outcome. A more nuanced understanding of the social and political impact of 
participatory mapping requires a conceptual framework that considers digital 
mapping affordances in the context of situations that have been addressed by 
mapping.
Maps and activity: a conceptual framework
Addressing the debate about the role of participatory mapping requires 
a conceptual framework that allows us, on the one hand, to address the 
uniqueness of digital maps as participatory objects and, on the other hand, to 
explore the role of maps in the context of issues that have been addressed by 
mapping. While the affordances concept explains the technological factors that 
enable participatory mapping, it does not allow us to explore it in the context 
of specific situations. At the same time, theories that discuss the social and 
political impact of participatory mapping are mostly focused on explaining 
the successful cases where this could play a substantial role. Nonetheless, they 
do not explain the various scales of impact of participatory mapping and 
the cases of its failure. In this light, there is a need for a framework that will 
support a critical analysis of both the successes and failures of participatory 
mapping in addressing social and political challenges, as well as in addressing 
both technological and sociopolitical aspects of user participation in the 
development of digital maps.
In order to address these challenges, the following conceptual framework 
proposes a focus on the triangle of relations between the tools and purposes 
of mapping and the communities engaged in it. Traditionally, maps were 
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considered primarily as something that mediated the relationship between 
the user of the map and their environment. By offering a representation of 
an environment that assisted with navigation, maps helped the user to reach 
a specific destination. Most users, however, were excluded from production 
of the map. The emergence of ‘prosumers’ (Toffler, 1980) – those who both 
participate in the generation of maps and also use them – can be associated with 
the dual position of a map as an object of development and as a mediator of 
the relationship between users and their environment. This duality is addressed 
here through the lenses of CHAT and by relying on the notion of activity 
systems developed by Engeström (1987).
Activity theory grew out of cultural- historical psychology, as developed by 
Lev Vygotsky (1978). According to Vygotsky, the ‘individual and the social 
were conceived of as mutually constitutive elements of a single, interacting 
system’ (cited in Cole, 1985, p.  148). CHAT argues that the activity is a 
form of relationship between individuals (subjects) whose environment has 
two properties:  it is mediated by tools and oriented towards goals (objects). 
According to Kaptelinin and Nardi (2006, p. 56), ‘the structure of a tool itself, 
as well as learning how to use a tool, changes the structure of human interaction 
with the world’. In this sense, a map is a tool that mediates the relationship 
between subjects (users) and their environment. It supports navigation and 
allows a subject to achieve its object.
Vygotsky (1981), however, highlighted how the role of maps is more 
complicated than just the mediation of external activity. He argued that 
maps can be considered as psychological tools that mediate mental function. 
According to Vygotsky (1930), psychological tools ‘are directed toward the 
mastery of [mental] processes – one’s own or someone else’s – just as technical 
devices are directed toward the mastery of processes of nature’ and modify 
the ‘structure of mental functions by determining the structure of the new 
instrumental act, just as the technical tool modifies the process of natural 
adaptation by determining the form of labour operations’. In other words, 
maps have a reverse function by comparison with material tools. While 
material tools are applied in order to change the object of activity, maps are 
internally oriented and change the subject. In this light, maps structure, guide 
and transform activity by offering new forms of relationships between a subject 
and his/ her environment and supporting the attainment of specific goals.
Vygotsky distinguished between psychological tools as physical artefacts and 
as symbolic systems (Kaptelinin and Nardi, 2006), and showed that physical 
artefacts continue to fulfil their functions even after their subjects stop using 
them. This phenomenon was addressed as a process of internalisation, that is 
the transformation of the material psychological tools into internal cognitive 
functions. According to Kaptelinin and Nardi (2006, p. 43), ‘internalization of 
mediated external processes results in mediated internal processes’. However, 
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despite the differences between material and psychological tools, the analysis 
of tools – whether material or psychological – was situated within a context of 
the mediation of activity. Kaptelinin and Nardi (2006, p. 42) conclude that 
‘the use of mediators, whether crushing a nutshell with a hammer or orienting 
oneself in an unfamiliar city using a map, changes the structure of activity’.
CHAT highlights how maps should be examined in the context of human 
activity as a form of mediated subject– object relation. Nevertheless, while the 
traditional analysis of maps in activity theory has addressed maps as psychological 
tools that transform users’ relations with the environment, digital affordances 
that allow participatory forms of producing maps have created new challenges 
for their conceptualisation. On the one hand, maps continue to be a mediating 
tool located between subject and object, supporting orientation towards a goal. 
On the other hand, maps are an object of participatory production that is 
mediated through a variety of digital tools. Moreover, maps can be considered 
as an object of collective activity.
Vygotsky’s followers were concerned with the role of tools in the mediation 
of activity as part of collective action. Relying on a notion of activity developed 
by Leontiev (1978), Engeström (1988, p.  30) conceptualised activity as 
a collective phenomenon and defined it as ‘systems of collaborative human 
practice’. Engeström proposed that we analyse the role of tools as one of 
constituting and mediating activity systems. In addition to a relation between 
subject and object (purpose of activity), which is mediated through tools, the 
model includes three supplementary elements of activity:  the rules within 
activity systems, the community of those who participate in an activity that has 
been mediated by an artefact and the division of labour within this community 
(around attaining the object of the activity system) (see Figure 2.1).
Tools
Subject Object   → Outcome
Division of laborCommunityRules
Figure 2.1. The model of a human activity system (Engeström, 1987).
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From this perspective, a participatory online map has a dual position. On 
the one hand, a digital map is a tool that mediates the activity of a community 
of subjects in relation to a specific object. On the other hand, a digital map 
as an outcome of participatory development can be considered as an object 
of activity of a community of users that is mediated by relying on a variety of 
digital tools. In the first case the object of the systems is the creation of the map, 
while in the second case the map is used in order to reach a desired outcome.
The major question suggested by applying CHAT is: what is the place of 
the mapping within the activity system? In the case of ‘mapping as activity’, 
the purpose of the activity system is the creation of the map. In the case of 
‘map- mediated activity’, there is an infinite range of potential forms of activity, 
while the common denominator of these activities is that they are supported 
by mapping. Activity theory offers a methodological framework for the analysis 
of digital maps in the context of activity systems. The purpose of analysis, 
however, is not only to establish the location of a map in the context of an 
activity system. The main advantage of applying CHAT to the analysis of 
participatory mapping is the opportunity to explore the interrelation between 
maps as an object of activity and maps as mediators of activity.
In some cases, the participatory development of maps can be integrated into 
a larger context of activity around a common object that requires mapping as 
a form of mediation. In this case, those who create maps and those who use 
maps belong to the same system. In other cases, the development of maps and 
the activity supported by mapping can be seen as segregated activity systems, or 
at least systems with a limited degree of integration. In this case, the question 
becomes: Do mapping as an activity and mapping- mediated activity belong 
to one integrated activity system or are they separate systems? And, if the 
communities of these systems are separate, how is their relationship structured?
To sum up, unlike the critical approach that investigates maps as a form of 
symbolic representation, a conceptual framework that relies on CHAT allows 
us to focus beyond the question of how reality is constituted, through a map as 
an outcome of a particular power relationship. The focus on the link between 
the participatory development of mapping and the activity that is mediated 
through maps allows us to consider critically the role of digital maps in the 
context of social and political processes. The following case studies allow us 
to apply this framework to an analysis of crisis mapping and urban mapping.
Case studies
Crisis mapping
According to Starbird (2012, p. 47), ‘crisis maps are maps of impacted areas 
that users collectively create and edit’. She explains that ‘volunteers for crisis 
mapping projects can come from a local community in response to a specific 
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event, or from a growing pool of individuals who identify as “crisis mappers” 
and repeatedly participate across events, most often from outside the affected 
area’. In this sense, crisis mapping initiatives can represent a spontaneous self- 
organisation of people around a specific crisis, relying on members of a crowd 
or on projects facilitated by an established community of crisis mappers. In 
order to address both cases, this section considers a number of cases from 
Russia, as well as other cases that have been supported by members of the 
global crisis mapping community.
In 2010 a densely populated area of western Russia experienced a significant 
wave of wildfires. The disaster caused dozens of casualties. Russian internet 
users tried to self- organise to respond to the emergency. The crisis- related online 
activism was motivated particularly by the lack of an appropriate response 
from traditional institutions responsible for disaster management (Asmolov, 
2013). A  group of online volunteers created an Ushahidi deployment and 
named it Help Map. The purpose of the mapping was not only the collection 
of information about fires, but also the facilitation of aid links between those 
who needed help and those who were interested in helping.
While state- controlled traditional media broadcasted that the situation 
was under the full control of the emergency services, Help Map offered an 
alternative picture, presenting a truer scale of the disaster by relying on reports 
from citizens. Moreover, it also offered a mapping of resources available to 
support an emergency response. The major purpose of the mapping was the 
collection of data about needs and available resources (including transport, 
firefighting equipment, clothing, evacuation destinations and volunteers 
willing to participate in firefighting). The emergency services ignored the map 
and avoided contact with volunteers. However, the map was used by volunteers 
on the ground and by charity non- governmental organisations (NGOs) that 
took part in the emergency response.
The purpose of moderators, who created an offline coordination centre, was 
not only to aggregate data from different sources and verify the data submitted 
by users, but also to make sure that requests for help were linked to offers of help 
and to ensure that the information mapped did not remain without a response. 
If internet users were not able to address a particular need, the moderators 
tried to find a relevant NGO or charity organisation to help. In other words, 
the mappers’ activity was not limited to mapping, but also involved doing their 
best to ensure that the required activity happened in the offline dimension. In 
this sense, the map was not only a tool for data collection, but also a tool for 
the allocation of citizen- based resources for the purpose of emergency response. 
In the case of Help Map, there was no strong distinction between those who 
created the map and contributed to the mapping and those who used it to 
respond to the disaster. The mapping itself and the activity enabled by it relied 
on the same community of internet users.
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A few months later, in the winter of 2010– 11, Russia was hit by an 
unprecedented cold front. Many cities were left without heating and thousands 
of people were struggling to receive basic supplies due to the extreme weather 
conditions. This crisis was addressed by another deployment of Ushahidi called 
Holoda.info (holoda means ‘cold’ in Russian). The structure of the map was 
similar to that of Help Map. However, this time no offline coordination centre 
was established. In addition, unlike in the case of the wildfires, this crisis was 
not met with large- scale citizen mobilisation. Eventually, the map collected 
many reports about problems in different regions experiencing extreme weather. 
Nonetheless, the map stopped functioning a few days after deployment since 
it received very few reports about available resources and was not connected to 
specific organisations offering a response. While Holoda.info contributed to 
increasing transparency around the scale of the crisis, its role in the facilitation 
of response was minimal.
In another case of disaster response in Russia, a different type of 
relationship between the community of mappers and the community of 
responders was evident. In July 2012 floods destroyed a significant part of 
the city of Krymsk in southern Russia. As in the case of the wildfires in 2010, 
the response from the authorities was slow and insufficient. Many volunteers 
self- organised online and went to the area of the disaster. However, one of the 
problems they faced on the ground was a lack of updated maps of the disaster 
area. Lack of a geographic map made the coordination of a response more 
difficult. To address this gap, a group of OSM volunteers self- organised in 
Russian OSM forums and created an updated map of the area of the floods. 
Consequently, volunteers were able to have updated maps that enabled them 
to facilitate a better response to the emergency. In this case, there was a clear 
differentiation between the community of mappers and those who used the 
maps. Moreover, the map created online as a result of the mapping activity 
was transformed into a physical printed artefact that was used by volunteers. 
Despite the fact that the mappers and those who used the maps were from 
different communities, this case presents a good example of integration 
between a mapping activity and an activity enabled by mapping within 
unified activity systems and with the object of responding to the disaster. 
Later, the OSM map was also used as the basis for online thematic maps in 
order to create a crowdsourcing deployment similar to Help Map in the case 
of the wildfires.
The global crisis mapping movement offers a different case of relations 
between those that participate in mapping and those that use the map to 
address a crisis. The case of the response to Typhoon Yolanda, which struck 
South East Asia in November 2013, allows us to consider the complexity of 
the relationship between the different actors that participate in mapping and 
the responders. The request ‘to carry out a rapid needs and damage assessment 
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by tagging reports posted to social media’ (Meier, 2013a) was submitted by the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
to the Digital Humanitarian Network (DHN), which represented an online 
coalition of organisations of networked volunteers.
The activation included not only the members of online crisis mapping 
communities, but also an appeal to members of a broad crowd that could 
participate by using the Micromapping tool (Hildebrandt, 2013). This tool 
simplified the participation of online users in the analysis and categorisation 
of visual and textual information about the disaster. MicroMappers2 is based 
on the idea of crowdsourcing and microtasking (such as in the case of Amazon 
Turk), where the simplification of participation is based on tasks that do not 
require prior knowledge, allowing the range of potential participants to be 
expanded and making the achievement of the desired outcome easier and faster.
The project was managed by Patrick Meier (who at the time worked 
at the Qatar Computing Research Institute) and his colleagues from the 
volunteer disaster- response community Standby Task Force (SBTF). Relying 
on a number of tools that aggregate disaster- related messages and images, the 
platform created a data set of hundreds of thousands of tweets and images 
related to the consequences of the typhoon. Aggregation tools allowed an 
ongoing process of ‘feeding the clickers’ with new data for categorisation and 
geolocation (Meier, 2013b). The analysis relied on a number of mechanisms 
that allowed the tagging of tweets and images by ‘clickers’.
In this case, the microtasking platform and the map were two different 
tools. The mapping activity was mediated through the microtasking platform, 
while the visualised outcome was represented through a map. The map was 
created following a request from its potential users:
In the case of Typhoon Yolanda, we also had a formal partner, the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), that 
officially requested digital humanitarian support. In other words, our 
efforts are directly in response to clearly articulated information needs. In 
contrast, the response to Haiti was ‘supply based’ in that we simply pushed 
out all information that we figured might be of use to humanitarian 
responders. (Meier, 2013a)
This case presents a strong division between the community of mappers and 
those who used the map. It allows us to identify three type of actors that are 
related to the mapping. The first group was an unbounded crowd that took 
part in mapping by relying on mediation with dedicated tools that simplified 
participation. The second was a bounded group of online volunteers with a 
certain degree of expertise that managed the crowd and made sure that the map 
met the expectations of responders. The third group was humanitarian agencies 
2 See http:// micromappers.com.
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that used the maps to increase situational awareness, support the allocation of 
resources and assist responders on the ground.
In this case, intermediaries like SBTF and DHN made sure that the outcome 
of participatory mapping was integrated with activities that could benefit from 
the maps. That linkage was also supported by the fact that the mapping activity 
was activated by responders. In other words, in the community around the map 
of Yolanda there was an integration of mapping as an activity and the activity 
enabled by the mapping. That said, while initially emergency organisations 
outsourced the mapping to the crowd, in more recent years we can see how 
international organisations develop internal technological and professional 
capabilities to analyse big data in crisis situations and therefore have less need 
for the engagement of external actors.
Urban mapping and civic applications
The mapping of the urban environment for a variety of purposes has become 
a popular branch of participatory mapping. One of the best- known examples 
is SeeClickFix, a web tool for the reporting of non- emergency issues in a 
neighbourhood to local authorities launched in the United States in 2008. 
The name SeeClickFix highlights the connection between the act of data 
collection, the act of mapping and the act of resolving an issue that has been 
mapped. Another tool, CitySourced, ‘provides new spatial media tools for civic 
engagement’ and is ‘seeking citizen involvement in municipal problem- solving 
by allowing people to submit reports about different problems (e.g. potholes or 
garbage) to an interactive online map’ (Elwood and Leszczynski, 2013, p. 8). 
This map offers local government an opportunity to follow a problem and 
report back on the resolution of the issue.
Urban mapping projects that seek to resolve local issues, however, have 
also been launched in countries where the local authorities often seek to avoid 
responsibility and ignore citizen reports. In this light, some urban mapping 
initiatives are considered as ‘civic applications’ and provide a means of cyber- 
empowerment that assists city residents in forcing local authorities to address 
problems. According to Ermoshina (2014, p. 5), ‘civic applications make use 
of existing legal mechanisms and standards to legitimize and strengthen an 
individual complaint’. She describes the mechanism of civic application: ‘Every 
problem declared via a civic application has two destinations. The first one is 
an invisible one – higher administrative units (Inspectorate, City Hall, etc.). 
The second destination is a public one – the application’s server – where the 
problem becomes visible to other users’ (Ermoshina, 2014, p. 6).
One of the most popular Russian participatory mapping civic apps is 
Rosyama, launched by Russian oppositional activist Alexey Navalny to address 
the condition of Russian roads. Once a message with the geolocation and image 
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of a pothole is submitted, this automatically generates a complaint that is sent 
to the local authorities responsible for the issue, who are then legally obliged 
to take care of it. In another case, a platform from St Petersburg, Zalivaet.spb 
(Flooded.spb), offered a map of leaking roofs following spring melting snow 
in 2010 in order to force the local housing service to address the problem. 
Eventually, senior officials had to pay attention to the map and invited the 
founder of the project to collaborate in resolving the problem. Another online 
urban mapping platform, RosZHKH, was a Russian alternative to SeeClickFix 
that allowed people to submit reports about local problems such as illegal 
parking and linked these reports to a tool that generated official complaints to 
local authorities.
In all the above cases, the participatory mapping not only increased 
transparency around specific problems, but also allowed people to hold the 
authorities accountable by offering a specific repertoire of activities to address 
the problem. The maps can be seen here as ‘problem- solving instruments’ that 
offer a link between the mapping of the problem and the activity enabled by it. 
That said, in many cases the mapping projects were not able either to force the 
authorities to respond or to develop a collaboration mode with local authorities 
that allowed them to offer a link between participatory mapping and activity in 
response to the issue raised by the map.
The following case enables us to examine the relationship between mappers 
and the users of the map in a project called Open Maps of the Perm Region, 
launched by an ombudsman of the Perm region in Russia with assistance from 
the World Bank in 2011. The general purpose of the project was defined as 
supporting local self- governance and civic society, including citizen activism 
in the region (Margolina, 2012). The maps addressed mostly small cities 
with some significant social challenges. For instance, in Kizel a Crowdmap 
deployment called ‘Recreating Our City: Kizel – Past, Present and Future’ was 
created.3 The city had been experiencing significant problems since its main 
industries were closed. The idea was to map three different geographic layers 
in the dimension of time. The ‘past’ layer would map how the city had looked 
in the past (a nostalgic manifestation of memories). The ‘present’ layer would 
focus on the current problems of the town. The ‘future’ layer would present a 
map- mediated vision of how the city should look.
However, while planning these projects the initiators discovered that 
the basic layer of updated geographic data was missing for some areas. 
Consequently, the project suggested first mapping the towns themselves 
(literally ‘putting them on the map’) in order to allow for work with 
3 See http:// history.kizeladm.ru.
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issue- related layers later. Civic activism was refocused from solving local 
problems to engaging people in geographical mapping, relying on OSM and 
based on the website osm.perm.ru. Eventually, the project was successful 
in adding a great deal of geographical information about remote areas of 
the Perm region to OSM. The regional Crowdmap deployment in Kizel, 
however, remained almost empty and inactive a couple of years later. The 
project was successful in creating a community of VGI mappers, but failed 
to create a community of users of those maps.
In some cases, the authorities have tried to take control of mapping tools 
by offering their own urban mapping platforms. In this way, the moderators 
could filter reports submitted by citizens, as well as making sure that the action 
supported by the maps had no disruptive effect. For instance, in some cases, 
reports about streets that were blocked by snow were addressed by removing 
the snow from photos using Photoshop and posting the edited photo as proof 
that action had been taken. In other cases, platforms offered a limited repertoire 
of citizen participation. For instance, the Active Citizen platform, launched by 
the mayor of Moscow, was criticised for appearing to provide an opportunity 
to complain, but with no consequent action taken, and creating ‘a semblance 
of openness and participation, while in practice neutralising citizens’ activity 
and exerting control over them’ (Asmolov, 2017, p. 463).
The idea that in order to solve the problem you first need to create a 
layer of geographical information about a particular area that is scarcely 
represented on the existing map is certainly not exclusive to Russia. One of 
the most notable projects in this field is the mapping of the slums of Kibera 
and Mathare in Nairobi. According to Fairbanks (2013), ‘on Google Maps 
they figure as blank expanses, in keeping with their reputation as shadowy, 
marginal places’. Drawing Kibera on the map relied on the engagement 
of volunteers to collect data about the area and on the crowdsourcing of 
information about the location of key places (such as water taps, schools, 
pharmacies) based on information from local citizens, as well as adding 
official data. However, according to Kovacic and Lundine (2013, p. 123), 
while Map Kibera successfully created data and mapped the slums, the 
outcome of the mapping project was not ‘accessible to or consumable by 
local organizations’.
A new model of mapping was implemented by a social enterprise, Spatial 
Collective, in the slums of Mathare:  ‘The goal was that Mathare residents, 
through mapping and social media tools, relate their stories to an audience 
outside of the slum and beyond the borders of the nation, but more importantly 
start the conversations within the community through constant small forums’ 
(Kovacic and Lundine, 2013, p. 124).
The mapping relied on members of youth groups from the slums. One of 
the leading activists, Isaac Mutisya, explained the role of the map from the 
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perspective of the local mappers: ‘We think of GPS maps as guides. They are 
the sometimes annoying, always calm, recorded voice in our car that steers us 
through unfamiliar places. But maps are also public records that can help slum 
dwellers negotiate with city authorities’ (Warner, 2013).
One of the issues for problem mapping in Mathare was illegal dumping 
grounds. The purpose of mapping was defined as improving ‘the existing waste 
management systems found in the community’ (Spatial Collective, 2013). 
Mapping various segments of the life cycle of waste and locations related to 
illegal waste allowed local community members to take care of this problem. 
Other problems addressed by the map have focused on the facilitation of 
dialogue between local residents and the local authorities, for example on 
mapping the infrastructure of pipes in order to increase the number of public 
toilets and crime mapping that relies on community reporting.
The case of Mathare demonstrates how the same community has conducted 
the mapping and used the outcome of it to enable an activity that can contribute 
to the solution of problems like waste management. We can also see how a 
specific organisation, in this case the social entrepreneurship Spatial Collective, 
supports both the mapping process and how it is used to address the problems 
of the slums. The purpose of the maps is ‘not only to present information (e.g. 
a water supply shortage), but also to produce concrete action (e.g. to facilitate 
the delivery of water to remedy the shortage)’ (Kovacic and Lundine, 2013, 
pp. 126– 7).
Analysis
This chapter argues that the role of participatory digital maps needs to be 
examined in the context of activity potentially related to these maps. The notion 
of an activity system allows us to identify the dual position of the maps as a 
mediator and/ or as an object. Case studies from the fields of crisis mapping and 
urban mapping allow us to examine the locations of the maps in the context of 
activity, as well as the structure of relations between different communities of 
users related to the maps.
Figure 2.2 presents a case where the map can be considered as an object 
of activity. This activity is mediated via a variety of digital tools that afford a 
broad scope of participation in the development of maps. The participatory 
mapping activity includes the aggregation of data from a variety of sources, 
data analysis and data verification. In each case considered above we can see 
various forms of digitally mediated participatory practices that were directed 
towards the development of digital maps. Maps as objects can be seen both 
in the case of participatory development of geographic maps (e.g. OSM) and 
of participatory development of issue- focused maps such as crisis maps or 
urban maps.
 
 
 
 
MAPPING CRISIS56
Figure 2.3 presents a case where the map can be considered as a mediator 
of activity in relation to specific objects. This can be seen in the cases of crisis 
mapping, where digital maps were supported in order to enhance emergency 
response, and in the cases of urban mapping, where the maps were developed 
in order to address a variety of problems on the city level. The major question, 
however, is how mapping as an object of activity is related to the outcome of 
the mapping. Figure 2.4 allows us to focus on an analysis of the relationship 
between the community taking part in the production of the map and the 
community using the map, and to explore the mechanisms linking the map’s 
two functions.
In the case of Help Map, the mapping activity and the mapping- enabled 
activity were integrated in the structure of a mapping platform, suggesting 
a link between needs and resources. Those who participated in the mapping 
were the same group of people who participated in the response to what 
had been mapped. Both activities relied on a community of volunteers 
who used the Internet, as well as a number of NGOs participating in the 
emergency response. It is safe to say that the mapping and mapping- enabled 
Sensors'
participatory affordances
Community
of users
Digital map
Figure 2.2. Participatory maps as objects of activity.
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Community
of users
A problem
(e.g. crisis situation)
Figure 2.3. Participatory maps as mediators of activity.
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activities were highly integrated in the case of Help Map. The group of 
map moderators played the role of facilitators in order to ensure that the 
mapping was linked to the activity required in response. However, in the 
case of the map that dealt with the extreme weather in Russia, this link was 
missing and the map remained mostly an object of activity.
In the case of the response to Typhoon Yolanda, the community of 
users that created the map and those who used the map were substantially 
different. The map relied on the participatory activities of micromappers; 
however, the outcome of the mapping was developed for an international 
responding organisation, in this case OCHA. The link between mapping 
as an activity and the activity mediated by it was supported by SBTF, an 
established online community of crisis mappers. The two types of activity 
were also integrated due to the facilitation by the DHN and due to the 
fact that the activation of the mapping community took place following a 
request from those interested in the map to support the rescue operation on 
the ground.
The cases of urban mapping also allow us to examine different types of 
relations between mapping as an object of activity and the activity that has 
been mediated by the mapping. In the case of projects dealing with potholes, 
leaking roofs and neighbourhood problems, the maps forced institutional 
actors to address the issues thanks to algorithms that automatically generated 
Community
of users
Sensors'
participatory affordances
Digital map
Community
of users
A problem
(e.g. crisis situation)
Figure 2.4. The dual role of participatory maps in the context of activity systems.
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complaints. The moderators of the maps also made sure that the reports were 
transformed into official complaints and reached their destination. In the case of 
the Open Maps project in Perm, the emergence of a GIS mapping community 
was not followed by the emergence of an issue- mapping community or a 
community of people who could act on the basis of the mapping. The map 
in Kizel demonstrates how mapping can be disconnected from activity that is 
supposed to address the issues mapped.
The case of the mapping in Kibera and Mathare also demonstrates how 
it is linked to various types of activity by the local community. The same 
community of youth groups from the slums was engaged in mapping and in 
activity relying on it (such as the collection of rubbish). In some cases, the 
community around the map included not only internal actors (local residents), 
but also external actors, including the authorities and aid organisations. The 
high degree of integration between mapping and mapping- enabled activity was 
supported by the Spatial Collective NGO.
In some cases, however, the mapping activity is not necessarily designed to 
address a specific problem. The cases where it is driven by the goal of updating 
geographic maps (as in the case of OSM) can be considered as ‘generative 
mapping’, where the purpose is to support unexpected outcomes and a variety 
of potential actions. Generative mapping relies on a community of mappers, 
but usually this is not linked to a community of those who can use the map, 
since no specific type of mapping- enabled activity is considered as part of the 
project.
These cases allow us to identify two types of relations between a community 
of mappers and a community of those who use the maps. In the first case, 
groups of users belong to the same group. This can be seen in the case of 
crowdfeeding projects, where the members of the crowd both develop and use 
the maps to address the issues mapped. In the second case, the community of 
users that participate in mapping and those who use the maps can be seen as 
two different groups. In most of these cases, the mappers can be considered as 
members of a digital crowd or online groups of volunteers, while those who 
use the maps to address the issue of mapping are institutional actors.
In some cases, the institutional actor initiates and supports the mapping in 
order to support their own activity. In these cases, the maps serve as facilitators 
of collaboration between the community represented by the mappers and 
external actors. In such cases, we can see that mapping is more likely to be 
followed by a mapping- enabled activity and to serve the mutual interests of 
all sides. In other cases, the maps force institutional actors to respond. The 
purpose of the map in these cases is to get the issue on the agenda and to 
attract attention. However, this symbolic representative value of the map in 
many cases does not necessarily lead to action, despite the claims that maps will 
increase transparency and accountability.
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In all the cases considered, we have seen that a central role in connecting 
mapping as an activity and the activity mediated by mapping was played by 
intermediaries. In some cases, the intermediaries are an outcome of spontaneous 
self- organisation, as in the case of the Help Map coordination centre. In the 
case of Typhoon Yolanda, intermediaries are presented by online groups of 
volunteers, including SBTF and DHN. In the case of Kenya, the intermediary 
is an NGO (Spatial Collective). Some of the urban mapping platforms embed a 
mechanism that links mapping to action. In the cases of Rosyama and Zalivaet.
spb, the automatic generation of complaints, as well as the activities of the 
founders of the mapping platforms, ensure that the outcome of mapping forces 
institutional actors to address the issues mapped.
The additional trend that can be seen is that the organisational actors 
develop internal capabilities of mapping by relying on the analysis of big data 
and therefore rely less on the engagement of the crowd. This can be seen as 
a shift from crowdsourcing to insourcing of digital mapping. At the same 
time, we can see that some institutional actors seek to neutralise the link 
between mapping and mapping- enabled activity through the development of 
platforms that allow them to control the outcomes and offer a semblance of 
participation. The latter can be addressed as a form of vertical crowdsourcing 
(Asmolov, 2017).
Conclusion
The focus on participatory mapping in the context of activity systems has 
allowed us to explore the relationship between those who create the data 
and those who use it, and in particular to ask to what extent these groups 
are interrelated. The investigation has focused on the degree of integration 
between various types of activity as represented in the links between different 
communities of users. Maps always exist in a context of activity. The balance 
between activity directed towards the development of a map and activities that 
rely on mapping differs, however, from map to map.
The analytical differentiation between mapping as activity and activity 
mediated by mapping allows us also to investigate the relation between these 
two forms of activity and suggests a model for the structure of this relation. In 
the first case, the same community conducts both mapping and the activity 
based on the mapping. In this case, mapping as an activity is a segment that has 
been integrated into a larger activity system. In the second case, the mapping 
as an activity and the mapping- enabled activity are two separate systems with 
independent objects of activity and different communities.
Addressing the question of the structure of the relation between mapping 
as an activity and the activity enabled by mapping allows the identification of 
different kinds of ‘mapping failures’. The first type of failure is where mapping 
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as an activity is not followed by an activity mediated by mapping. In this case, 
the map remains a meaningless object. For instance, in some cases a community 
of social activists (such as an NGO) will ask a community of mappers to create 
a map (either a geographic or an issue map), but this map will not in the end 
be linked to or integrated within any specific activity.
The second type of failure can be seen when a community that needs a map in 
order to achieve its purposes is not able to mobilise a community of mappers to 
create the required mediating tool or more generally does not realise the mapping 
needed. A  third type of failure, which can be seen within activity systems 
mediated through online maps, is around the object of mapping. In these cases, 
there is a contradiction between, on the one hand, the way the mappers imagine 
the desired activity enabled by mapping and, on the other hand, the forms of 
activity desired by the people experiencing the problem on the ground.
One may argue that because it is easier today to participate in mapping 
than in the activity enabled by it, more internet users are taking part in 
the process, but not necessarily in the solution of the issues mapped. 
Consequently, ICTs contribute to shifting the balance towards mapping 
activity, while fewer resources deal with mapping- enabled activity. While 
almost anything can be mapped, this does not guarantee that mapping will 
contribute to a solution to what has been mapped. Conversely, mapping 
becomes part of a symbolic gap between increasing awareness of a problem 
and the decreasing amount of resources available to solve this problem. 
Considering maps in the context of activity systems should help to address 
this gap, and help the users of digital maps not only to navigate the 
environment but also to change it.
This research has been supported by the Leverhulme Trust.
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3. Knowledge and spatial production  
between old and new representations:  
a conceptual and operative framework
Maria Rosaria Prisco
Proprio perché tutto dipende dalle rappresentazioni, occorre che esse siano 
in grado di comprendere e regolare i processi di trasformazione del pianeta.
(As everything depends on representations, it is necessary that they are 
able to understand and inform the processes of planet transformation.) 
(Dematteis, 1985, p. 101)
This chapter critically analyses whether new data sources, generally referred to as ‘big data’ and volunteered geographic information (VGI), can represent a way of overcoming the limits of traditional 
geographical representations based on official statistics and indicators. It also 
asks whether this new availability of spatial information simply increases 
the amount of georeferenced data or, through the support of a theoretical 
framework, it can also open up new and more effective ways of revealing places 
and their identities and thus improving community participation as practice 
for policymaking and planning.
If read in its historical context, the recent emergence of the big data era and 
the so- called ‘fourth paradigm’, based on data- intensive analysis (Anderson, 
2008), appears to be in perfect continuity with the late 19th- century 
quantitative turn in social sciences where statistical quantification of human 
behaviour played a key role in explaining the world and in forming modern 
Western identity (Hacking, 1990). This ‘objective’ knowledge also produced 
a new approach to social engineering based on managing natural and social 
facts more easily through numbers (Barnes, 2013). The current ‘datafication’ 
of knowledge represents the power accorded to data in the construction and 
reproduction of social representations based on the huge availability of digital 
information and the power of the Internet (Newell and Marabelli, 2015).
This approach also has epistemological and ontological implications, in 
particular when the analysis is carried out at subnational level. As Shelton 
(2017) states, data used to represent the phenomena under investigation are 
strongly influenced by what is simpler to quantify and easily counted, causing a 
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misrepresentation or underrepresentation of all that is not visible or is difficult 
to operationalise through the traditional top- down approach to knowledge 
production. The result is the production of partial geographies in which all 
that is not easy to represent, like conflict, cultural, ethnical and social diversity, 
essentially becomes invisible (Vanolo, 2018).
All these aspects are part of the subjective/ emotional side of place 
representation carried out on different scales, from the body to the home 
and neighbourhood, up to larger scales characterising what Lefebvre (1991) 
defined as ‘lived spaces’. These ‘lived spaces’ are traditionally neglected in 
positivist geographical studies based on a conception of space as an object 
bounded by administrative limits and by economic and technical criteria. 
As Davidson et  al. (2005, p.  1) note:  ‘The difficulties in communicating 
the affective elements at play beneath the topographies of everyday life have 
meant that, to a greater or lesser extent, geography has tended to deny, avoid, 
suppress or downplay its emotional entanglements’. A limit probably due both 
to the limited availability of data and to the intrinsic difficulty in quantifying 
and operationalising subjective aspects, especially in relation to their spatiality.
This approach is particularly inadequate when values are at stake in the 
analysis as, for example, in the recent indicators framework built to assess 
the progress of policies for human well- being and sustainability: the ongoing 
sustainable development goals (SDGs) promoted by the United Nations 
(UN) in 2015. Despite the significant shift in considering different measures 
of human progress beyond the criteria of gross domestic product (GDP), 
the way to represent the complexity stemming from this new approach to 
development remains bound to the traditional systems of indicators based 
on official statistics produced by national institutions. According to this 
perspective, the geographical dimension of sustainability is restricted to the 
study of spatial differences and quantified using administrative spatial units 
with a comparative approach at global level. By describing regions or cities 
only in terms of their contents – that is, wage earners, pupils’ achievements, 
number of unemployed people and so on  – they become mere objects of 
comparison in the ranking exercise of attributing above/ below scores with 
respect to the national average.
The container approach to space is not able to grasp some complex 
issues of the sustainability/ well- being concept and constitutes a rather poor 
conceptual and methodological basis for dealing with a complex place- based 
concept like sustainability (Manderscheid, 2012). Where people reside and act, 
their subjective and relational dimension of spatiality from the body and its 
multilayered interrelations with others scaled up to global level, is an issue 
that requires a more complex vision of spatiality, which Lefebvre (1991) and 
Harvey (2006) effectively introduced in their conceptualisation of space. This 
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framework of reference can help in decoding and understanding the role of 
new sources of data in the production of a more participatory geographic 
knowledge.
Starting from this field of observation, the chapter will test the possibilities 
offered by new sources of geographic data usually defined as big data (in 
particular those produced through people’s voluntary contributions) in 
supporting a research path that can lead to more participatory and coherent 
spatial representations with the complexity that emerges when values and 
people and the specificities of places are at stake. The chapter will also examine 
the role of VGI and explore the ways in which a new approach to spatiality can 
help to decode and understand this avalanche of data.
From drought to a deluge of spatial data
The term ‘big data’, typically used to mean a wide range of data sources 
with specific characteristics and epistemological, methodological and legal 
implications, has since around 2010 become a ‘popular technological meme’ 
(Gorman, 2013). Despite its popularity across a wide range of disciplines, 
from information science to medicine, sociology, economics and management, 
the term does not yet have a structured and universally accepted definition. 
Through a survey of 1,581 conference papers and journal articles that contained 
the full term ‘big data’, de Mauro et al. (2016, p. 131) propose a definition 
independent of the various fields of application and based on big data as an 
information asset ‘characterised by such a high volume, velocity and variety to 
require specific technology and analytical methods for its transformation into 
value’.
To the well- known ‘three V’ criteria of data (volume, velocity and varieties) 
(Laney, 2001), some scholars (Boyd and Crawford, 2011; Kitchin, 2014) 
have added other criteria, in particular: completeness (the ability to grasp the 
characteristics of entire populations or systems); relationality (generally data 
have common key fields attached to other data sets); and high- resolution 
information involving a fine level of detail, including spatial scale resolution.
Among different typologies of sources of big data identified by the current 
literature (Kitchin, 2014; Miller, 2010) and major statistical agencies, 
the classification of the sources provided by the UN (UNGGIM, 2013) is 
particularly interesting for its relationship with data contents:
• What people say – online content: international and local online news sources, 
publicly accessible blogs, forum posts, comments and public social media 
content, online advertising, e- commerce sites and websites created by local 
retailers that list prices and inventory.
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• What people do – data exhaust: passively collected transactional data from the 
use of digital services such as financial services (including purchases, money 
transfers, savings and loan repayments); communication services (such 
as anonymised records of mobile phone- usage patterns); or information 
services (such as anonymised records of search queries).
One of the most important characteristics of this avalanche of data is the 
possibility of georeferencing the information produced. Mobile phone users, 
access to the Internet, weather sensors, tracking of vehicles providing location 
in real time, social networks, shopping in the point of sale (POS) circuits 
and so on, allow the analysis and prediction of events with a geographical 
precision that was unthinkable in the mid-2010s. The number of social 
media users worldwide was 2.46 billion in 2017 (European Commission, 
2019), although not all digital tracks are georeferenced. Roughly 2 per cent 
of the total number of tweets collected (almost 500 million tweets per day 
and 326  million people using Twitter every month in 2017)  showed the 
user’s location with a street level accuracy, mainly due to privacy problems 
(Leetaru et  al., 2013). Moreover, despite the low percentage of geotagged 
data from social networks, some researchers are developing an algorithm 
able to predict a Twitter user’s location without the need of a single 
geotag (Krishnamurthy et  al., 2014). Batty (2013) suggests that the big 
data revolution will profoundly change geographic analysis thanks to the 
availability of small- scale information that will allow the emergence of some 
phenomena previously not easily measurable.
Another relevant big data issue is the ongoing shift in the production of 
data. Traditionally, data are collected by national statistical authorities that 
monitor the whole process from production to dissemination. One of the most 
relevant effects of technological advances since 2010 has been the involvement 
of non- professional producers in mapping activities and spatial data collection, 
the so- called ‘produsers’, that is people playing the twin role of producer and 
user of data (Budhathoki et al., 2008). These new ways of geographical data 
production can take place either voluntarily (through ad hoc spatial interfaces 
and the use of social networks, blogs, e- commerce, opinions about products 
and services and the like) or through the involuntary tracks generated by the use 
of mobile devices or other everyday practices (use of credit cards, health cards, 
public transport, satellite box car insurance, for example). Many terms are used 
to classify citizen- derived geographical information, such as crowdsourcing, 
user- generated content and VGI (See et al., 2016). However, in general, this 
range of technologies and human participation practices is defined as the 
‘Geoweb’: the integration of Web 2.0 and geospatial information technology 
(such as Google Earth, OpenStreetMap (OSM), geographic information 
system (GIS), quantum geographic information system (QGIS)) (Elwood 
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and Leszczynski, 2012). Some scholars have defined this new production as a 
revolution, an ‘unprecedented moment in human history: we can now know 
where nearly everything, from genetic to global levels, is at all times’ (Sui and 
DeLyser, 2012, p. 13). Boyd and Crawford (2011) also highlight the ability of 
big data to make connections between different kinds of personal, collective, 
social, financial and spatial data, producing a significant informational value 
in the analysis of relationships and behaviour patterns and a new paradigm for 
sociospatial research (Jiang and Thill, 2015).
Crowdsourced data or the emergence of a new point of 
view on space
Within the more general phenomena of crowdsourcing and user- generated 
content, the result of the voluntary data production processes has been defined 
as VGI (Goodchild, 2007), a particular kind of georeferenced crowdsourcing 
that represents the contribution citizens make to local knowledge (‘citizens as 
sensors’). Citizens create, collect, publish and share geographic information 
on the Web, playing an increasing influence on government operations, on 
urban and regional planning and on a wide range of business activities. Citizen 
involvement also concerns mapping activities, which have previously been the 
exclusive responsibility of the central authorities. The development of GIS- 
oriented applications for mobile devices has further facilitated the creation 
and sharing of information maps, allowing the construction of user- friendly 
web platforms not requiring any professional cartographic skill (‘collaborative 
mapping’). This is the case with OSM,1 a collaborative map of the world 
created by a community of mappers who contribute to acquiring, reviewing 
and updating data on roads, trails, cafés, railway stations and other open 
data not covered by copyright. In 2019, 15 years after its creation, the OSM 
community of mappers was made up of more than five million registered 
members around the world.
Another example of VGI is the use of geotagging in the daily activities 
of people moving through the city. Cranshaw et al. (2012) developed a new 
representation of cities not based on the administrative boundaries of districts, 
but on what they define as ‘livehoods’: geo- social neighbourhoods defined by 
geographic proximity and by the cultural similarities of people in terms of 
social behaviour and daily use of the city. EmoMap is an application developed 
by the Vienna University of Technology (Capineri et al., 2018) that tries to 
understand the relationship between the urban context and the emotional 
responses of people crossing and living in different areas of the city.
1 See https:// www.openstreetmap.org/ stats/ data_ stats.html.
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The information produced from the users of the Geoweb is increasingly 
employed by the governments and organisations that play a central role in 
stimulating and organising citizen input into local planning (Certomà and 
Rizzi, 2017; Johnson and Sieber, 2013). The UN is experimenting with 
VGI’s potentiality through U- Report,2 an anonymous messaging service 
available through the Facebook Messenger app that allows young people to 
speak out on issues that matter in their area. Over time, they also have the 
opportunity to contribute to discussions on certain issues, giving feedback 
about their experience as a U- Reporter to the central or local authorities. This 
service works in more than 53 countries around the world, from Argentina to 
Liberia and New Zealand. Citizen crowdsourcing is also the basis of the social 
experiment carried out by the Barcelona municipality through Decidim, a free 
open- source participatory online platform helping ‘citizens, organizations and 
public institutions self- organize democratically at every scale’.3 Bria (2018) 
states that over 70 per cent of urban policies in Barcelona have been proposed 
and decided through the online participation of citizens.
Albeit without adopting a precise technological mandate as in the case 
of Barcelona, in 2018 Rome’s III Municipality government requested the 
collaboration of citizens (Morosi, 2018) in producing a collaborative map of 
under- used or abandoned spaces, in order to allocate them for cultural purposes. 
This ongoing mapping exercise, based on the open- data platform Reter,4 a critical 
and collaborative cartography project, has led to spaces emerging that had 
never been considered in the past, by means of the Rome municipality’s official 
map:  parks, gardens, schools, associations, community centres, bookshops, 
parishes, public buildings, squares, open spaces, streets, urban stairs, private 
terraces, interior courtyards in popular condominiums, all potential spaces where 
people can meet and develop cultural programmes based on public pedagogy. 
A new way of providing collective knowledge about places is provided by local 
people living there, a living and non- static map, with an affective and emotional 
dimension. In such a context, the cultural and entertainment dimension acts as 
a motivation for citizens to get actively involved (Figure 3.1).
The active production of information provided by the citizen is only a part 
of the Geoweb universe. A larger proportion of it is produced involuntarily by 
social media and mobile app users, which Campagna (2016, p. 48) defines as 
‘social media geographic information’ (SMGI), a sub- category of VGI:  ‘any 
piece or collection of multimedia data or information with explicit (i.e. 
coordinates) or implicit (i.e. place names or toponyms) geographic reference 
collected through the social networking web or mobile applications’. An 
2 See https:// uk.ureport.in.
3 See https:// www.decidim.org.
4 See https:// reter.info.
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unstructured data set of content that, if integrated with other data sources, can 
improve the knowledge of citizens’ perceptions and mood through ‘sentiment 
analysis’. Feick and Roche (2013) identify the ‘geowebbers’ as Debord’s 
‘psychogeographers’ – flâneurs in urban space, exploring, using and producing 
new unstructured, but potentially valuable, data for local understanding.
The Geoweb has also transformed the traditional and professional GIS- 
user interfaces into simple, yet compelling, web browser- like interfaces. As 
Sui (2008, p. 4) argues, the ‘wikification of GIS is perhaps one of the most 
exciting, and indeed revolutionary developments since the invention of [GIS] 
technology in the early 1960s’. VGI is a sort of postmodern GIS ‘in which 
individuals are able to assert their own views of their surroundings and play 
a part in local decision- making’ (Goodchild, 2010, p.  20). The UN has 
recognised that ‘VGI and crowdsourced data … has the potential to enable 
user’s view of the geography, which if utilized by policy and decision- makers, 
will allow for potentially more effectively targeted interventions and more 
tailored public services’ (UNGGIM, 2013, p. 29).
Figure  3.1. Spaces of entertainment discovered by collaborative mapping in the 
III Municipality of Rome: an internal condominium courtyard (September 2018, 
https:// www.facebook.com/ grandecomeunacitta/ photos/ a.485400815204313/ 485401 
775204217/ ?type=3&theater, accessed 28 Feb. 2019, used with permission of the author 
Carlo Marcolin).
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Capineri (2016) suggests that the experiential nature of VGI content 
can challenge the dominant narratives, traditionally provided by statistical 
indicators, because VGI represents a situated knowledge, inscribed in places 
and based on local practices and culture. Despite the technocratic implications 
of an excessive confidence in technology and the risks of the exclusion of 
people who do not have the required skills, Certomà and Rizzi (2017) posit 
that crowdsourcing is a tool able to generate new forms of urban governance 
through the active participation of citizens in the local political life.
This promising universe of new data provides huge quantities of geographical 
information that need to be not only exploited, but also decoded and understood 
within clear theoretical and epistemological frameworks (Kitchin, 2014; Sui 
and DeLyser, 2012). The emergence of information produced by people and 
communities claiming their point of view, without the filter of statisticians 
and other experts, undermines and calls into question the role of a neutral and 
objective knowledge, mostly based on the quantitative paradigm described earlier.
A paradigm based on the idea of space as a geometric and bounded entity 
inspired the analyses of positivist geography and other disciplines such as regional 
science. If the place where people and their perceptions and emotions reside 
matters, a new dimension of spatiality should be considered, a multilayered and 
dynamic vision that is the basis of the so- called postmodern turn in geography 
theorised by scholars such as Lefebvre (1991) and Harvey (2006).
Beyond geotagging: towards a conceptual framework 
for big geodata
One of the most interesting outcomes of the postmodern turn in geography 
is the transition to a new way of looking at space. In the recent past, many 
scholars have suggested that space has a much deeper meaning and importance 
than just an absolute and Euclidean dimension and they have proposed 
a theory in which space is seen as absolute, relative or relational, or any 
combination of these depending on the circumstances. As Harvey (2006, 
p. 145) puts it: ‘An event or a thing at a point in space cannot be understood 
by appeal[ing] to what exists only at that point’, depending on a wide amount 
of spatial relations on different scales and subject to historical influences. In 
the attempt to reach an even more analytical conceptualisation that allows us 
to disentangle, reaggregate and, at the same time, unify the concept of space, 
Harvey (2006, p. 152) suggests proceeding through a ‘speculative leap’. This 
consists of associating his former three- dimensional conceptualisation of 
space (‘absolute/ relative/ relational’) (Harvey, 1969) with the spatial trialectic 
(‘experienced/ conceptualized/ lived space’) proposed by Lefebvre (1991). This 
association generates a 3 x 3 matrix in which each cell represents a specific way 
of conceiving the meaning of space (Harvey, 2006) (see Table 3.1).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1. The matrix of spatialities (Harvey, 2006, p. 152)
Material space (experienced space) Representations of space (conceptualised space) Spaces of representation (lived space)
Absolute 
space
Walls, bridges, doors, stairways, floors, 
ceilings, streets, buildings, cities, 
mountains, continents, bodies of water, 
territorial markers, physical boundaries 
and barriers, gated communities
Cadastral and administrative maps; Euclidean 
geometry; landscape description; metaphors of 
confinement, open space, location, placement 
and positionality; (command and control 
relatively easy) – Newton and Descartes
Feelings of contentment around the 
hearth; sense of security or incarceration 
from enclosure; sense of power from 
ownership, command and domination 
over space; fear of others ‘beyond the pale’
Relative space 
(time)
Circulation and flows of energy; water, 
air, commodities, peoples, information, 
money, capital; accelerations and 
diminutions in the friction of distance
Thematic and topological maps (e.g. London 
tube system); non- Euclidean geometries and 
topology; perspectival drawings; metaphors 
of situated knowledges, of motion, mobility, 
displacement, accelerations, time– space 
compression and distanciation; (command 
and control difficult, requiring sophisticated 
techniques) – Einstein and Riemann
Anxiety at not getting to class on time; 
thrill of moving into the unknown; 
frustration in a traffic jam; tensions or 
exhilarations of time– space compression, 
of speed, of motion
Relational 
space (time)
Electromagnetic energy flows and 
fields; social relations; rental and 
economic potential surfaces; pollution 
concentrations; energy potentials; sounds, 
odours and sensations wafted in the breeze
Surrealism; existentialism; psychogeographies; 
cyberspace, metaphors of internalisation of 
forces and powers; (command and control 
extremely difficult – chaos theory, dialectics, 
internal relations, quantum mathematics) – 
Leibniz, Whitehead, Deleuze, Benjamin
Visions, fantasies, desires, frustrations, 
memories, dreams, phantasms, psychic 
states (e.g. agoraphobia, vertigo, 
claustrophobia)
new
genrtpdf
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By introducing Lefebvrian categories, Harvey (2006) assigns great relevance 
to the ‘subject’, that is, the inhabitant of the city, with all her/ his perceptions 
of the real context of the place (‘experienced space’) involving feelings and 
emotions (‘lived spaces’). This, in turn, allows Harvey to stress – within a clear 
postmodern framework – the importance of the positionality of the subject in 
the knowledge and representation of space. Furthermore, by introducing the 
category of ‘representation of space’, Harvey raises the issue of political power, 
in its capacity through mediated representations, to produce and reproduce 
space and to influence its perception and use.
In the matrix, the different position of the cells allows, once crystallised, the 
identification of the phenomena taking place in space by decomposing them. 
What is more, through the inverse dialectic movement process across the cells, 
the matrix also allows us to recombine a complex, transcalar and dialectical 
view of space.
In this way, the matrix permits the deconstruction and, at the same 
time, the reassemblage of different types of space. It is possible to describe 
‘absolute experienced space’, that is the space of walls, streets, bridges and all 
the elements that a human being is able to perceive; the ‘relative spaces of 
representation’, as in the case of the frustration of commuters generated by 
being trapped for hours in traffic on their way to or from work; the ‘relational 
spaces of representation’, that is the artistic production in space mediated by 
the artist. The same space, as in the case of a city square, can be described 
by the cadastre map, by a postcard, by the time needed to reach it from the 
nearest train station, by the quantity of air monitored by air- pollution control 
systems; it can be described by the city’s official tourist guide, containing all 
the information on how to access the square and presented through an artistic 
medium. Finally, it can assume several features if, along with this information, 
we add emotional factors: the feelings of people living there, of people passing 
by in the square for business or pleasure, the place that the square has in the 
individual as well as in the collective memory.
However, this stimulating view of spatiality is limited by an operational 
impasse, because as we move away from a Cartesian and geometric conception 
of space, the representation and analysis of phenomena in terms of dialectic 
and emotional spatiality becomes increasingly difficult and complex. The space 
of sensations, emotions, imagination and meanings embedded in everyday 
life, experienced through the complex network of symbols and images of its 
inhabitants and users, is essentially qualitative, fluid and dynamic. As Zhang 
(2006) suggests, an important element in Lefebvre’s (1991) space theory is 
the introduction of the ‘viewer’s point of view’, because its trialectic is not 
intended as a cake cut into three slices, but rather as three different images 
that overlap. Each image represents a different moment of the human spatial 
experience.
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This conceptual perspective can help to clarify the role that new sources of 
information can play in geographical studies. They can allow the analysis of 
spatial phenomena in quantitative terms, via the availability of a large amount 
of georeferencing data passively collected, not only in a static way, but also in 
terms of flows and movements, and also in qualitative terms, via the information 
about what people say and voluntarily produce through online content. This is 
a central point of the potential that big data can offer to geographical studies: a 
deeper knowledge of places and local dynamics beyond simple geotagging 
based on the possibility of locating available information.
SDGs: Indicators as usual
In order to test the heuristic power of the inspiring conceptualisation of 
spatiality described in the previous section, it must be understood how the 
categories identified in the matrix can provide a relational and complex 
representation of the phenomena analysed in their spatial dimension and if 
new sources of data like VGI can support it.
The exercise proposed consists of testing the operational potentialities of the 
matrix through the representation of the concept of sustainability in an urban 
context.
In 2015 UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, defined as ‘a shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for 
people and the planet’, comprised of 17 SDGs: a global call for action against 
poverty and other deprivations, the implementation of policies for health and 
education, the reduction of inequality, the support of economic growth, and 
the challenge of climate change in order to preserve the planet.
The goals were defined according to the concept of sustainability involving 
three dimensions (environmental, social and economic), with the aim of 
capturing both the time perspective of intergenerational sustainability and 
the spatial perspective of intragenerational sustainability among nations and 
regions. The 17 goals comprise of 230 indicators that cover the 169 targets 
expected to be achieved by 2030.
Despite this significant shift in the global approach to social and economic 
development, the way of representing the complexity stemming from this 
new route, in particular at the local level, remains bound to the traditional 
systems of indicators based on official statistical data produced by institutions 
to communicate a vision of the local as objective and neutral (Kaika, 2017).
The ‘Cape Town Global Action Plan for Sustainable Development 
Data’ (UN, 2017) only generically sketches the need for ‘new sources of 
data’ (Objective 2.3), without considering data highlighting the individual 
component of sustainability. The production of geographic information 
(Objective 3.4) is also requested in order to be integrated with statistical data, 
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but without a specific reflection on the objectives and actors involved, as well as 
the choice of spatial units relevant to the analysis of the targets at sub- national 
level, such as in Goal 11: ‘Make cities and human settlement inclusive, safe, 
resilient and sustainable’.
Leaving aside the criticisms around the ideological bases, the effectiveness of 
the policies and the fundamental contradictions regarding the unsustainability 
of economic growth and environmental protection as consistent objectives of 
the SDGs expressed by some scholars (Easterly, 2015; Nightingale, 2018; Swain, 
2018), many objections have been raised regarding the issue of a data- driven 
approach. Two of the main elements at stake that have been raised are the lack 
of a theoretical basis (Szirmai, 2015) and the inconsistency of the framework 
indicators due to the contested concept of sustainability not being directly 
observable or measurable (Spaiser et  al., 2017). When measuring discrete or 
simple phenomena (like industrial production or goods transported by train), 
the role of indicators is quite simple and not questionable. However, when the 
phenomenon to be represented is a contested concept, like sustainability or 
human well- being, then it is necessary to adopt some care in its conceptualisation, 
construction and use. Mair et  al. (2018) state that if sustainability is a non- 
univocal concept, the representation provided by indicators only reflects the 
vision of one of the possible interpretations of the concept and not a universal 
meaning. This problem is also intertwined with the ethical implications of 
indicators that in modern Western society are separable from technical issues 
seen as neutral and objective. If data do not consider the moral dimension of 
sustainability of different communities involved, there is a risk that data do not 
reflect people’s real values. Nevertheless, indicators produce visions of the world, 
shaping and determining policies and action (Liverman, 2018). It is precisely 
here that the problem of the scale of representation intervenes, being the values 
strictly connected to the local dimension where people live and act. If urban is 
not only a territory or a simple portion of space but the place where sociospatial 
relations act simultaneously (Massey, 1992), then it is difficult to synthesise it in 
just one way, and a rethinking of the traditional categories (such as centre and 
periphery) of urban representation is needed.
If the concept of sustainability is widely defined as a pillar of the strategy 
of the SDGs, the concept of ‘city’ that inspires Goal 11 of the SDGs remains 
opaque and difficult to operate. Unlike the general consensus on the importance 
of cities for sustainable development that appears in the background as 
an unquestionable truth, a clear definition of the city does not emerge from 
UN documents, and the SDG devoted to cities seems to be somewhat of a 
compromise between the different schools of theoretical thought (Barnett and 
Parnell, 2016). A consequence of this indefinite theoretical assumption is the 
lack of an adequate scale of analysis for the implementation system, centred on 
indicators at the national level, without conceptualising and undertaking ‘new 
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forms of relational comparative analysis, those that escape the normalizing 
assumptions on traditional styles of comparative analysis’ (Barnett and Parnell, 
2016, p. 11).
With these considerations in mind, we propose testing the matrix of 
spatialities outlined above (Table 3.1) in order to understand whether urban 
sustainability can be better represented by traditional indicators and, at the 
same time, if the subjective dimension of the communities involved in SDG 
policies can be integrated into the framework of indicators. The matrix, 
through a holistic approach, also allows the vision of the connections that link 
the different aspects of the problem analysed and of the different spatial scales 
involved in the implementation of the strategy.
In SDGs, Goal 11 is devoted to policies that will make cities and human 
settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. Urban sprawl is one of 
the main problems that world cities are facing:  ‘Urban sprawl is a complex 
phenomenon that is difficult to quantify and measure accurately … moving 
from sprawl to compact form is more likely to be a direction in a continuum 
rather than across fixed and measurable categories’ (Frenkel and Ashkenazi, 
2008, p. 57). The official indicator proposed to monitor the implementation 
of policies is ‘average ratio of land consumption rate to population growth rate, 
1990−2000 and 2000−2015’, based on a stratified sample of 194 cities. As 
stated in The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2016 (UN, 2016, p. 33), 
this indicator has a significant disclaimer:
Unfortunately, a low value for this ratio is not necessarily an indication 
that urban dwellers are faring well, as this can indicate a prevalence of 
overcrowded slums. Unplanned urban sprawl is associated with increased 
per capita emissions of carbon dioxide and hazardous pollution and often 
drives housing prices up, all of which hamper sustainable development.
It is clear that the indicator simplifies a highly complex problem that cannot be 
measured in the same way for all world cities or through a single measure and 
a spatial administrative unit.
In this exercise urban sprawl is proposed as a ‘stylised fact’ of spatial injustice, 
a multidimensional ‘space- embedded’ phenomenon that can be considered as a 
good example of the circular and cumulative relationship between spatial forms 
and social behaviours.
Starting from the material aspects of urban sprawl in terms of ‘absolute/ 
relative/ relational/ experienced space’ (first row of the matrix), we will then 
broaden the analysis to the other social and spatial phenomena connected to it.
The first step consists of deconstructing urban sprawl into its main spatial 
and social forms and effects:
• home– workplace commuting;
• energy consumption;
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• air pollution;
• infrastructural costs;
• agricultural land consumption;
• land waterproofing and sealing risks;
• natural habitat fragmentation (biodiversity losses);
• social costs: segregation of non- drivers or non- car owners, disadvantaged 
groups, lack of neighbourhood relationships, lack of identity and sense 
of community belonging, lack of places to socialise.
These dimensions are closely interdependent, and have a clear spatial dimension 
that is, however, difficult to grasp through static analysis.
In Table  3.2 we describe urban sprawl, in a relational way, and its 
unsustainable human impact, that is the daily home– workplace commuting 
of people living in urban- dispersed peripheries. By integrating the different 
spatialities and scale of urban sprawl, the matrix allows us to bring out the 
complexity of the phenomenon:
• experienced/ absolute space (i.e. transport networks);
• conceptualised/ absolute space (i.e. the way in which commuting space 
is represented by official documents, plans and projects, thematic maps, 
tourist guides, tube maps);
• lived/ absolute space (i.e. the imaginary of commuters, their anxieties 
and frustrations).
Each cell identifies a specific type of original space that helps to deconstruct a 
concept (the mobility of commuters within a sprawled urban context) and to 
incorporate its intrinsic spatiality.
The next step consists of filling up the matrix with the quantitative and 
qualitative information according to their spatiality. As shown in Table 3.2, the 
matrix contains different types of information at different spatial scales. In our 
case, the spatial reference of commuting flows comprises people resident in a 
given urban area with diffused urban characteristics that need to be related to 
the other spatial levels of the analysis.
The result of the reassemblage of the information contained in the matrix 
is a relational representation of the investigated phenomenon. This allows us 
to grasp and disentangle different levels of the analysis and different points 
of view of the urban sprawl and to focus, in turn, on both quantitative and 
qualitative aspects, or choose an overall narrative in which space is integrated 
into the analysis.
If the first column of the matrix represents discrete phenomena easily 
operationalised through quantitative data and indicators, the column relating 
to the ‘lived space’ is instead difficult to be represented through traditional 
quantitative tools, but it nevertheless plays an important role in our 
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understanding of the urban sprawl. The role of big data can be supportive in 
all the different phases/ cells of the matrix, in particular for the relational aspects 
of the observed phenomena (e.g. the daily commuting of passengers through 
transport card chips, the use of the city made by the commuter through their 
geotags). However, it is in the third column relating to the lived space that the 
use of crowdsourcing reveals its most interesting potentialities for all the reasons 
explained in the previous paragraphs. It is here that people involved in daily 
commuting can express their point of view, which cannot emerge through the 
indicators selected to implement Goal 11 of the SDGs. These voices can produce 
Table 3.2. The matrix of spatialities: spaces of urban commuting
Space Experienced Conceptualised Lived
Absolute Streets connecting 
periphery to city 
centres; public 
transport lines; no. 
of inhabitants per 
square km
Documents of 
territorial planning for 
mobility, territorial 
statistics and local 
labour systems, 
sectorial territorial 
studies, landscape 
description, documents 
related to real- estate 
market
Emotions, feelings 
of insecurity 
generated by 
the location of 
their own house, 
comparison with 
people living in 
historical/ central 
areas of the same 
city)
Relative Average commuting 
home– workplace 
times; home– 
workplace commuting 
flows; movements for 
business- related reasons
Thematic maps 
(information on traffic 
and public transport) 
of the area, train/ bus 
timetables
Perception of 
commuters 
regarding 
commuting times; 
anxiety caused by 
transport delays, 
traffic; anxiety, 
discomfort
Relational CO2 concentration 
caused by transport; 
incidence of diseases 
in the population 
according to type of 
disease; socialising 
places; accessibility 
to primary and 
secondary services; 
ICT connectivity: web, 
Wi- Fi
Artistic representations 
(i.e. surrealism), 
psychogeography, 
literature, blog
Perceptions of 
the quality of 
life and social 
relationships; 
feeling of 
isolation; lack of 
social identity 
(comparison with 
people living in 
historical/ central 
areas of the same 
city)
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new spatialities and contribute to the inclusion of citizen and communities in 
the decision- making process, allowing those minority views to be taken into 
consideration (Kharrazi et al., 2016).
The coexistence of multiple scales and sources involved in the analysis invites 
us to explore the possibility of using different – although interrelated – analytical 
tools (Sui and DeLyser, 2012), including methods, techniques and different 
types of sources, trying to make a hybrid integration that is able to reassemble 
as much as possible the complexity of the theme, where ‘mathematics, poetry, 
and music converge if not merge’ (Harvey, 2006, p. 124).
Conclusions
The large and increasing availability of geospatial data about individual and 
social preferences, opinions, values, movements and relationships, although 
still largely unstructured and in search of new measures for the assessment 
of its quality, can contribute to a new information base for improving our 
collective knowledge of places. In this chapter, we have tried to clarify, on 
conceptual grounds, the role that this avalanche of data, especially those 
voluntarily produced by web users, can play in improving the research agenda 
of geographical studies. These data sources represent not only a chance to 
enlarge the availability of geographic data, but also, and more importantly, 
they can support the development of new representations of spatial processes at 
various scales, allowing them to move from a static to a dynamic level in terms 
of flows, processes and relationships. VGI, in particular, can also challenge the 
representation provided by traditional indicators, producing different narratives 
and discourses about places. People can act as living indicators, incorporating 
dimensions like subjectivities and emotions still largely neglected in the case of 
policies devoted to well- being like the UN SDGs.
The idea of spatiality that emerges from the conceptual perspective proposed 
in this chapter represents a critical topic to be considered in order to avoid 
the risk associated with the technoscientific epistemology produced by the 
growing and pervasive availability of data. The possibility of representing living 
spaces, through the voice of local communities, without the intermediation of 
power and experts, is nevertheless a politically relevant issue. It also requires the 
development of a new methodological approach where the integration of data, 
formats, methods, tools and subjects producing information becomes crucial 
and a major challenge for the future research agenda.
Despite this promising scenario, many issues need to be explored. 
Inclusiveness and participation in the Geoweb still show patterns of inequality 
both geographically and socially. The participation in crowdsourced information 
takes place mainly in urban areas where infrastructural information and 
communications technology (ICT) facilities (internet, Wi- Fi and so on) are 
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more available; a distribution that unfortunately confirms that the digital divide 
follows the traditional lines of social injustice on a global scale. Moreover, as 
is evident from this chapter, the voluntary contribution to the production of 
data directly usable for collective information concerns only a part of the big 
data universe. To the traditional debate on the exclusion from the Web of those 
who do not have the means and the computer skills necessary for participation, 
we must add the problem of those who own and process these large amounts 
of data. These new subjects only partially coincide with the public institutions 
and represent a potential threat to democratic information and to the privacy 
of people. Citizens’ digital rights include the rights of privacy, security and 
information self- determination and must be placed at the centre of digital 
policies (Bria and Bain, 2018).
The scientific community, in particular the producers of official statistics, 
is still wary of the role and quality of crouwdsourced data. If traditional 
statistics are produced through documented and reproducible phases and 
methodologies, in the world of big data information comes from multiple 
sources, the synthesis is done by the user and the sampling process is not 
provided before data gathering. The assessment of quality and reliability of 
these new data sources is a complex issue that cannot be limited to the field of 
statistical studies but implies the rethinking of the epistemological framework 
for social analysis in an era where the production of knowledge is no longer left 
exclusively to the scientific community (Saltelli et al., 2016).
The practices of online democratic participation reported in this chapter 
are still wide-ranging in nature and intensity and need a more comprehensive 
assessment of their ability to become integrated in local government processes. 
To avoid the risk of a new technocratic way of producing knowledge, the 
information asset of big data and online participation is only a part of the 
debate between citizens and institutions. Technology is not an endpoint but 
only a tool to improve broad participation in place construction.
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4. Data colonialism, surveillance 
capitalism and drones
Faine Greenwood
The world is undergoing a process of ‘datafication’ (Mayer- Schönberger and Cukier, 2013) and the aid sector is no exception. Humanitarian and development workers are using newly available big data products 
to make operational decisions, learn more about crises and monitor the impact 
of ongoing response. This ‘humanitarian data ecosystem’ (Raymond and Al 
Achkar, 2016) encompasses many information sources, including social media 
postings, open- source maps, detailed records of mobile phone calls, as well 
as imagery taken from satellites and drones. Much of this information now 
comes from platforms or data sets controlled by private corporations, such as 
Facebook, Google and Twitter (Burns, 2018; Taylor and Broeders, 2015), and 
humanitarians increasingly partner with private corporations that have the data 
collection and analysis capacities they do not possess themselves (Fontainha 
et al., 2016).
Taken together, these developments can be described as a ‘technocratic turn’ 
in the humanitarian aid and development sector, as technical expertise grows 
in importance and impact (Read et al., 2016). At the same time, international 
debate has flared over the role that technology companies play in government 
and in our personal lives. Critics are developing new descriptions of the ‘data 
extraction’ (Zuboff, 2015, 2019) processes these companies rely upon to make 
profits. Couldry and Mejias (2018) and Thatcher, O’ Sullivan et al. (2016) refer 
to ‘data colonialism’, a term that describes a means of ‘capitalist accumulation by 
dispossession that colonizes and commodifies everyday life in ways previously 
impossible’ (Couldry and Mejias, 2018, p.  1). Zuboff (2019) describes the 
system of ‘surveillance capitalism’, in which human data by- products are 
converted into wealth, often at the expense of the producers of this raw material.
Small civilian drones are particularly representative objects of this 
technocratic turn in humanitarian aid, due to both their perceived novelty 
and to the ‘disease’ of surveillance capitalism with which they are often 
associated. The drone ‘allows us to project our intelligence into the air and to 
exert our influence over vast expanses of space’ (Wallace- Wells, 2014). Drones 
are sociotechnical ‘assemblages of the vertical’ (Crampton, 2016, p.1) that 
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permit us to view the world from a novel perspective: below the high- altitude 
flight path of manned aircraft and satellites, but above the viewpoint of an 
earthbound human being (Garrett and Anderson, 2018). In the context of 
humanitarian aid and development, this new perspective is often hailed as 
one that permits humanitarians to do their jobs more effectively and to quite 
literally see need more clearly:  it allows the circumstances they operate in to 
become more ‘legible’ to them (Scott, 1998). However, this new- found aerial 
perspective also brings with it novel risks to the people who are being surveilled, 
often without their explicit consent or knowledge. Importantly, these risks are 
by no means restricted to drones, which are simply one of many new data 
collection technologies used by humanitarian aid workers today. The ethical 
quandaries that they present are closely linked to those presented by the use of, 
for example, geolocated mobile phone data to track the spread of disease or the 
use of facial recognition technology to control refugee access to financial aid. 
This chapter will use civilian drone technology as an entry point to a broader 
consideration of data collection practices in the aid and development sector 
today, situating the technology within the dual frameworks of data colonialism 
and surveillance capitalism.
Big data, innovation and humanitarian aid
Humanitarian data collection has been present since very early in the history 
of the humanitarian movement. Read et al. (2016, p. 5) trace the ‘continuing 
fascination with speed and accuracy in information management, as well 
as fundamental ethical issues arising from data mining’ to the 1870s and 
J.C.  Chenu’s and Florence Nightingale’s statistical analysis of casualties 
in the Crimean and Franco- Prussian Wars (L. McDonald, 2013). The so- 
called ‘humanitarian data revolution’ (Dickinson, 2016), however, is a more 
recent development, aligned with other data- driven technological advances 
outside the humanitarian sector. Many commentators (Meier, 2015; Read 
et  al., 2016) trace the origin point or foundational moment of this new 
epoch of humanitarian data to 2010 and the response to the devastating 
Haiti earthquake. A new cadre of remotely distributed, spontaneous digital 
volunteers used map- making software, social media postings and other digital 
data sources to improve humanitarian situational awareness. These new 
networks of volunteers are often referred to as ‘digital humanitarians’ (Hunt 
and Specht, 2019; Meier, 2015). Social media postings (especially geotagged 
postings) ostensibly permit humanitarians to learn more about what is 
happening during a disaster, who needs help and where resources ought to be 
directed. Humanitarian satellite imagery analysts use high- resolution imagery 
to search for signs of impending famine, track population movements and 
monitor ongoing conflicts. These data collection efforts extend beyond the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91DATA COLONIALISM AND DRONES
realm of immediate crisis response and the traditionally defined humanitarian 
sector and into the closely linked international development sector as well. The 
‘digital traces’ left by mobile phones and social media provide information on 
population health, movement, public opinion and other matters that are not 
represented in often scant statistical data, providing development workers with 
a far greater range of quantifiable information than they had access to in the 
past (Mann and Ferenbok, 2013; Taylor and Schroeder, 2015). Burns (2015, 
p.  25) asserts that emergency management, disaster relief and international 
development are all ‘deeply interlocked regimes of knowledge, power, and 
morality’, with often amorphous boundaries between them. The interlocked 
nature of these sectors is reflected in their similar approaches to the use of ‘big 
data’ in their activities today.
Much of this data is not collected by humanitarian or development 
workers themselves, nor is it posted on platforms that they control. Instead, 
humanitarian data analysts often rely on data that come from somewhere 
else, including social media networks like Facebook, satellites operated by 
governmental or private organisations and mobile phone records that are 
released to humanitarians by telecom providers. Using external data sources 
costs less, involves less labour and is a less time- intensive prospect for 
humanitarians than self- collection, with companies sometimes donating the 
data to aid organisations themselves as an act of ‘data philanthropy’ (Jerven, 
2013; Kirkpatrick, 2011). Supporters of these practices believe that using 
these data and the technologies that analyse them is ‘more accurate, faster, 
and more egalitarian’ (Read et al., 2016, p. 7) than the analogue humanitarian 
data collection practices of the past (Burns, 2018).
Read et al. (2016) argue that this technocratic turn in humanitarian aid 
was mediated by a number of factors, following the new corporate orientation 
that took root in aid organisations beginning in the 1980s and coupled with 
growing pressure on organisations from governments and donors to work 
more efficiently and transparently. These public– private partnerships embody 
the logic of what Currion (2018) describes as ‘market humanitarianism’, 
a system that combines the worst aspects of both hierarchy and market 
(Seybolt, 2009).
This neoliberal approach is echoed in the rhetoric surrounding 
new technologies for humanitarian aid, like small camera- carrying 
drones: technology that is ‘efficient, effective, and cheap’ will help save more 
lives and reduce the cost of humanitarian aid (Sandvik and Jumbert, 2016, 
p.  12). This orientation also incorporates and normalizes metrics stemming 
from the drive for ‘capital accumulations’ (Burns, 2019), emphasising cost 
saving, consumer choice and returns for aid donors who increasingly demand 
ever- more precise accountability in return for their financial investment. 
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Digitised methods are increasingly presented as a means of achieving this level 
of granular accountability, permitting donors to more clearly see the ‘impact’ 
of their giving.
Today’s aid workers are often encouraged to learn from the ‘innovative’ 
technological expertise of private sector organisations (Mitchell, 2011). 
Humanitarian aid organisations are urged to hire data specialists and to 
increase the data literacy of existing staff. A blog post on the World Economic 
Forum (2018) on big data and humanitarian aid warns that ‘data is the new 
oil and, in order to maximise its extraction, there is a specific need for a skilled 
workforce’. Currion (2018) and Burns (2019) link this aid sector embrace of 
private sector tech expertise to the economic assumptions of neoliberalism, 
coupled with the growing sense that humanitarian aid itself functions as a sort 
of quasi- market. Currion (2018, p.  5) asks, ‘How better to succeed in this 
marketplace than to partner with organizations that have already succeeded in 
another marketplace?’
As a result, decision- makers in the aid sector were perhaps well- primed to 
welcome new partnerships with large corporations, especially those dependent 
on the extraction of data from individuals. Many of today’s largest and most 
widely known tech companies have announced recent partnerships with aid and 
development organisations. In 2017, Facebook’s Data for Good team launched 
its Disaster Maps Initiative, which uses Facebook data to search for areas where 
aid is most needed during a disaster. The company had partnered with 30 non- 
profit organisations and agencies by late 2018, including the United Nations 
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the World Food 
Programme (WFP) (Cheney, 2018). In September 2018, the UN, the World 
Bank, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Microsoft 
Corp, Google and Amazon Web Services announced an ‘unprecedented global 
partnership to prevent future famines’, which will ‘use the predictive power of 
data to trigger funding through appropriate financing instruments, working 
closely with existing systems’ (World Bank, 2018). In February 2019, the WFP 
announced a five- year collaboration with data analysis company Palantir, to 
improve the efficiency of its aid delivery.
Drones in humanitarian aid: an overview
Drones are unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), usually equipped with some level 
of on- board computational power beyond that of traditional remote- controlled 
aircraft. They range in size from the military RQ- 4 Global Hawk at 14,950 
pounds (6.7 tonnes) to the Hubsan X4 Micro Quad Copter, which weighs less 
than an ounce (28 grams). They are built by at- home hobbyists using spare 
parts, by consumer technology companies and by military suppliers. This 
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chapter focuses exclusively on small drones (under 55 pounds or 25kg) that 
are built by non- military contractors and are intended for civilian purposes, 
as these are the type that appear to be most widely used by humanitarian and 
development actors.
Drones are not a new technology. The Kettering Bug, the first functional 
UAV, was introduced in 1918 and billed as a ‘flying torpedo’ (Newcome, 
2004; Stamp, 2013), while armed drones equipped with television technology 
were first used in warfare in 1944 (Lerner, 2017). As these military- specific 
drones developed, so too did hobby remote- controlled aircraft: the world’s first 
successful small remote- controlled aircraft was built in 1938 (Yarrish, 2011). 
By the 1980s, Japanese farmers had begun using unmanned helicopters to spray 
crops (Sheets, 2018). The development and success of smartphones bolstered 
demand for small, powerful sensors and processors and remote- controlled 
aircraft hobbyists began to incorporate these into their model designs, making 
their aircraft ‘smarter’. Hobby drone companies began to emerge in the 2000s, 
including Dajiang Enterprises (DJI), a Chinese company that by 2019 would 
become the world’s largest civilian UAV manufacturer. In 2013, DJI released 
its Phantom model, a relatively easy- to- use quadcopter- style drone equipped 
with global positioning system (GPS) and capable of carrying a small external 
camera.
Today’s civilian, consumer drones are capable of carrying high- resolution 
cameras, which can be used to collect video and still images. They are equipped 
with GPS receivers and can geotag the images they collect, which can then be 
processed into geographically accurate maps. Unlike the long- range drones used 
by the military, small multirotor drones can fly for approximately 30 minutes 
and have a maximum transmission range of 4.1 miles, meaning that operators 
are required to be relatively close to what they are attempting to surveil (DJI, 
2019). As of 2019, small civilian UAVs have become a growing international 
market, while many nations have begun to introduce regulations that govern 
their use. At the moment, the so- called ‘big five’ technology companies (Apple, 
Facebook, Microsoft, Alphabet and Amazon) are largely not directly involved 
in the consumer drone market. However, drone- focused companies regularly 
use products that are produced by the ‘big five’ companies, such as Google 
Maps (for navigation), Apple iPhones and iPads (as a means of providing a 
visual interface for the drone), and Amazon Web Services (for data processing 
and storage).
How humanitarians use drones
Civilian drones have been used by disaster responders since at least 2000, 
when the Japanese government used the Yamaha R- Max unmanned helicopter 
to remotely evaluate volcanic activity in Hokkaido (Sato, 2003). Damage 
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assessment has proved to be a particularly popular use for civilian drones in 
humanitarian contexts. In 2012, the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) used drones to map damage from Hurricane Sandy in Haiti, while 
in 2013, drones were used to assess damage from Typhoon Haiyan in the 
Philippines. Drones were used for damage assessment in the aftermath of 
the 2015 Nepal earthquake, while in 2018, drones were used by disaster 
responders during the response to Hurricane Florence in the Eastern United 
States (Karpowicz, 2018) and to assess damage from the Sulawesi earthquake 
in Indonesia (DroneDeploy, 2018).
Some humanitarian organisations are also experimenting with civilian 
drones for purposes outside of damage assessment, such as package delivery 
and population monitoring. In 2018, the United Nations International 
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the government of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan announced the establishment of jointly run drone- testing corridors 
in that country (UNICEF, 2018), while the IOM regularly flew drones as part 
of needs and population monitoring efforts over refugee camps in Bangladesh 
(Humanitarian Data Exchange, 2019). The WFP has supported a number 
of humanitarian drone projects since 2015, including UAV cargo delivery 
experiments in the Dominican Republic (WFP Innovation Accelerator, 2019), 
UAV disaster assessment trainings in Mozambique (WFP Insight, 2019b) and 
emergency warning efforts in Bolivia (WFP Insight, 2019a).
Organisations dedicated to humanitarian and development drone use have 
also begun to emerge in response to the growing use of the technology. The 
Humanitarian UAV Network was founded in 2014, with the goal of serving as 
a central organisational point for humanitarian drone users. The organisation 
also introduced the UAV Network Code of Conduct (2019), which represents 
one of the first attempts at enshrining best practices and ethical standards into 
humanitarian drone use. The WeRobotics non- profit, founded in 2015, focuses 
on using robotics (particularly aerial civilian drones) to further humanitarian 
and development goals; its projects include both drone data collection and 
drone delivery efforts.
Drone use by humanitarian and development workers today can be broadly 
divided into two representative categories:  data collection and the delivery 
of objects. Little data currently exist that attempts to quantify the particular 
drone models used by humanitarians, or the specific ways in which these 
drone models are used. Data collection uses are exceptionally heterogenous, 
due to the ever- growing variety of sensors that can be attached to consumer 
drone models. Organisations may in some cases use a single drone model to 
collect multiple types of data, from photographs and orthorectified maps to 4K 
videos and thermal photographs. While manned aircraft can take very high- 
resolution photographs, it is much more expensive to operate these aircraft 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95DATA COLONIALISM AND DRONES
and the photography equipment they carry than it is to operate a small drone 
(Greenwood and Kakaes, 2015). Purchasing satellite imagery is also very 
expensive, and the process of tasking a satellite and analysing those images 
often requires a highly specialised skill set (Radjawali et al., 2017).
Because today’s consumer drones are inexpensive and relatively easy to use, 
they have been adopted by many individuals and organisations who previously 
lacked access to aerial imagery. Notably, drone imagery has been used by a 
number of indigenous groups (Paneque- Gálvez et al., 2017; Radjawali et al., 
2017) as a means of codifying their rights over traditional land, countering 
figurative (and literal) erasure of their presence by the ‘land- grabbing’ activities 
of neoliberal capitalists.
Unlike exclusively data- collecting drones (which are often made by 
consumer producers and less technically complex to operate), delivery drones 
are more often developed and deployed by private companies like Zipline, 
which operates medical delivery drones in Rwanda. The company evocatively 
describes its drones as ‘life- saving’ technology, developed as part of the company 
mission to ‘provide every human on Earth with instant access to vital medical 
supplies’ (Zipline, 2019).1
Data colonialism and surveillance capitalism
While critics of mass personal data collection have existed for as long as the 
practice and the companies that rely upon it have, these critiques have found 
new attention and consideration since around 2010, as the world grapples 
with unsettling realisations about the power of technology platforms to 
distort democracy, alter human relations and twist our societies into new and 
unwelcome forms (Manjoo, 2017). In the second decade of the twenty-first 
century scholars have defined and described new frameworks that describe 
these data collection practices and their particular effects on human society. 
This chapter, in its consideration of drone data collection in humanitarian 
aid, will rely upon two such frameworks:  data colonialism and surveillance 
capitalism. Both will be summarised briefly in this section.
Couldry and Mejias (2018, p.  2) describe ‘data colonialism’ as a process 
that combines the ‘predatory extractive practices of historical colonialism 
with the abstract quantification methods of computing’. In their analysis, 
data are the new oil, which must be appropriated from the human actors 
that generate them via a process that they call ‘data relations’. This constant 
tracking of human behaviour brings about a phenomenon that they describe 
as ‘data colonialism’, a distinctively 21st- century manifestation of colonialism 
1 It should be noted that delivery drones can also be used to collect visual spatial data.
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that normalises ‘the exploitation of human beings through data, just as historic 
colonialism appropriated territory and resources and ruled subjects for profit’ 
(Couldry and Mejias, 2018, p.  1). Key drivers of this new form of data 
colonialism include private companies that are heavily dependent upon the 
accumulation of individual data, such as social media companies like Facebook, 
mobile telecommunications companies like AT&T and advertising technology 
specialists such as Google.
The firms that profit from data colonialism, in this framework, view 
human social life as an open and ownerless source of raw data that is just 
there (Couldry and Mejias, 2018). For this data to be extracted for profitable 
purposes, however, Couldry and Mejias (2018, p. 3) contend that ‘life needs 
to be configured so as to generate such a resource’. Further, data from one 
individual in one moment need to be aggregated with other data from other 
times, permitting new conclusions to be drawn. Ultimately, the constantly 
watching, constantly tracking data practices perpetuated by these companies 
‘invade the space of the self ’ in their efforts to incorporate all of life into ‘an 
expanded process for the generation of surplus value’ (Couldry and Mejias, 
2018, p. 8). Corporations attempt to normalise this process to the public and 
to regulators by likening the data that they rely upon to a natural resource that 
will be lost to humanity unless it is cleverly appropriated. Further, they argue 
that the data exhaust that humans emit cannot be owned by anyone (although 
it certainly can be used by anyone who has enough technical expertise to 
do so). Couldry and Mejias (2018) argue that these ideas resemble colonial 
arguments of the recent past that worked to justify the violent appropriation 
of terra nullis that clearly belonged to and was inhabited by indigenous people 
(Cohen, 2017).
Thatcher, O’Sullivan et al. (2016) describe the capture of big data related 
to individuals and to groups as an inherently asymmetric process. In their 
analysis, power asymmetry is integral to the process of data colonialism: the 
relations between the producers of data and the collectors and owners of data 
‘mirror processes of primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession 
that occur as capitalism colonizes previously non- commodified, private 
times and places’ (Thatcher, O’Sullivan et  al., 2016, p.  5; see also Harvey 
2003, 2004).
The process of capital transforms data from a set of observations ‘into a 
multidimensional flow of algorithmically linked data points’, collected by 
various smart devices that transform human beings into ‘potential sensors’ 
(Thatcher, O’Sullivan et al., 2016, p. 5). Ultimately, Thatcher, O’Sullivan et al. 
conclude that: ‘If the processes by which big data commingle with everyday life 
are understood not as a “frontier” to be colonized, but as processes by which 
everyday life is colonized by “big money and big power”, then a new theoretical 
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terrain for understanding big data is opened’ (Thatcher, O’Sullivan et al., 2016, 
p. 11, original emphasis).
The use of data colonialism as a metaphor for this type of large- scale, profit- 
driven data collection and use is by no means restricted to the aforementioned 
sources. A  2016 anonymously authored piece for Model View Culture 
(Anonymous, 2016) argued that the information and communications 
technology for development (ICT4D) sector continues the ‘legacy of 
colonialism within aid work’ via two trends: a ‘lack of ethical processes around 
data collection and management’ and ‘ongoing Western control over data’. The 
author concludes that it ‘seems clear that the lack of protections are used as 
another form of exploitation on the “global South” under the guise of aid, and 
the primary benefit is not intended for the project participants’.
In a 2018 interview with the Internet Health Report (Mozilla, 2018), Renata 
Avil, a Guatemalan senior digital rights adviser at the World Wide Web 
Foundation, defined ‘digital colonialism’ as ‘the new deployment of a quasi- 
imperial power over a vast number of people, without their explicit consent, 
manifested in rules, designs, languages, cultures and belief systems by a vastly 
dominant power’. Information researcher Michael Kwet (2019) describes 
digital colonialism as a ‘crisis’ that is ‘wreaking havoc on the global South’ as 
its practitioners consolidate power (in the form of data) and impose Silicon 
Valley’s ‘extraterritorial governance’ around the world. He stresses that it is 
‘time to talk about Silicon Valley as an imperial force’, as a precursor to making 
the difficult changes required to counter its influence.
Related to data colonialism is the concept of ‘surveillance capitalism’, 
defined by technology scholar Shoshana Zuboff (2015, p. 75) as ‘an emergent 
logic of accumulation in the networked sphere’ that is dependent on a 
‘global architecture of computer mediation’. The framework of surveillance 
capitalism is similar to that of ‘data colonialism’ in its criticism of new means 
of technology- driven profit creation that are dependent upon the extraction 
of data from human sources. It represents a second useful framework for 
considering the collection of data by humanitarian and development workers 
with drones.
Zuboff (2019, p. 8) notes that surveillance capitalism is not a technology in 
and of itself, but is instead a ‘logic that imbues technology and commands it 
into action’ that ‘unilaterally claims human experience as free raw material for 
translation into behavioural data’. The resulting products are ‘about predicting 
us, without actually caring what we do or what is done to us’ (Zuboff, 2019, 
p. 70). Under this logic – which shares some attributes with the concept of data 
colonialism elucidated by Couldry and Mejias (2018) – the practitioners of 
surveillance capitalism are highly motivated to find new sources of raw material 
from which they may extract behavioural surplus data, encompassing every 
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aspect of human experience that is mediated through technology, including 
our voices, faces and elemental details of our likes and dislikes (Zuboff, 2019, 
p.  70). Further, Zuboff (2019, p.  8) asserts that surveillance capitalists are 
attempting to intervene in our lives in an effort to ‘nudge, coax, tune, and herd 
behaviour toward profitable outcomes’, leading to a world in which technology 
and technology companies work not just to ‘know our behaviour, but also 
to shape our behaviour at scale’. According to Zuboff (2019), the ultimate 
goal is to automate us, by subordinating the means of production to a means 
of behavioural modification, leading ultimately to the creation of a new type 
of power that she calls ‘instrumentarianism’. This power manipulates human 
behaviour to suit the needs of the corporate powers that profit from it, rather 
than to fit our own needs. It exerts itself through the ‘automated medium of 
smart networked devices, things, and spaces’ and it is becoming ever- more 
difficult to meaningfully escape from its influence (Zuboff, 2019, p. 8).
Echoing language that is often applied to settler colonialists, Zuboff (2019, 
p. 9) describes Google as a pioneer of surveillance capitalism, an organisation 
that has launched an ‘unprecedented market operation into the unmapped 
spaces of the Internet, where it faced few impediments from law or competitors, 
like an invasive species in a landscape free of natural predators’. According to 
Zuboff (2015, p. 78), the companies she is critiquing are engaged in ‘incursion 
into undefended private territory until resistance is encountered’.
Zuboff (2019, p.  10) argues that surveillance capitalist companies do 
not view the public as their customers, because their true customers are ‘the 
enterprises that trade in its markets for future behavior’. Nor do they view 
the public as potential employees, because the technology companies of today 
generally employ far fewer people than the most profitable corporations of the 
past. Instead, Zuboff (2019) suggests that Google and similar large corporations 
view the public as a source of raw material in a fashion that evokes the colonial 
idea of the exploitable and easily manipulated ‘Other’ (Eves, 1996). Colonists 
were not accountable to the people they profited from, nor are practitioners 
of surveillance capitalism accountable to the people whose data they extract: 
the surveillance capitalist company simply takes what it wants (Zuboff, 
2015). And just as the colonialists of the past loudly asserted their moral 
right to extract raw material from their colonies, so do today’s surveillance 
capitalists ‘assert their right to invade at will’, using arguments based around 
self- determination, Darwinian survival and the supposed inherent value of 
innovation to normalise their ‘digital dispossession’ of humanity (Zuboff, 
2019, pp. 24, 100). Ultimately, Zuboff (2019, p. 100) argues that we ‘are the 
native peoples now whose tacit claims to self- determination have vanished 
from the maps of our own experience’, rendering us similar to the indigenous 
inhabitants of terra nullis described by Cohen (2017, p. 213).
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Humanitarian aid, drones and data colonialism
The international humanitarian aid and development sectors are regularly 
criticised for their perceived entanglement with colonial and neocolonial 
systems and attitudes. According to these critics, aid and development 
professionals may replicate old asymmetries of power:  they may regard the 
people that they are attempting to help as ‘backward’ (Olivius, 2015), fail to 
consider the needs or perceptions of aid recipients (Dijkzeul and Wakenge, 
2010) and impose neocolonial economic and social patterns upon the 
countries they work in (Langan, 2018). Critics of digital humanitarianism 
have also begun to question the optimistic narrative that accompanied its 
introduction, and the power that data holders now have over the development 
and aid sector (Taylor and Broeders, 2015). Aid organisations hold much 
more information about the people they assist than the latter do about them, 
in a pattern similar to the asymmetries in knowledge and power between the 
average person and the data aggregation companies of today (Zuboff, 2019). 
Aid organisations reliant upon the humanitarian imperative to push through 
technical innovation may use this motivation to weaken critical voices about 
the impact of these technologies on data privacy and security (Hosein and 
Nyst, 2013; S. McDonald, 2016).
Duffield (2016, p. 148) criticises the ‘hubris and technological determinism’ 
that has come with the ascendance of digital technology in humanitarian aid 
work in the global South. He asks if this new digital connectivity is helping to 
‘reproduce stagnation, inequality and external control rather than ameliorate 
such conditions’. In their ethnographic study of the response to Typhoon 
Haiyan in the Philippines, Madianou et al. (2016) investigated the effectiveness 
of mobile phone- based ‘accountability to affected people’ initiatives. They 
found that these data were largely not ‘fed back’ to the communities actually 
impacted by the typhoon, but were instead sent to donors as evidence of 
‘impact’, creating an illusion of accountability that was not evidenced by actual 
results. They concluded that ‘rather than improving accountability to affected 
people, digitized feedback mechanisms sustained humanitarianism’s power 
asymmetries’ (Madianou et al., 2016, p. 960).
Read et al. (2016, p. 11) also take note of this apparent one- way interchange 
of data between local communities and the organisations that purport to 
help them:
Although cloaked in the language of empowerment, data technology 
may be based on an ersatz participative logic in which local communities 
feed data into the machine (either through crowd sourcing, or by being 
enumerators or subjects in most traditional surveys) but have little leverage 
on the design or deployment of the technology.
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The above critiques are applicable to a wide range of technologies and 
processes, many of which are used by digital humanitarians today. They are by 
no means specific to civilian drones, but encompass a broader set of ethical and 
operational concerns and fears. Drones do, however, offer us a specific entry 
point into a broader debate over the place of data collection technology in the 
aid and development sector and it is to the specific matter of spatial data that 
I now turn.
While the positive aspects of spatial data collection are widely understood 
and discussed in the humanitarian and development sector today, considerably 
less attention has been given to its downsides and to the historical and ethical 
implications of these data collection practices. Colonists have long relied on 
cartography as a means of cementing territorial control via the collection of 
spatial information and knowledge (Hunt and Specht, 2019; Kirsch, 2016; 
Sletto, 2011). Maps do not inevitably encode colonial power, but they are also 
not necessarily objective or inherently neutral. Instead, they make possible new 
modes of exploitation, such as the processes described as data colonialism and 
surveillance capitalism.
Proponents of open- source mapping projects often argue that their efforts 
help people by making them more ‘legible’ (Scott, 1998). To be ‘put on the 
map’ is a way to gain societal legitimacy and access to important services and 
legal protections. But being made more legible is not always desirable. Critics 
are increasingly challenging the narrative that maps (like those produced 
with drone imagery) are inherently tools of empowerment. They note that 
these map- making efforts ‘frame recognition in terms of titling, demarcation 
and legal reform, sidestepping more complex political questions about how 
indigenous claims have been shaped by processes of colonialism, dispossession 
and inequality’ and force people to conform to externally imposed notions of 
property ownership (Bryan, 2011, p. 49).
Taylor and Broeders (2015) observe that the practice of ‘reading like a state’ 
outlined by Scott (1998) in his description of legibility has been altered in 
the big data era. They suggest that remote data analytics often observe people 
unaware of this observation who cannot meaningfully consent to the collection 
of their data even if they wanted to do so (Taylor and Broeders, 2015). Further, 
they draw a distinction between Scott’s notion of legibility and the data- 
driven visibility of today, noting that people are made visible due to the huge 
volume of observed data about them that can be collected by governments 
and private corporations and that therefore people who are more connected 
are more visible than others (Taylor and Broeders, 2015). Visibility, more so 
than legibility, offers the power to ‘influence and intervene to a wider, more 
distributed set of actors:  the corporations who gather and analyse the data, 
plus whoever they choose to share it with (or can capture it through other 
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means), who may be state actors, international development institutions, or 
other corporate partners’ (Taylor and Broeders, 2015, p. 230).
This concept is illustrated clearly in Facebook’s recent effort to create a 
data map of the human population by applying computer vision techniques 
to match satellite imagery with government census information. This data 
map covers 23 countries and Facebook intends to use this information to 
determine how best to deliver internet services via satellites and drones to 
people living in different geographic areas (Shinal, 2017). The Facebook 
Connectivity Lab that has pioneered this programme claims its mission is to 
‘connect the unconnected and underserved in the world’ (Gros and Tiecke, 
2016). However, the Free Basics connectivity that the company offers does not 
give users access to the open web, instead mediating their connectivity through 
Facebook’s application. Facebook appears to be carrying out this project under 
the assumption that connectivity and visibility are inevitably superior to the 
alternative. This behaviour could credibly be read as not dissimilar to that of 
colonising powers who worked to impose ‘modern’ (and implicitly superior) 
ways of life and being upon indigenous people. Constine (2018) suggests 
that Facebook and its advocates appear to ‘believe that some internet is better 
than none for those who wouldn’t otherwise be able to afford it’, even if that 
connectivity comes at the price of making new users visible to (and thus 
exploitable by) the practitioners of surveillance capitalism.
People who reside in less- connected and less- developed parts of the world 
increasingly find themselves forced to choose between visibility and invisibility, 
and the introduction of drone technology – whether it is used to make maps 
or to deliver connectivity to social media applications – is part of this choice. 
Participatory mapping can therefore present ‘an impossible choice; one in 
which participants encounter the dilemma of needing to shed or set aside 
notions of how territory has been historically contested and negotiated in order 
to secure legal recognition of their rights in a hoped- for future’ (Bryan, 2011, 
p.  46). In an increasingly data- mediated world, people who refuse to make 
maps themselves may still be mapped by corporations like Facebook or Google, 
or by resource- extraction companies that are ‘commodifying and transforming 
space at an unprecedented scale’ (Radjawali et  al., 2017, p.  818). Further, 
they lack ‘clear exit rights from the effects of heavily deployed technologies’ 
(Fox et al., 2006, p. 100). Without control over their spatial data, Fox (2002) 
argues that disempowered people will be no better off than if they had not been 
mapped at all.
Data colonialism and surveillance capitalism remove this control from 
everyone who is encompassed in their networks. For example, Radjawali and 
Pye (2015) cite a case where a small Indonesian village was literally erased 
from government censuses, as the satellite imagery that the census relied 
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upon was too low resolution for the settlement to be visible. Ironically, the 
problems created by these ubiquitous technologies may only be able to be 
addressed by the technology itself. The solution to failures of humanitarian 
technology is thus forced to come from the application of more technology 
(Hershock, 1999; Tenner, 1996). Map- makers from indigenous communities 
are aware of these dynamics. By using drones, they can fight against systems 
where ‘access to maps and spatial information is limited and commodified’ 
(Paneque- Gálvez et al., 2017; Radjawali and Pye, 2015, p. 1). As participants 
in an indigenous mapping workshop concluded, ‘the more we map, the more 
likely it is that we will have no choice but to map’ (Fox et al., 2006, p. 105).
Drone data, like all forms of digitally mediated data, cannot be ‘uncollected’. 
Data that are collected for one purpose can be appropriated and used in 
unintended and unexpected ways. The rise of digital humanitarianism has been 
accompanied by a spread of open- data principles from the world of technology 
to the aid sector, which place importance on making data as publicly available 
and easily accessible as possible (Principles for Digital Development, 2019). 
Humanitarian data collectors who subscribe to these principles must therefore 
make choices about which data are too sensitive to share publicly and which 
data can be made freely available on sources designated for this purpose 
(such as the Humanitarian Data Exchange or drone- specific platforms like 
OpenAerialMap2). At the time of writing, there is little clarity on how these 
sensitive decisions are being made by humanitarian organisations regarding 
drone data.
As of February 2019 it is now possible to download high- resolution 
drone maps, collected by IOM staff, of the Cox’s Bazaar refugee camp from 
the Humanitarian Data Exchange and from the OpenAerialMap platform 
(Humanitarian Data Exchange, 2019). The OpenAerialMap platform asks 
users to submit high- resolution drone data and aerial maps, which are then 
made publicly available. The platform does not appear to screen this data for 
sensitive imagery, nor are privacy or security risks mentioned explicitly in 
the website’s documentation. In 2018, Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team 
(HOT) volunteers were encouraged to use this drone imagery of the camp to 
identify and map roads that cut through the area.
Most critiques of consumer drone data emphasise dangers to individuals, 
who may be photographed or videotaped by a stealthy drone without their 
knowledge or consent. Fewer critiques consider the dangers that might be 
presented to groups of people or individuals by drone imagery that does not 
portray any individuals at all, but rather their neighbourhoods, homes and 
other aspects of their physical context (Taylor et  al., 2017). Indeed, little 
2 See https:// map.openaerialmap.org/ #/ - 84.375,- 5.528510525692789,3/ square/ 21000?_ 
k=8tjb1j.
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research exists that directly links the public dissemination of high- resolution 
drone images and maps to their potentially harmful effects on people affected 
by disaster.
Researchers are increasingly aware of the problems posed by data aggregation 
(de Montjoye et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2017), by which disparate sources of data 
are combined to come up with new and often unexpected conclusions. These 
risks are by nature difficult to predict. It is also difficult to predict what non- 
humanitarian actors, such as corporations or government entities, might do 
with this data if they are permitted open access to them. Data colonialism is 
largely dependent upon the extraction and recombination of terra nullis data – 
like the data that Facebook collects  – into new forms, forms that are often 
opaque or unintelligible to the people whose data have been appropriated. 
As humanitarian organisations work to better organise and consolidate 
the data they hold to improve their operational efficiency (as is the motive 
behind the WFP’s collaboration with Palantir, announced in the late 2010s), 
it appears inevitable that the risks posed by the open sharing of this data will 
grow. Humanitarians may also be motivated to consolidate and share these 
data to protect themselves, as part of their efforts to reduce on- the- ground 
risks to their staff (Hoelscher et  al., 2017). Duffield (2016, p.  161) warns 
that these ‘security concerns are encouraging the convergence of the localised 
humanitarian, development, government and security databases into systems 
with a wide international reach’, largely unchecked by regulations or oversight.
This security- motivated drive to collect more data about more people 
operates in tandem with drives that motivate the private sector practitioners 
of surveillance capitalism and data colonialism. There are numerous 
instances of large internet companies sharing data they hold on their users 
with national governments, either voluntarily or under legal or political 
duress. Furthermore, the data that are held by either governments or by 
private sector companies may be stolen or otherwise revealed to the public. 
Humanitarians cannot assume that data shared with one actor will reliably 
stay with that actor.
Experimentation is another site of potential risk connected to humanitarian 
drone technology. The authors of a Google- published White Paper on the 
development of infrastructure that will permit company engineers to run 
‘better, faster’ tests, write that:  ‘At Google, experimentation is practically a 
mantra’ (Tang et al., 2010, p. 1). This experimental attitude is de rigueur among 
Silicon Valley companies – for example Facebook’s former motto to ‘move fast 
and break things’ (Vardi, 2018) – and this bleeds over into the humanitarian 
world’s technology efforts. In 2017, when the government of Malawi and 
UNICEF launched an air corridor for testing UAV uses, private companies 
were encouraged to apply to use the airspace for testing purposes (UNICEF, 
2017). The drone delivery company Zipline, mentioned above, highlights this 
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experimental approach in its work, as it tests its technology in Africa with the 
eventual goal of exporting it to the United States and Europe.
McDonald et al. (2017) asked at what point should humanitarian innovation 
be described as becoming ‘human subjects experimentation’, noting that this 
dividing line is poorly defined. Sandvik (2015, p.  75) observed that Africa 
is ‘the perfect recipient of good drone interventionism’, not only because the 
continent is construed as being eternally in need of externally imposed aid, but 
because of its (relative) inability to resist the rescue and investment efforts of 
outsiders, regardless of whether they target African territory or African airspace.
This experimentation is often accompanied by another assumption:  that 
people who live in poorer parts of the world must know little about (and thus 
will be frightened by) civilian drones. In a 2016 survey of humanitarian actors 
carried out by Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD), 57 per cent of respondents 
felt that ‘local populations feel threatened by the use of drones’, although, as 
the survey authors note, these responses seem to be at odds with the highly 
limited available evidence regarding public perceptions of the technology 
(Soesilo and Sandvik, 2016).
These survey replies align with a common perception that people in 
developing countries are not as technically aware or technically competent 
as the humanitarians that are attempting to help them, an assumption that 
logically encompasses drone technology. If humanitarians operate under the 
(at this time largely unsupported) assumption that local people are frightened 
of or ignorant about drones, they may use the technology anyway, but in 
ways that exclude local people. They may fail to work with local partners who 
are knowledgeable about the technology and the context. As Tingitana and 
Kaiser (2018) note in a blog post for the WeRobotics drone non- governmental 
organisation (NGO):  ‘Time and time again, we’ve seen large organizations 
in these sectors hire foreign drone companies to carry out aerial surveys that 
local drone pilots could do equally well and in a fraction of the time’. The use 
of drone technology by humanitarians can also, without adequate oversight 
or consideration of these issues, reinforce existing inequalities pertaining to 
the production of data and spatial data across gender, racial and class lines 
(Paneque- Gálvez et al., 2017; Radjawali et al., 2017).
It is also worth considering where the drones themselves come from. 
Consumer drones are widely available across the world and require less effort 
and skill to use than home- made models. It is reasonably safe to assume that 
time- strapped aid workers will largely rely upon their products. Dajiang 
Industries, the current market leader in the consumer drone sector (Skylogic 
Research, 2019), does not have a business model that is currently dependent 
upon the extraction of user data, but this does not mean its model will not shift 
in the future. There are a few competitors that produce similar products at the 
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same price point as DJI does, creating the risk that aid users of the technology 
will be locked into their systems.
Initiatives are underway that seek to make drones a more standardised 
and legitimate part of countries’ national airspaces, including the creation of 
unique digital drone ‘licence plates’ and other means of remote identification 
(Moon, 2018). Some of these proposals may require that drone users pay a 
significant fee to operate in national airspace systems, or may centrally collect 
the data of drone users, integrating drones more thoroughly into the processes 
of data colonialism and surveillance capitalism. Some nations already require 
drone users to pay a large licensing fee (such as South Africa), while others, like 
Mexico, require groups that photogrammetrically process drone data to hold 
a government permit (Paneque- Gálvez et al., 2017). A world in which drones 
are only usable by the rich and well- connected (including international aid 
workers) will not be a more equitable one.
Addressing data colonialism in drone use
Digital humanitarianism is an inherently hopeful endeavour, a movement 
that perceives itself as harnessing the power of networked technology to help 
people around the world, breaking down technical, social and economic 
barriers. Spatial technologies, like drones, ‘hold incredible epistemological 
and tactical promise’ (Burns, 2018, p. 8.), they are tools that can conceivably 
be used to make the world a more equitable and ethical place. The processes 
of data colonialism and surveillance capitalism threaten to leave these hopes 
unrealised. Instead, they threaten to create a ‘surveillance humanitarianism’ 
that appropriates the ethical goals and considerations of the aid movement 
at the expense of both humanitarian aid workers and the people they wish 
to serve. These forces are powerful, but it is not too late to push back against 
them. Indeed, it is clear that data colonists recognise (and wish to be linked to) 
the moral authority that humanitarian aid still holds. By using this authority – 
in a number of differing, but interlocking ways – the aid and development 
sectors can push back against the march of digital dispossession.
The first step may be to recognise – and reject – digital colonisers’ arguments 
about the supposed necessity of their data extraction methods. Hosein and 
Nyst (2013, p. 58) write that ‘the choice between privacy and development 
creates a false dichotomy and spurs over- simplified arguments about the role of 
technology’. Similarly, Zuboff (2019) argues that technology companies have 
created a false dichotomy, where we are led to believe that their surveillance 
systems are inevitable and a required part of capitalism. She calls for mass 
resistance to these quantifying forces, which must of necessity be accompanied 
by political pressure beyond the abilities of individuals.
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Couldry and Mejias (2018, p. 11) also describe a vision of resisting data 
colonialism that ‘rejects the idea that the continuous collection of data from 
human beings is natural, let  alone rational; and so rejects the idea that the 
results of data processing are a naturally occurring form of social knowledge, 
rather than a commercially motivated form of extraction that advances 
particular economic and/ or governance interests’. They previously noted that 
‘a continuously trackable life is a dispossessed life, no matter how one looks at 
it. Recognizing this dispossession is the start of resistance to data colonialism’ 
(Couldry and Mejias, 2018, p. 10).
A humanitarian movement that recognises these forces should be 
empowered to assert its values. It should feel capable of turning down 
collaborations with or data- sharing agreements with data colonisers, but 
it must also be able to clearly explain why. Some humanitarian aid and 
development organisations are developing codes of conduct, handbooks and 
other compilations of best practices to serve as a ‘moral road map’ for their 
interactions with data- collecting technologies and technology companies. In 
the case of drones, the Humanitarian UAV Network Code of Conduct (2019) 
is the most comprehensive current attempt to develop a set of ethical standards 
for humanitarian drone use, covering data issues, local involvement, privacy 
protection and other categories. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) 2017 Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action (Kuner 
and Marelli, 2017) also specifically considers the problem of data protection 
with drones. Both standards call for humanitarian drone users to conduct both 
practical and ethical risk assessments prior to flight, to develop data- sharing 
techniques in advance of collecting the data itself, to engage local communities 
to the extent realistically possible in data collection efforts and to minimise the 
amount of data collected. However, these standards lack any real enforcement 
mechanism and it is unclear to what extent they are actually being adhered to 
today. More work is needed to ensure that they are both widely known and 
followed in the humanitarian aid and development sector. While these ethical 
codes are important, they are no panacea. It is clear that adherence to a certain 
set of rules or criteria is not enough to arrest the spread of data colonialism and 
surveillance capitalism. Powerful companies and their supporters are capable 
of influencing what these rules look like, while toothless codes of conduct that 
rely largely on internal policing merely put a legalistic fig leaf over extractive 
practice.
Little academic research exists that attempts to formally link human security 
and safety to the collection and dissemination of drone- collected data. There 
are few technical or formal guidelines that concern themselves with minimising 
these risks. For example, it is unclear what types of blurring or image redaction 
might reduce the risk of harm to affected populations from drone- collected 
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data, what types of sensitive information are discernible from drone imagery 
collected at different altitudes and at different resolutions or how security risks 
from drone video differ from security risks from drone photographs. This is 
likely due to the relative novelty of the technology and its uses in humanitarian, 
disaster- response situations. Whatever the cause of these gaps, they must be 
filled if aid organisations intend to conduct meaningful risk assessments of the 
collection of drone data.
There is also very little research that attempts to determine how different 
groups of people in different cultures and in different geographic locations 
feel about and approach the use of drones and drone- collected imagery in 
humanitarian contexts. The vast majority of existing survey and opinion 
research related to drone technology and privacy has been carried out with 
US and European populations. This absence of research, unfortunately, 
extends beyond drone data. As Payal Arora (2016, p. 1694) writes, there ‘is a 
dearth of studies on how marginalized populations in the global South view, 
construct, and practice privacy’. Local, contextual knowledge is protective 
against processes of data colonialism and involving people more closely in data 
protection processes gives them a chance to maintain agency over information 
that is collected about them. In the absence of this information, humanitarian 
aid workers run an increased risk of using the technology in ways that reinforce 
data colonialism and surveillance capitalism: consider the strange absence of 
local people in the aspirational ‘technoscape of the Ebola drone’ described by 
Sandvik (2015, p. 11). Still, it is important to note that better research will 
do little to protect individuals if large aid organisations continue to engage in 
partnerships and data- sharing agreements with data colonists.
Localisation is one means of addressing these risks, in large part because 
it is a means of sharing power and influence over technical projects between 
more people. Andrew Schroeder (2018) of WeRobotics commented in a 
blog post that ‘if drones are going to fulfil their humanitarian potential, the 
structures, skills, and knowledge that guide them cannot depend on large 
international agencies or rapid importation at times of crisis’. One such 
practice is participatory mapping, which includes many different community 
members and stakeholders in the mapping process. Often this is done explicitly 
as a means of reducing the colonial ‘view from above’ implications of colonial 
mapping projects. It is not a panacea, data from such participatory projects can 
still be shared (and exploited) in unexpected ways (Specht and Feigenbaum, 
2018). However, these efforts do give the people whose data are being collected 
a clear role and a voice in the collection and analysis of their information and 
more such work is needed. Paneque- Gálvez et al. (2017, p. 16), referring to 
Peruvian community mapping efforts that incorporate drone imagery, write 
that ‘we need to Amazonize drone technology so that it can become truly 
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useful in such a socially and environmentally challenging context’. They call 
for the establishment of new drone schools that cater to the specific context 
of indigenous people, referring to the example of Irendra Radjawali’s Swandiri 
Institute (Radjawali and Pye, 2015) as an example of this model.
Humanitarian and development workers should be aware of the legal status 
of drone use in the areas that they work and how these legal changes may 
impact local users of the technology. Regulations ensuring that drones can only 
be effectively used by deep- pocketed and well- connected organisations remove 
the technology’s grassroots potential. More powerful organisations should 
work to assist smaller ones with pushing back against exclusionary lawmaking.
As part of supporting these localisation processes, humanitarian drone users 
should also ensure that they look beyond Eurocentric ideas about big data, 
data sharing and technology. Arora (2016) writes that today’s debates about the 
impact of big data on human society continue to be highly Western- centric. 
Moreover, while the West is in the midst of considerable societal debate about 
the negative impact of big data on its societies, discourse around ‘big data 
projects [in] the Global South have an overwhelmingly positive connotation’ 
(Arora, 2016, p. 1682). Arora (2016, p. 1694) further notes that we must ‘pay 
more attention to where the values in digital design emerge and who dictates 
these information infrastructures to create allowances for a richer databased 
identity’, adding that the global South ‘should be actively engaged with current 
debates – such as the right to be forgotten – as multinational IT companies 
confront national sentiments, values, and institutions, illustrating how context 
continues to matter’.
Milan and Treré (2018), meanwhile, in their exploration of ‘big data from 
the South’, ask us to consider how the processes of datafication that this chapter 
critiques might look ‘upside down’. They warn against the trap of ‘digital 
universalism’ that attempts to ‘gloss over differences and cultural specificities’ 
(Milan and Treré, 2018, p. 324) in its criticism of big data and the practices 
that accompany it. Drawing on work from Arora (2016) and Udupa (2015), 
they note that while the majority of the world’s population resides outside of 
the West, we ‘continue to frame key debates on democracy and surveillance – 
and the associated demands for alternative models and practices – by means 
of “Western” concerns, contexts, user behaviour patterns, and theories’ (Milan 
and Treré, 2018, p. 320). They urge us in our thinking to make ‘the move 
from datafication to data activism/ data justice’, by examining the ‘diverse ways 
through which citizens and the organized civil society in the South engage in 
bottom- up data practices for social change and resist a datafication process that 
increases oppression and inequality’ (Milan and Treré, 2018, p. 328).
Ultimately, we can decolonise our use of drone technology in humanitarian 
aid. It is well within our power to decline to create a system of ‘surveillance 
humanitarianism’ or to facilitate its creation by others. We can realise the 
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power of new technology to save lives and reduce human suffering without 
embracing the practitioners of data colonialism and surveillance capitalism. 
The humanitarian aid sector should stand as an essential moral voice against 
data colonisers. Indeed, its survival as an independent and effective movement 
depends on it.
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5. The role of data collection, mapping and 
analysis in the reproduction of refugeeness 
and migration discourses: reflections 
from the Refugee Spaces project1
Giovanna Astolfo, Ricardo Marten Caceres, Garyfalia Palaiologou,  
Camillo Boano and Ed Manley
Introduction
Even if the use of statistics and data analytics has been widely criticised in 
the past decades, in the light of the rise of identity politics and globalisation 
(Davies, 2017), when it comes to migration, data still play a crucial role in 
policymaking, humanitarian intervention and public discourse. Indicators 
are used by governments, international organisations and security agencies 
to monitor and control movements, arrivals, border crossings and violations, 
asylum- seeker requests and transfers.2 According to the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), ‘data are the lifeblood of decision- making 
and the raw material for accountability’ (UN Data Revolution Group, 2014). 
Not only are data fundamental to design policy, but they are also critical in 
humanitarian work. In particular, the allocation of resources for reception and 
assistance would be impossible without data.
1 The Refugee Spaces data project and platform were funded by the Bartlett Faculty of the 
Built Environment, University College London, through the Materialisation Grant over the 
period 2016– 18. Data collection and analysis was conducted by four teams. We would like 
to thank Gala Nettelbladt, Tahmineh Hooshyar Emami and Asimina Paraskevopoulou for 
working on the Germany, France and Greece cases; Kayvan Karimi for overseeing the data 
collection strategy; and Ed Manley and Stephan Hugel for developing the Refugee Spaces 
platform. We are also grateful for the always prompt advice provided by Professor Roger 
Zetter (Refugee Studies Centre Oxford), Dr Marta Welander (Refugee Rights Europe) and 
Dr Nando Sigona (Birmingham University). Finally, our thanks to Murray Fraser and Ella 
Sivyer for supporting the team throughout the delivery of this Bartlett- funded project. This 
chapter reflects the views of the authors, not of everyone who has been involved in this 
research.
2 For example, in the context of global migration, UNCHR and IOM are humanitarian 
organisations that are prominent data providers, as well as Frontex (The European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency), which is acting from a securitisation perspective.
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After the so called ‘European refugee crisis’,3 data on arrivals and asylum 
requests have also heavily fed media narratives and the Internet4 – to either 
raise compassion or exacerbate xenophobia (Wodak, 2015). According to 
Fawaz et al. (2018), migration flows are currently portrayed in two opposite 
ways:  refugees and migrants are either ‘depicted as mere victims of external 
pressures that have forcefully displaced them and exposed them to the violence 
of host communities’ or as invaders who threaten ‘the livelihood, coherence, 
work, health and way of life’ of host communities (Fawaz et al., 2018, p. 4). 
Similarly, Triandafyllidou (2018, p.  215) argues that there are common yet 
contrasting interpretative frames that are shared across countries:
Socialist, Social Democrat and other center- left or left- wing parties and 
media adopt the moralization frame, upholding notions of solidarity and 
providing protection despite the massive character of the flows, while 
right- wing and far- right- wing politicians in particular adopt an interpretive 
frame of threat and risk, using this frame to create divisions within Europe.
In both cases, data are used to reinforce the notion of crisis and chaos, 
often relying on univocal and sensationalist interpretations without building a 
contextualised and nuanced understanding of the migration phenomenon. In 
particular, numbers are manipulated to either magnify or minimise a situation. 
They feed expert discourses, and politicians are eager to quote statistics and 
quantify social phenomena (Cheesman, 2017; Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti, 
2016). According to Anderson (2017, p. 1529),
for those involved in the migration industry, in general the more bodies 
processed the better, but for policy- makers and politicians the ostensible 
goal is reduced numbers. As with criminals, governments are always open 
to the charge that there are too many migrants and too many is a difficult 
number. One million entrants to the EU were too many but it was less 
than 0.5 per cent of the EU population. At the other end of the scale, one 
migrant murderer not deported is always one too many.
From humanitarian calls for action to warnings of impending collapse, 
Europe widely considers itself to be in crisis, at a political breaking point 
that justifies extreme measures. As Anderson (2017) puts it, politicians, 
policymakers and all those involved in the migration industry share a common 
3 See note on the term ‘refugee crisis’ at the end of the chapter.
4 A swift review shows that since around 2017 a slew of websites and web platforms has been 
created to show migratory data. Of those, five deal exclusively with flow density, five on 
location of border deaths and the rest include a blend of data- analysing population trends, 
asylum applications and camp locations. Specific attention has been given to the reporting 
on the Mediterranean route and number of arrivals. Less attention is paid to migrant and 
refugee subjectivities. Websites collecting stories of migrants are comparatively few, with 
migrant stories being systematically excluded (Singleton, 2015), turning migrants into 
‘faceless masses’ (Adams, 2018, p. 542).
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interest in responding to the ‘crisis’ through enforcement. Data on arrivals and 
border crossings have created the need for and justified the hardening of border 
policy; even though such measures did not result in better and safer migration 
management. On the contrary, it has been argued that higher investments 
on securitisation and deterrence coincided with an increase in fatalities at the 
border (Léonard, 2010; Neal, 2009; Perkowski, 2012; Squire et  al., 2017; 
Steinhilper and Gruijters, 2017).5
It is often difficult to disentangle the causal relationship between discourses 
and measures. According to Krzyżanowski (2013, 2018), since 2014 responses 
in policy and political actions have entailed various subsequent ‘discursive 
shifts’ (Fairclough, 1992) and policy changes, leading to policies and actions 
becoming legitimised by political and mediated discourses, as in the case of 
the refugee quota. For years, European countries have operated a redistributive 
system according to which refugees and asylum seekers are allocated to 
European Union (EU) member states based on agreed quotas. During the peak 
of arrivals in the spring and fall of 2015, however, the system stopped working. 
There was clearly a shift from seeking to manage and to channel the flows 
through quotas, to the construction of the refugee flows as a crisis that called 
for more drastic measures (Triandafyllidou, 2018), such as increase of border 
refusals and removals to reduce public anxiety. These policy developments were 
in an interactive relationship with developing media, political discourses and 
civil society mobilisations around the refugee crisis.
During 2017– 18, numbers of arrivals have slowly and steadily decreased, 
which has been interpreted as a decrease in migration flows, subsequent to 
policy changes. It has been further used to celebrate a successful policy and to 
placate xenophobic sentiments. However, many argue that the arrival drop is 
not generated by a decrease in flows, but rather results from the closure of the 
route and the diversion of the flows. If this is the case, then the problem has not 
been mitigated but simply moved elsewhere. Such an example of the complex 
entanglement between data, media discourse and policy measures sheds light 
on how data are produced by a certain discursive practice that creates the need 
for those data to exist in the first place.
Interpretations of the Foucauldian social theory on discursive practice 
and its relation to power suggest that data – admin data, censuses, statistics 
and ‘evidence’ in general – operate as technical devices to sustain dominant 
5 One has to read comparatively Frontex budget figures and independent research on official 
(e.g. securitisation) and unofficial (e.g. smuggling) costs and refugee deaths. For example, 
such research is conducted for the Migrants’ Files project (Journalism++, 2013). Frontex 
budget figures are available via the Frontex website (https:// frontex.europa.eu/ about- frontex/ 
key- documents/ ?category=budget&year=2017) and European Court of Auditors website 
(https:// www.eca.europa.eu/ Lists/ ECADocuments/ FRONTEX_ 2016/ FRONTEX_ 2016_ 
EN.pdf ). Frontex budgets increased from €92,000,000 in 2011 to €302,029,000 in 2017.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAPPING CRISIS122
structures of power. In order to expose such structures of power, there is a need 
to question what data are collected, by whom and for whom, who decides what 
data to collect and for what purpose, how and what data are shared, disclosed 
and aggregated. Critical insights into data collection methods might help to 
understand and contain the divisive narratives that frame the current influx of 
refugees into Europe (Haynes et al., 2006; Triandafyllidou, 2018) on the one 
hand, and make sure that data support better migration research and policy on 
the other. For this purpose, what follows is a closer look into the relationship 
between discourses and power followed by a review of publicly available 
existing data on migration. Reflections stem from a two- year data project called 
Refugee Spaces,6 an open digital platform conceived to stimulate debate on the 
ways in which European countries have represented and responded to recent 
migratory waves.
Data and discursive practice
In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), Foucault develops his notion of 
discourses as ‘systems of thought composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of 
action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the 
worlds of which they speak’ (cited in Lessa, 2006, p. 285). According to such a 
definition, discourses create a ‘regime of truths’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 101) that 
legitimise some knowledges as true and normalise the norms that sediment 
power and the truth it produces. Furthermore, discourses are pervasive, 
implicit in ‘the ideas and statements that allow us to make sense of and see 
things’ (Schirato et al., 2012, pp. xix– xx). As a result, ‘social reality is produced 
and made real through discourses’ (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p. 3). Ultimately, 
discourses legitimise a certain way of making sense of the world and those 
who inhabit it (Mole, 2007). We argue that data are also part of that system of 
thoughts that forms a discursive practice and that data support a certain way 
of making sense of the world. As a consequence, data produce new knowledge 
not because they are universally truthful – on the contrary, their truth is always 
a construction with a purpose – but for the simple reason that they exist as part 
of a discursive practice.
Any discourse within a given context constructs a regime of truths as well 
as carrying power relations. Indeed, discourse is strongly related to power; it is 
both an effect and instrument of power in a project of constructing subjects that 
can be disciplined and populations that can be regulated. By contributing to the 
circular creation of knowledge and power, data also produce the subjectification 
of those who are contained in it (as happens for instance with the categorisation 
6 See https:// www.refugeespaces.org.
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of the ‘asylum seeker’ or the ‘refugee’ as normalised subjects). To understand 
how data ‘construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak’ (Lessa, 
2006, p. 285), it is useful to remember that data are a representation of the 
world, not the world itself. It is possible to modify data and their narrative, 
constructing a perception that will be rationalised and consumed. However, 
perception is a cultural construct. As Bacchi and Bonham (2014, p. 178) put 
it, Foucault’s focus is on the ‘things said’, not in terms of their content but in 
relation to the operation of a whole package of relationships.
According to Foucault (1971, p.  8), ‘in every society the production of 
discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a 
certain number of procedures’. Discourses are part of the organised practices 
(mentalities, rationalities and techniques) through which subjects are 
governed, leading us to the idea of governmentality:  ‘The ensemble formed 
by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and 
tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, 
which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political 
economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security’ (Foucault, 
2007, p. 108). Fimyar (2008, p. 5) summarises thus:
By merging ‘governing’ (‘gouverner’) and mentality (‘mentalité’) into 
the neologism ‘governmentality’, Foucault stresses the interdependence 
between the exercise of government (practices) and mentalities that 
underpin these practices. In other words, governmentality may be 
described as the effort to create governable subjects through various 
techniques developed to control, normalize and shape people’s conduct. 
Therefore, governmentality as a concept identifies the relation between the 
government of the state (politics) and government of the self (morality), 
the construction of the subject (genealogy of the subject) with the 
formation of the state (genealogy of the state).
Governmentality refers to how power is exercised in Western societies 
(Foucault, 1991, pp. 102– 4), where the sovereign power of the ruler merges 
with ‘police’ to secure a state’s internal stability coincident with redefining 
‘population’ as an object of governmental techniques. Such a process of 
governmentalisation of the state (Foucault, 1991, p. 91) is ‘an invention and 
assembly of a whole array of technologies that bring together the calculations 
and strategies of the constitutional, juridical, fiscal and organizational powers 
of the state in an attempt to manage the economic life, social habits and health 
of the population’ (N. Rose, 1999, p. 18).
In a liberal state the welfare of the population is perceived as the ends of 
the government. Security of the economic and social development of the 
population is its fundamental concern and the basis of state prosperity. To 
achieve this, the population is framed into apparatuses of security (including 
police). Lives (and bodies) become objects of systematic administration and 
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data and statistics become a means towards this. Mapping has historically been 
a key strategy of governmentality (Harley, 1988). The same can be said for 
statistics, censuses, data on population trends, flows, etc., which extend and 
reinforce the legal statutes, territorial imperatives and values stemming from 
the exercise of political power over a certain territory. Data on population and 
migration conform to Bentham’s concept of a panopticon, in which the one 
views the many.
This way of thinking gave rise to the concept of ‘biopower’ (power over 
life) and ‘biopolitics’ (exercise of this power by the government) (Foucault, 
2008). Biopolitics is characterised by administrative intervention aimed at 
optimising the life of the population. In other words, state and government 
extend their terrain of interest towards all life processes:  how humans live, 
procreate, become ill, maintain health and die. Biopolitics is concerned with 
the family, with housing, living and working conditions and with patterns of 
migration.
Migration is an essential biopolitical concern. In order to ensure the most 
effective management of lives, biopolitics divides the population into subgroups 
(e.g. refugees, criminals, migrants, the employed) that either contribute to the 
collective prosperity of the population or constrain it. Those that constrain it 
are to be tightly regulated. Of course, such practices lead to discrimination, 
exclusion and racism, whereby race (or other ‘Othering’ processes) appears as 
a defence mechanism of the life and welfare of the population against internal 
and external threats.
While it was not directly part of Foucault’s oeuvre (Fassin, 2001, 2011, 2016), 
his impact on migration debates today is confirmed by a fast- growing body of 
work. Relevant for this chapter are the debates concerning the surveillance and 
discipline of international mobility and labour migration (Geiger and Pécoud, 
2013; Rudnyckyj, 2004; Salter, 2013) and migration and governmentality 
(Bigo, 2002, 2008; Darling, 2011; Gill, 2009; Hess and Kasparek, 2010; 
Huysmans, 2000; Hyndman, 2012; Jeandesboz, 2011; Mezzadra and Neilson, 
2013; Nyers, 2006; Papadopoulos et  al., 2008; Salter, 2013; Squire, 2011; 
Walters, 2012).
The Refugee Spaces platform
If discourses are situated within relations of power, they do not stem from a 
single point of reference. The systems of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, 
beliefs and practices that surround them  – including data  – can also be 
used to disrupt and subvert a certain regime of truths and the norms that 
construct subjects. Power and resistance are interlinked. Subjects can make 
use of discourses in subversive manners, creating new meanings. Counter- 
narratives and counter- archives that resist mainstream narratives illustrate 
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such resistive practices (Garelli et al., 2018). Examples that have produced 
critical data to oppose fearmongering narratives have acted as essential 
sources of knowledge production in humanitarian campaigns and academic 
research and include the well- known Forensic Oceanography project 
(Heller et al., 2011), WatchTheMed (WTM, n.d.) and the Migrants’ Files 
(Journalism++, 2013).
In a similar vein, the Refugee Spaces platform compares data on demographic 
trends and the cost of migration across different geographical contexts and 
standpoints, to give a more nuanced reading of current narratives of chaos 
and crisis. To demystify the representation of an invasion and the burden of 
protection, the platform compares relative and absolute data on arrivals of 
refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and the Middle East. The resulting map 
shows how, over the period 2010– 15, Italy has seen an increase in its refugee 
population of around 122 per cent against an increase of around 32,200 
per cent in Turkey (Refugee Spaces, 2018). Another map shows how while 
governments and media discourses have portrayed the recent wave of arrivals 
to Europe as an onslaught, the Continent currently hosts only 6 per cent of the 
displaced population globally, with all European countries hosting few people 
compared to the top- hosting countries in the world.
In order to question the media- constructed idea of migration as a burden to 
sovereign states and hosting communities, the Refugee Spaces platform further 
compares public spending for refugee reception and social integration with 
the cost for relocation, detention and securitisation in each state. The map 
shows that in Italy alone, the ratio between reception and securitisation is 1:2 
(Lunaria, 2013). Another map compares the amount of resources allocated to 
humanitarian response with the investments in security and military operations 
at sea; while the first is decreasing, the latter keeps growing steadily. From 
20 million euros in 2006, Frontex’s annual budget reached 90 million euros in 
2010 and 143 million in 2015. Today, it is 300 million euros (AEDH, 2017; 
Frontex, 2018; Perkowski, 2012).
Data collection and analysis: methodological and 
ethical challenges
Aside from the production of a set of maps and visualisation aimed at 
questioning the media- constructed idea of a ‘refugee crisis’, the Refugee 
Spaces platform has exposed the numerous challenges associated with 
treating secondary data on migration, particularly admin data, statistics and 
censuses. During the implementation of the project, we reviewed numerous 
data sets collected, aggregated and shared by institutional and governmental 
sources in Italy, France, Germany and Greece. Such examination enabled 
the development of critical insights on the fragile nature of data collection 
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methods and their resolution, consistency and reliability within countries and 
across Europe.
First, the majority of available data on migration flows  – concerning 
arrivals, border crossing, asylum requests and transfers – are collected by large 
organisations (e.g. Eurostat, the Organisation for Economic Co- Operation 
and Development (OECD), national governments and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), because collection and 
analysis are time- consuming and onerous and only centralised nation states 
or supranational bodies can afford to undertake it across large populations in 
a standardised fashion. However, with such limited alternatives in production 
and sources, the demand for data and their subsequent interpretation risks 
being univocal, easing the path for unilateral pre- set narratives. In this context, 
grassroots organisations and academic research could potentially offer the 
possibility of having a more pluralistic system of data collection. Charities, 
activist groups and researchers have been able to collect accurate and diverse 
data in smaller sample pools, including a closer estimation of population, age 
and gender, educational background, aspirations and experiences of violence 
in the host countries.7 Nevertheless, their knowledge often remains hidden, 
unavailable and disconnected from policy, media narrative and national 
statistics. Academic research in particular tends to exclude non- academics 
and those in civil society without access to policymakers from accessing 
data – possibly to avoid their work being sensationalised (Düvell et al., 2010; 
Singleton, 2015). This therefore makes national government statistics the most 
accessible data because they are listed in public records.
Second, national statistics are the product of a centralised administrative 
system, whose units may not be sufficiently representative of the localised 
variation in the data. Nuances are hardly captured, often compromising the 
accuracy of a reported trend and/ or leading to misinterpretation. Furthermore, 
research stemming from these data might reproduce the same categories and 
the same inaccuracies as those originally found in the administrative source. 
Notable gaps (i.e. information not represented or captured by centralised 
data collections) can be linked to a range of criteria including a specific 
crossing/ settlement status, the provision of fake identification documents, 
the involvement of people- traffickers and smuggling cartels and the multiple 
counting of the same asylum seeker while crossing more than one European 
border. Fear of being registered by border control officers in a country that 
may not constitute the migrant’s chosen destination has also led to certain 
data to be inaccurate.
7 Refugee Rights Europe (Welander, 2015), for example, researches and documents the lived 
realities of refugees and displaced people seeking protection in Europe, with a specific focus 
on human rights violations and inadequate humanitarian conditions.
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It is widely acknowledged that the privileged status of a nation can contribute 
to inherent biases of migration statistics and can attempt to simplify what is 
a complex phenomenon. Under the need for standard uniformity, national 
aggregates and statistics impose systems of classification and definition (i.e. 
refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, etc.) that make it possible to 
discern how far a given classification extends across a certain phenomenon. 
The resulting ‘categorical fetishism’ (Apostolova, 2015) annihilates identities 
and ultimately undermines the ability ‘to capture adequately the complex 
relationship between political, social and economic drivers of migration or 
their shifting significance for individuals over time and space’ (Crawley and 
Skleparis, 2018, p. 48). Individuals disappear within statistical data, while their 
stories are represented as homogeneous, undiversified and decontextualised. 
By being presented as ‘an undifferentiated mass’ (Fawaz et al., 2018), refugees 
and migrants are consequently misrepresented to lack either agency or the 
skills of the ‘settled citizenry’ and to unreasonably demand Western assistance 
(Behrman, 2014, pp. 249, 268). Numerical aggregates and averages not only 
reflect an abstract centralised representation of migrants that is far from 
reality, and dehumanise the particular needs of individuals, they also create a 
distorted image and perception of migration ultimately influencing a climate 
of hostility.
However, reducing the complexity of migration into simple figures offers 
governments and organisations the opportunity to circumvent the need to 
acquire contextual detailed insights about migrants’ challenges, journeys and 
aspired destinations. This blindness to local variability and subjectivity is precisely 
what can make statistics less beneficial, leaving the understanding of the reasons 
behind migration being grossly overlooked. As research by the MEDMIG project 
(Crawley et  al., 2016) shows, it is precisely the lack of understanding of lived 
experiences that is ultimately compromising the ability of migration policies to 
respond effectively to the increased movement of people.
Third, our research has also shown that data are rarely equally available 
across countries.8 In the absence of what Bonnor (2006, p.  149) defines as 
‘European public access culture’, we struggled to access consistent data and 
information across Italy, France, Greece and Germany. France proved to have 
the most systematic and high- resolution compilation of information regarding 
location and regional governance of the centres for reception, accommodation 
or detention of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, enabling us to identify 
and map around 700 centres within the national borders. In the case of Italy, 
we mapped just under 300 centres out of nearly 4,000, as the information 
8 Data collected for the Refugee Spaces project are from open- access sources and the compiled 
data sets are available at https:// www.refugeespaces.org.
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regarding other centres is either not collected or not disclosed.9 However, data 
on number of refugees per centre is collected in a more systematic fashion 
in Italy compared to France. In Germany around 100 centres were mapped; 
information available proved difficult to compile as migration management 
is highly decentralised. Each of the 16 federal states has different measures 
and diverging policies on how to collect and publish data on reception and 
detention centres (Mouzourakis and Taylor, 2016). Thus, across the country 
there is no comparable information available on reception and detention 
arrangements.
Similarly, we found that different sources within the same country were 
inconsistent. For example, in relation to the same variable, the figures published 
by the Eurostat agency on the number of arrivals or refusals of entry per year 
for a given country sometimes differed from those provided by the Interior 
Ministry of that country, or those gathered by a local non- governmental 
organisation (NGO).10 This could be attributed to the fact that data cover 
different time periods or are collected at different locations. For instance, data 
on arrivals are collected at the border, while data on asylum requests and number 
of refugees are collected at the border and in the reception or detention centres. 
Tazzioli (2015), Sigona (2015) and Rozakou (2017), among others, have made 
a considerable effort to show how such fragmentation leads to miscalculations 
and double counting, for instance, in the case of data on sea arrivals. Besides 
the inherent fragmentation of data sources, the heterogeneity of the systems of 
classification and the different time and spaces of collection, these type of data 
sets are also in constant flux and such oscillations are not easy to capture.
Similar inconsistencies were found on data showcasing the declared and 
actual capacity of centres. If there is an uncalibrated variability, these indicators 
could potentially misestimate requirements for budget  allocations and 
provision of adequate living conditions in host locations. For France, official 
audits suggest there is no consistency between declared and actual capacities 
9 The location of around 3,000 Centri di Accoglienza Straordinaria (Centres for Emergency 
Reception – CAS) do not show in any list, document or report. These structures are 
identified by the prefectures, in agreement with cooperatives, associations and hotel 
facilities, according to the procedures for awarding public contracts, after consulting the 
local authority in whose territory the facility is located. The stay should be limited to the 
time strictly necessary for the transfer of the applicant to the second reception facilities. For 
further details regarding the non- disclosure of information around the location of CAS see 
Cittadinanzattiva et al. (2016).
10 As an example, in the case of Italy, we noticed minor discrepancies between (a) people 
accommodated in reception centres in Italy in 2017, according to UNHCR (2016, 2017b); 
(b) people accommodated in reception centres in Italy in 2017 according to the Ministry of 
Interior (Ministero dell’Interno, 2017b); (c) sea arrivals to Italy according to UNHCR in 
November 2017 (UNHCR, 2017a); and (d) sea arrivals to Italy according to the Ministry of 
Interior (Ministero dell’Interno, 2017a, 2017b).
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(Cours des comptes, 2015, 2016). Similar problems have been identified in 
Greece and Italy, while for Germany data on the capacity of centres is localised 
and far from traceable, let alone verifiable (Kalkmann, 2017; Katz et al., 2016; 
Mouzourakis and Taylor, 2016).
Fourth, not all data were equally disclosed. If asylum requests are the most 
comprehensively collected and shared, governments do not give access nor 
disclose comprehensive updated data on the location of shelters, reception, 
accommodation and detention centres in Europe. This can be ascribed to 
several factors, including the lack of data collection systems, the inability to 
cope with the fast pace of changes, as well as with ethical or security reasons. 
Our research suggested that the only comprehensive data sets are on the 
category of ‘asylum seekers’ for which there exist actual numbers, costs and 
locations. This information is available at different administrative levels per 
country. In France it is collected at regional level,11 while in Italy it is collected 
at national level, and data are categorised according to centre typology 
(Ministero dell’Interno, 2015). Such inconsistency has rendered comparability 
across European countries extremely challenging.
A final and important point is related to the rationale of data sharing among 
different institutions, such as border agencies and governmental agencies. 
Data on arrivals of migrants and refugees constitute a telling example of 
this. Data on arrivals released by government and media are based on Frontex’s 
data  sets  on border crossings. Clearly, arrivals and border crossings do not 
have the same significance and value. Arrivals are one- time data, while border 
crossings can be multiple as the same person might attempt a crossing on more 
than one border or more times on the same border. As a consequence, numbers 
of arrivals communicated by governments and media are not ‘actual’ arrivals; 
on the contrary they are estimates, often inflated compared to actual numbers 
(Sigona, 2015).
Such an example sheds light on several aspects and challenges related to data 
collection methods. In particular, it questions the collection modus operandi 
of national governments and border agencies. In light of their alleged authority, 
we – researchers, policymakers and the public – tend to overtrust large- scale data 
collection bodies, with little consideration for where their interest is positioned. 
This in turn risks leading to the reproduction of uncritical discourses. In the 
case of the inflated data on arrivals explained above, this is conducive to the 
perpetuation of the myth of a ‘foreign invasion’, eliciting reactionary discourses 
11 The French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (Office français 
de protection des réfugiés et apatrides – OFPRA) produces annual reports (Rapports 
d’activité) listing in detail numbers associated with reception at the administrative level 
of ‘departments’ (départements) (for a total number of 52 departments). The reports are 
accessible online since 2001 (OFPRA, 2001) and updated annually.
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and practices against hospitality and inclusion and encouraging feelings of 
mistrust and hate.
Data representation
The above interrogation into methods of data collection and interpretation, as 
well as the rationale according to which we built the Refugee Spaces platform, 
are underpinned by a simple reflection stemming from Foucault’s interpretative 
frames: data collection and analysis are not as free of judgement, intention and 
purpose as commonly perceived. Being the product of a discursive practice and 
nourishing that same discursive practice (Boehnert, 2016) data are never neutral 
or objective. They are always subject to interpretation and deliberation, be it in 
the form of selecting what data to collect and disclose or not, or in the form of 
graphic representation and symbolic annotation of visual arguments (Bertin, 
1967; Bresciani and Eppler, 2015). They can lead to multiple narratives that 
largely depend on why and by whom data have been produced and interpreted. 
Not only can the same set of data be combined in multiple ways to produce 
different narratives, it can also be understood differently according to the 
reader’s or user’s system of values.
Considered from a critical standpoint, the production and interpretation of 
data – whether quantitative or qualitative in nature12 – are always dependent 
upon the positionality and subjectivity of the collector agent. Feminist theory 
has long advocated for an understanding of data- based research and knowledge 
as always constructed from a specific subject position (Bordo, 1987; Haraway, 
1988; Harding, 1986, 1991; McDowell, 1992, 2016; G. Rose, 1997). More 
recently, D’Ignazio and Klein (2016, p.  1) have tested feminist research 
principles to data visualisation to develop ‘alternative visualisation practices that 
better emphasize the design decisions associated with data’. Principles are aimed 
at dismantling binaries and categorisations (such as gender, class, ethnicity), 
as well as challenging claims of objectivity by recognising the data collectors’ 
positionality and questioning the actors that have generated a particular 
data set. Similarly, Data for Democracy (2016) – which operates within the 
community of data scientists and technologists who work towards improving 
data standards – has put in place an ethical framework that is precisely based 
on the acknowledgement of positionality throughout all aspects of data work.
Yet, this is still to be recognised by the majority of data producers and end- 
users, whether researchers, media or policymakers. Few scholars recognise that 
the assumption of objectivity and neutrality of data is misleading (Adams, 2018; 
Cloke et al., 2004; Düvell et al., 2010) and that the production of knowledge 
12 This distinction is broadly debated among geographers (Demeritt and Dyer, 2002; Philo 
et al., 2013).
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is always inherently biased or ‘ethico- political’ as Fuchs puts it (2017, pp. 44– 
5). Data are still presented as being objective in media and policy discourse 
in order to reflect a certain regime of truth and to invest political agendas 
and public discourse with ideals of ‘evidence’. Only by challenging ideas of 
evidence and neutrality and embedding within the data collection process 
a reflection around the subjectivity of data – a ‘reflective practice’ – can we 
actually aspire to produce counter- narratives on migration and ultimately 
better data for better policy.
Conclusion
Following a review of the spiralling discourse on migration and refugees since 
2015, this chapter has attempted to highlight how the alleged scientificity and 
objectivity of data increasingly contribute to obscuring the political and ethical 
subjectivity of media narratives and governmental practices by using statistical 
evidence for which methods of collection and aggregation are questionable in 
their origin and validity.
As evidenced by the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17, as well as by 
the UN data revolution initiative (UN Data Revolution Group, n.d.), the call 
for better use and presentation of data on migration is growing. The chapter 
puts forward a series of critical observations about the reliability of institutional 
and administrative data and their resolution, consistency, collection methods 
and accuracy. This criticism, coupled with theoretical understanding of 
discursive practices in politics, reveals implications entailed in the use of data 
as governmental technology. Can policy be improved by means of scientific 
inquiry? Better data collection methods will help, but it is not the only 
requirement for ethically driven data- informed policy.
A growing number of researchers, activists and politicians warn that 
misleading data- driven reports and websites about the magnitude of migration 
flows into Europe are creating unjustified fears about refugees, as well as 
undermining efforts to manage humanitarian problems faced by those fleeing 
war zones (Butler, 2017). More websites and projects are focusing on migrant 
testimony (Italian Coalition for Civil Liberties (CILD), n.d.; Killing, 2017; 
Politzer and Kassie, 2016; Sossi, n.d.; Wang, 2017; Welander, 2015) to oppose 
abstract and generalised views of migrants and refugees. However, their number 
remains small and stories are represented from a single point of view – that of 
those who see them arriving. Most data portals remain largely inaccessible to 
either refugee or resident populations who are the ‘subjects’ of migration data 
collection efforts, rather than active agents.
On the other hand, little consideration is given to the implications of 
conducting research and producing data on refugees and migrants. This 
chapter has emphasised issues of data availability and the lack of access to 
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data. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that open access and sharing 
of data can create equally large ethical concerns, especially in the context of 
migration and refugees. For instance, UNHCR (2015) makes data access 
widely available to the public and to refugees; however, it cannot control 
the way third parties treat its data sets and mitigate risks of potentially 
indiscriminate and harmful usage.
Data- related malpractice might transform individuals into targets and 
perpetuate social marginalisation, discrimination and violence in both their 
country of origin and their host country (Bedford, 2017; Cheesman, 2017; 
Cloke et  al., 2004; D’Ignazio and Klein, 2016; McDowell, 2016; Novack, 
2015; Ruhil, 2018; UNDGC, 2017; UNOCHA, 2014; Vujakovic, 2002). Even 
more problematic is the sharing of spatial data, especially when it involves the 
disclosure of specific locations. For instance, making public and sharing spatial 
data on the location of refugee shelters or camps can be and has been used to 
target individuals (e.g. see Spiegel, 2015, on abuses tracked in Germany).
In this sense, still too little emphasis is put on the necessary critical 
standpoint from which to review the presentation and interpretation of 
spatial data (Tufte, 1990, 1997) and their social consequences. This has been 
a central concern during the preparation of the cartographic material for 
the Refugee Spaces project. The exact location and address of the centres for 
reception and detention has been blurred in order to avoid the possibility 
of transforming them on to a target. Research aiming to empower users 
and producers of data can end up being detrimental and disempowering, 
for instance when it reproduces power structures or when it perpetuates 
the ‘known’ instead of letting the ‘unknown’ emerge. Linda McDowell 
(1992, 2016) highlights the kinds of challenges encountered in qualitative 
data collection when working with refugees, including that of adequately 
capturing the complex temporalities and gender dynamics that are part of 
the refugee experience.
It is clear that a great deal of change still needs to happen. We need to stop 
looking at migrants and start looking with them, attending to their individual 
experiences, motivations and risks, encouraging public participation in, and 
engagement around, questions of data collection and interpretation, while 
testing more solid ethical frameworks for improving data standards well beyond 
existing rigid protection policies and acknowledging issues of positionality in 
all stages of data work, from collection to sharing.
Note on the term ‘refugee crisis’
We acknowledge that the term ‘refugee crisis’ is widely contested among 
scholars, humanitarian and civil society actors (Koselleck and Richter, 2006; 
Krzyżanowski, 2016; Roitman, 2013), both because it is inexact – the recent 
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flows concern migrants and asylum seekers not refugees (Crawley and Skleparis, 
2018) – and because it is a stigmatising and alarmist notion. However, it allows 
us to refer to a series of events in a concise way. We embrace the view that this is 
a multiple crisis (Boano and Gyftopoulou, 2016; Roitman, 2013). It is a crisis 
in terms of the increased volume and different pace of refugee and migrant 
flows, in terms of receiving countries’ asylum reception policies and with 
regard to European politics and policies, as it brings to the fore the divergent 
views of different member states.
Nonetheless, it is a term that also triggers a dramatic rise in suspicion and 
asylum panic (for a critical discussion on policy responses, see Triandafyllidou, 
2018). Ultimately, this is a crisis of the notion of Europe itself. As the nomos of 
Europe lies in the mutualisation and legitimisation of its borders and territories, 
which is enacted through the ‘open border’ scheme of the Schengen area, the 
waves of migrants fleeing into Europe push this system of control towards 
collapse. They are unknowingly but steadily dismantling the biopolitical system 
that constitutes one of the pillars of Europe and consequently threatening the 
European construction – or rather, pushing its deconstruction. The ways in 
which this is happening are multiple, from the political/ territorial impacts of 
mass migration, to the representation of these processes through discourses, 
narratives and media analysis (Astolfo and Marten, 2016, p. 7). However, the 
notion of crisis is neither negative nor positive, but represents a breaking point 
and a turnaround (from the Greek Krino).
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6. Dying in the technosphere: an intersectional 
analysis of European migration maps
Monika Halkort
More than 6,000 migrants have died in the Mediterranean since 2014 (IOM, 2020a). When the number of disappeared is included the figure rises as high as 19,803, about half of all those reported 
dead or missing while crossing a border on land or sea globally (IOM, 2020b). 
The devastating death toll has led some to describe the Mediterranean as ‘a 
macabre death- scape’ (Heller and Pezzani, 2017), the ‘world’s deadliest border’ 
(Albahari, 2015) or one of the largest ‘mass graves’ in European history (Center 
for Political Beauty, 2015).
In an effort to contain the high death toll, the European border and 
coastguard agency Frontex established a dense web of geospatial intelligence, 
comprised of remote sensing devices, satellite imaging and real- time tracking 
technology for the dual purpose of intercepting migrant vessels and assisting 
bodies in need. Combined with the calculative capacities of big data and 
algorithmic computing, this pervasive regime of scopic possibilities allows for 
the real- time tracking of maritime movements and conjures up matrices of 
‘situational awareness’ that promise to render the sea governable and transparent 
for the purpose of stopping smuggling activity and irregular border crossings. 
Humanitarian agencies, activists and people smugglers are simultaneously 
experimenting with the possibilities of real- time earth observation, pursuing 
objectives quite distinct from the Frontex surveillance regime.
Measured by the sheer volume of data generated by humanitarian agencies, 
activists and border security, it is fair to suggest that irregular migration 
constitutes one of the best- mapped ‘crises’ in the history of humanitarianism. 
And yet looking at the amount of information available on dead and missing 
bodies, it is startling to realise that little to no reliable data exist. It is not 
known how many bodies are never retrieved from the sea and thus these 
bodies become unavailable, either for counting or identification (Laczko 
et al., 2017). Between 1990 and 2013, the majority of those who washed up 
on Europe’s shores remain largely unidentified (Binnie and Kambas, 2016; 
Last et al., 2017).
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This chapter interrogates the key factors contributing to the critical gaps 
and blind spots within the maps of Europe’s alleged migration ‘crisis’. Drawing 
on intersectional analysis and post- humanist, feminist thinking, I assess how 
logics of utility, cost effectiveness and securitisation articulate and reproduce 
the logics of racialisation, subalternity and enclosure that are constitutive of 
the ways dead and missing migrants become readable, visible and intelligible 
in humanitarian border regimes. Born out of critical feminist theory, 
intersectional analysis (Crenshaw, 1991) examines how apparently value- 
free, bureaucratic processes such as counting, mapping and data extraction 
(re)distribute violence unevenly across populations, amplifying possible 
harms for those who are already targeted on multiple levels at once, such as 
race, class, gender, ethnicity and able bodied- ness (Grosfoguel et al., 2014). 
Relayed back to the context of digital mapping, this involves interrogating 
how targeted exclusions and power asymmetries are amplified, reformulated 
and/ or reproduced by digital infrastructures as they diffract unifying signifiers 
such as race, class, gender, age or ethnicity across sociotechnical, legal and 
political registers and domains. Their combined impact has produced a new 
underclass of ‘datafied’ subjects – digital subalterns – that are kept outside the 
political and symbolic order and whose inaudibility is a direct result of their 
ambivalent standing within registers of security and the state. The absence of 
dead and missing migrants on Europe’s crisis maps is indicative of a double 
rejection and denial. It bespeaks a radical rejection of the ethical and political 
responsibilities towards floating bodies that defy the political authority of the 
state, while at the same time denying their material agency to give testimony 
and to speak their own truths.
Empirically this chapter draws on a purposeful sample of (big) data sets 
and visualisations generated by the main organisations governing irregular 
migration in the Mediterranean, most notably the European Union (EU) 
border and coastguard agency Frontex, the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Additional material was 
gathered from operational reports, workshop proceedings and semi- structured 
interviews with staff members of all the above- mentioned organisations, 
representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), national 
coastguards and Frontex officials at the international border management and 
security conference SHADE in Rome, 2018. This eclectic mix of sources allows 
for a layered analysis of how the conflicting interests of humanitarian actors, 
security and border policing and activists intersect with the materiality of legal, 
political, technoscientific rationalities and environmental conditions to extend 
the border as political space and epistemic practice deep into the operational 
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scripts of contemporary data regimes. In line with this approach the main 
emphasis will be on the non- linear transition of the corporeality of migrant 
bodies into map data and the particular modes of silencing, objectification and 
foreclosure or subordination that this entails.
Situating border deaths in the Mediterranean
Mapping dead and missing migrants poses a series of intractable challenges. It 
confronts humanitarian agencies, activists and border security with the difficult 
task of accounting for bodies that are no longer immediately present or that 
have reached a stage of decomposition in which they cannot be easily identified. 
There is no system in place to report migrant fatalities in any systematic 
and reliable fashion. Many bodies are never found or recovered from open 
waters and even if they are discovered, it can take years before their identity is 
established (Laczko et al., 2017). This is in part due to the clandestine nature of 
irregular border crossings. They are designed to be untraceable and to disguise 
the point of departure and identity of those involved. Migrants and refugees 
do not carry passports or any other personal identifiable information in the 
hope that this will protect them from being sent back if intercepted by border 
patrols. This severely complicates the process of attaching a name, place of 
origin and surviving relatives to those who die or go missing. Doing so requires 
lengthy and tedious forensic investigations in which unique identifiers such 
as DNA samples, dental records and other authenticating details are collected 
and compared with data from a time before the presumed death (Grant, 2015; 
Mediterranean Missing, 2016; Pinchi et al., 2017). Few coroners or medical 
examiners from the local municipalities along the Greek, Italian or Turkish 
coastline are prepared, or equipped, to conduct such a demanding task due to 
a lack of financial resources and technical expertise (Last et al., 2017; Pinchi 
et al., 2017).
The chance of retrieving corpses lost beneath the waves is even smaller. 
Doing so demands specialist instruments such as transport vessels with human 
refrigerators and remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs), which marine 
control offices and national coastguards of EU border states can rarely afford 
(Kovras and Robins, 2016; Pinchi et al., 2017). This leaves search and rescue 
teams, fishermen and survivors of shipwrecks as the only first- hand source 
available to humanitarian agencies and activists for documenting fatalities. Yet, 
given the traumatic circumstance of their journey, survivors may not always 
remember the exact number of fellow travellers or may not be in a position to 
be interviewed at all. As a result, the current death toll circulated by activists 
and humanitarian agencies varies greatly. While IOM reported a total of 
17,589 by the end of 2018 (Kovras and Robins, 2016; Pinchi et al., 2017), 
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activists such as United for Intercultural Action (2018) or Fortress Europe 
(2016) count 34,361 and 27,382 for the time periods of 1993– 2018 and 
1988– 2016 respectively. These rather striking differences can be explained by 
the different time periods measured, but they also result from the fact that each 
group builds on its own unique set of secondary sources. These include official 
records from national coastguards and medical examiners, media reports, non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society groups to verify and 
supplement survivor and eyewitness accounts.
The uncertainty created by the gross variation in the migrant death count 
challenges the idea of the Mediterranean as a transparent and governable 
space that Frontex likes to imagine in its annual mission reports (Frontex, 
2018). It exposes the ‘patchy visibility’ at play in the real- time tracking of 
movements across borders, bringing a critical remainder of blind spots and 
‘shadow zones’ (Tazzioli, 2015, p. 5) to the fore. At the same time, it has 
left migrants in an ambivalent state of ‘known unknowns’ – an amorphous 
mass of muted bodies, without name or identity – visible only through their 
last recorded geopolitical location and vague descriptions of the immediate 
circumstances of their deaths. Such circumstantial evidence can certainly 
reveal changing patterns and trends once they are aggregated into statistical 
charts, flow diagrams and situational maps, yet they also leave behind 
what Lahoud (2014) calls an ‘excess of variables’ without clear designation, 
opening up ‘a natural reserve of complication’ that can be exploited and 
mobilised for various political agendas and aims. For Frontex, they provide 
a convenient backdrop to underline the success of their own rescue 
operations and to legitimise the increasing militarisation of Europe’s borders 
under the pretext of saving lives and preventing future deaths (European 
Council, 2019; Frontex, 2019). For intergovernmental organisations such 
as UNHCR and IOM, on the other hand, these knowledge gaps open up 
ample space to affirm their position as central clearing houses of politically 
sensitive information and to use their first- hand access to survivors and 
eyewitnesses of clandestine border crossings for developing new projects 
that further strengthen their authority as data brokers in global migration 
governance (IOM, 2014).
The increasing monopolisation over migrant data by intergovernmental 
organisations has become a source of much frustration among humanitarian 
activists, such as UNITED, Fortress Europe or WatchTheMed (WTM), who 
have been counting the human cost of ‘irregular’ migration since the early 
1990s, long before IOM arrived on the scene. They openly criticise the 
organisation for depoliticising their work by making the phenomenon more 
knowable, predictable and hence governable in the interest of affected states 
(Heller and Pezzani, 2013). Data on ‘irregular’ migration, in their view, do 
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not merely describe a pre- existing social reality, but rather contribute to its 
existence. In Heller and Pezzani’s (2013, p. 292) words:  ‘If the border only 
exists in its violation, the latter must first be detected, either by human 
perception or by its various technological extensions’. Against this, activists 
draw on a variety of open- source tools and crowdsourced geospatial intelligence 
to produce their own set of ‘counter- maps’ and ‘counter- statistics’ as part of 
a wider political project to shame European states into action and change 
their asylum and border policy. While ambitious in their political aims, these 
lobbying activities did little to release the dead and missing from their liminal 
status as ‘known unknowns’, much less to reinstate their agency to speak on 
their own behalf. Instead, the activist maps merely added another version of 
truth to the conflicting ‘knowledge ecology’ (Heller and Pezzani, 2013, p. 291) 
surrounding ‘irregular’ border crossings in the Mediterranean. Thus rendering 
the voice, recognition and visibility of migrants contingent on the variously 
differentiated definitions of border death and the struggle of where to situate 
it in the political geography of Europe that divide humanitarian agencies, 
activists and European states.
Frontex, for example, does not count border deaths per se, instead they record 
only those they encounter in search and rescue and security missions in which 
their own forces are involved. IOM’s Missing Migrants Project (IOM, 2014), 
on the other hand, counts all deaths at external state borders or those that occur 
during migration towards an international destination. However, IOM does 
not include those who die after their arrival in Europe, that is, in immigration 
detention facilities, refugee camps and asylum homes, or after deportation to 
their homeland. Also excluded are deaths connected with a migrant’s irregular 
status, such as labour exploitation or lack of access to free health care. Activists, 
by contrast, include a variety of instances far away from the European border, 
such as in the Sahara desert on the way to the Libyan coast, but also deaths in 
detention centres inside Europe, which IOM and Frontex do not count. Migrant 
deaths, in this view, do not follow territorial or legal definitions of the border, 
but instead include the sum total of deaths that emerge as an effect of Europe’s 
bordering practices and their dissemination into other states (Heller and Pécoud, 
2018, p. 9). Thus, while the death count of Frontex and IOM reinscribes the 
border as a central organising principle for safe and controlled migration and 
accepts border deaths as an unintended consequence of protecting the national 
interests of European states, the activists’ maps stand firmly in line with their 
wider political project to delegitimise bordering practices as a technology of 
containment and undue restriction of human mobility. Yet each map, in its 
own way, projects a universal experience of harm upon the singularity of dead 
and missing corpses and in doing so converts the power to look into a self- 
legitimising mandate to speak on their behalf.
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Death as geopolitical location
The conflicting interests and mandates undergirding the death count of 
irregular migration renders the bodies of dead and missing migrants as highly 
contested geopolitical locations where fundamentally opposed concepts of 
human mobility and the border collide. To speak of the body as location in 
this context is to recall the inherent instability and situatedness of knowledge 
and vision and to stress their inherent entanglement with historically distinct 
relations of power and privilege. Maps, just like any form of representation, 
always speak from particular places, not just in a geographic sense but also with 
regard to onto- epistemic (dis)positions that determine who gets to speak, on 
what terms and to what effect (Barad, 2003; Gajjala, 2013; Haraway, 1988). 
Attempting to relay this inherent partiality of knowledge into an emancipatory 
project, feminist scholars have long insisted on the body as the primary locus of 
political definition and self- definition, mobilising it for ‘a politics of location’ 
(Haraway, 1988, p. 589) from which one’s partial perspective can be enunciated 
and reclaimed. As Petra Hinton (2014, p.  101) writes, in emphasising the 
historical and political specificity and substance of what it means to be a 
woman, a refugee or migrant, feminist scholarship has aimed at disrupting the 
myth of objectivity and disembodied viewing that has been constitutive for 
Western epistemology and science, revealing the sexual, cultural and historical 
determinations that produce objects, environments, subjects and bodies while 
successfully obscuring the mechanisms of silencing and marginalisation that 
they engender and sustain. In the words of Donna Haraway (1988, p. 585), a 
pioneer of feminist critiques in science and technology studies, ‘vision is always 
a question of the power to see and the violence implicit in our visualizing 
practices’. Both operate in hegemonic spaces that ground knowledge in 
the disembodied fantasy of seeing everything from nowhere and that allow 
a distancing of the knowing subject from the world, ‘purging the marked 
body from all elements of subjectivity’ (Agostinho, 2019, p. 5). Against this 
backdrop the activist maps appear equally complicit in the silencing of dead 
and missing migrants, just as the mappings of Frontex and IOM do. Their 
ambition to resituate ‘the space of death’1 by turning the surveillant gaze of the 
state against itself merely stabilised the matrix of intelligibility that read the 
human cost of irregular border crossings from a disembodied view of nowhere, 
in pursuit of political projects that left the migrant’s own partial perspective 
invisible and foreclosed. What is more, by recording migrant deaths primarily 
on the basis of their last known geolocation, the activists, just like Frontex and 
IOM, ended up spatialising death in ways that reified the territoriality of the 
current geopolitical order, in so far as they read the material substance of the 
1 Charles Heller interview (2018) with author.
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dead and missing solely in relation to the state and the expansive geography 
of its border regime. What was lost on the way was the potential to rewrite 
the map from the viewpoint of the dead and missing migrant body itself – 
not as a fixed or bounded essence  – but as a multiplicity, a scattered and 
diffracted presence, stretched across various spatial, temporal and affective 
registers and locales. Admittedly, the extensive notion of border deaths in the 
activists’ account is a first important step in this direction. Not least because it 
successfully extends ‘the space of death’ to the full spectrum of localities where 
migrants may have died or disappeared. But the activists’ determination to 
condemn the political violence of the border ended up evidencing, above all, 
the interests of the state, without reinstating the fractured voice of the migrant 
as political space and location in its own right. The rather tragic irony here is 
that these effects unfold against a backdrop of a radical decentring of power 
in the field of vision. New sensory devices and remote viewing techniques 
have opened up a whole new spectrum of frequencies for engaging with forms 
of intelligence and modes of speech that have previously been inaccessible 
to humans or disavowed. Scholarship on this extended field of sensibilities 
(Bratton, 2014; Hansen, 2014) has shown how the datafication of ever- more 
aspects of the world enables insights into the basic building blocks of life and 
the planet (i.e. climate change, subatomic activity or the biophysicality of the 
body), which far exceed the capacity of human perception, opening up ways 
of knowing, understanding and interacting with domains of experience that 
would otherwise be foreclosed.
The fact that hardly any of these possibilities are currently utilised for 
the search and retrieval of dead and missing migrants calls for a critical 
review of the particular modes of silencing and erasures that take place 
in the non- linear transition between the materiality of the body and 
their data proxies and how they may reify, reproduce, but also transform 
long- standing patterns of structural inequality, racialisation and targeted 
exclusions inherited from historical knowledge regimes. What is clear from 
the above is that databased vision has added new layers of complexity to 
the politics of location inhered in digital mappings. It allows new actors to 
make use of maps and to insert alternative visions into the geo- / biopolitics 
of knowledge production, while at the same time diffracting the objectifying 
force of ‘disembodied viewing’ (Haraway, 1988) into a highly decentralised 
and distributive operation, with the effect that the question of who or what 
does the seeing and from what location becomes increasingly less clear. 
Before demonstrating how this decentring of visuality is implicated in the 
silencing and delegitimation of migrant bodies in the Mediterranean, I 
want to spend a few moments laying out some conceptual contours for this 
new post- human visual regime.
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The material agency of digital crisis maps
Maps are never value free but operate in historically situated fields of power 
that give them political efficacy and value (Blomley, 2003; Elden, 2010; 
Harley, 1989). As such they cannot be separated from the rules, tastes or 
technical abilities of societies that produce them, nor from the geo- and 
biopolitical effects they have when they are used (Bargues- Pedreny, 2019). 
Humanitarian maps are no exception in this regard. They may be presented 
as purely utilitarian, free from political or economic interests, but as Specht 
and Feigenbaum (2018, p.  1504) contend, whatever their political context, 
method or motif, humanitarian maps can never escape their embodiment in 
military technology, whose conventions of seeing are firmly rooted in practices 
of containment, persuasion and oppression that defined modern- colonial 
knowledge regimes. Therefore, humanitarian maps at best fail to represent 
the plurality and fluidity of emergent crises and at worst further malign the 
interests of security or humanitarian agencies. Specht and Feigenbaum’s (2018) 
critique draws attention to the critical role of operational rationalities and 
infrastructural arrangements in the performativity of digital maps. Their reliance 
on satellite imagery, crowdsourcing volunteers and geographic information 
software (GIS) makes the mapping of crises and catastrophes dependent on 
platforms, filters and geocodes designed by non- local actors (i.e. international 
space agencies, commercial satellite operators or platform monopolies such as 
Google), all of whom bring their own terms and conditions to bear on what 
appears and what is written out of the map (Specht and Feigenbaum, 2018). 
Therefore, crisis maps operate in a long- standing tradition of scopic regimes 
that have successfully harnessed visuality for control and profit (Sheppard, 
2015), embedding their utility within wider power differentials of political 
economy. And yet, following Sheppard (2015), while the impulse towards 
exerting visual power through the disciplinary and territorial deployment of 
maps may still resonate, the instantaneity of satellite imaging and ubiquitous 
earth observation has also added new layers of instability to mapping practices 
that come with their own flavour of objectification and immanence.
The seamless integration of real- time GIS with locative media and algorithmic 
computing has given way to a knowledge politics in which maps, as an ‘external’ 
cognitive artefact, connect human reasoning with computational methods such 
that inherited distinctions between time and space, observer and observed, 
map and territory, are becoming increasingly blurred (Brantner, 2018; see also 
Sutko and de Souza e Silva, 2011). Thus, the surface appearance of the world, 
to paraphrase Bargues- Pedreny (2019, p. 3899), no longer provides a stable 
referent for modelling space and topological relations, much less for identifying 
change and distributions across space and time. Social, political and economic 
processes are increasingly studied on the basis of data sources that are only 
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remotely connected to their underlying object, with the intention to reveal 
new patterns, tendencies and relations by selectively assembling previously 
unrelated data points (Amoore, 2011; Clough et  al., 2015). Hence, digital 
maps, as Bargues- Pedreny (2019, p. 3895) writes, no longer intend to grasp the 
world as an object that can be held in place, claimed or governed. Instead, they 
are mapping specific aspects and correlations that can be flexibly reconfigured 
into infinitely variable descriptions of the world.
This inextricable entanglement of data, space and world introduces a whole 
new range of actors and agencies into the struggle over how to see where to 
situate the partiality of embodied perspectives, decentring the loci of power and 
accountability. This diffraction of visual agency becomes ever- more pertinent 
as artificial intelligence (AI) and machine vision are increasingly reconfiguring 
the world in their own image, independent of the preoccupations of human 
perception, aspirations and aims. They confront us with a kind of ‘autonomous 
visuality’ (Sheppard, 2015, p. 2), an active, non- localisable perceptual system 
that opens up new possibilities for the production of difference and the 
patterning of behaviours, while at the same time enrolling new political spaces 
of exclusion, delegitimation and erasure in geocoded space- times. These self- 
referential, generative capacities invest digital infrastructures with critical 
agentive possibilities that simultaneously enact and represent objects, designs, 
bodies and environments on the basis of values they themselves engender. That 
is, geographic coordinates and location tags but also demographic codes or 
ethnic and genetic markers, thereby converting bodies into material- semiotic 
nodes (Haraway, 1988, p. 595) that allow for the realignment of experiential 
surfaces along techno- political heuristics, such that logics of racialisation, 
dehumanisation and enclosure easily diffuse deep into the operational 
rationality of digital maps.
With this in mind, digital mapping technologies can be understood as 
powerful ontological machines, which variously position living and non- 
living forms in relation to their environment and other modes of being. Such 
positionings are not reducible to discourse and representation, but unfold as 
‘productive materialisations’ (Clough et  al., 2015, p.  157) of data relations 
that reconfigure and redraw the physical and the symbolic boundaries of 
objects, places and bodies in ways that hold their position within the normative 
registers of nature– culture, human– non- human distinctions in a state of 
continuous ontological uncertainty and flux. Such an approach demands to 
assess the normativity of digital maps across the full spectrum of materialities 
that constitute the ‘facticity’ of the body (Young, 2005, p. 16), including socio- 
economic and environmental conditions, as well as technoscientific, legal 
and political practices and arrangements, all of which sustain the dialectics 
of recognition through which digital maps produce their techno- existential 
effects.
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The critical task for the remainder of this chapter will be to discuss how these 
non- linear transitions of the facticity of the body into and out of data affect 
the way dead and missing corpses become visible, readable and intelligible as 
subjects of legal and moral protection able to make their voice and presence 
count and heard.
The violence of non- identification
The recovery and forensic investigation of natural disaster victims and mass 
casualties has greatly benefited from advanced imaging technologies, such 
as panoramic cameras, ground- penetrating radars, surface laser scanners 
or photography in the near ultraviolet (UV) spectrum (Urbanováa et al., 
2017). When combined with drones, underwater robotic devices or the 
real- time earth observation capacities of satellite systems, these tools can 
create a critical resource for the search and collection of drowned bodies 
from deep seas and other inaccessible terrains. The recovery operations after 
major crashes such as the 2009 Air France plane crash in the Atlantic or 
the Malaysian Airlines accident in the Indian Ocean in 2014 both involved 
the use of remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), equipped with colour video 
cameras and long- range sonar scanners, capable of detecting scavenged 
and decomposed corpses on seabeds that would be unsafe or unfeasible 
for humans to search (Ellinghama et al., 2017). Similarly, oceanographic 
forecast models can now be used to predict the resurfacing of drowned 
corpses that remained undetected during ROV missions. This requires 
combining weather data with forensic research about the main oceanic 
factors that lead sunken bodies to resurface from the sea (Ellinghama et al., 
2017, p. 230).
Yet, none of these possibilities has so far been mobilised for the recovery of 
dead and missing corpses in the Mediterranean, bar three notable exceptions: the 
two shipwrecks off the coast of Lampedusa, Italy, on 3 and 11 October 2013, 
which left 639 people dead (Molinario, 2014), and mass casualties off the 
coast of Libya in April 2015, among whom 700 people died (Mediterranean 
Missing, 2016). In each instance big navy vessels with submarine robots were 
deployed to recover corpses lying 370 metres beneath the surface, which were 
then carried on land with large transport barges properly equipped with liquid 
nitrogen refrigeration systems. The total cost of this operation amounted to 
9.5 million euros, paid for by the Italian government (Pinchi et  al., 2017). 
The high death toll of these accidents drew a lot of media attention, which 
may explain why such exceptionally vast infrastructure resources were made 
available (Mediterranean Missing, 2016).
The cost involved in using high- end underwater equipment on a regular 
basis is certainly one reason why it is only mobilised in rare circumstances. And 
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yet, when compared with the overall budget made available for the surveillance 
infrastructure of Frontex, it becomes possible to see involvement of the wider 
political economy. The EU has earmarked a budget of 2.2 billion euros for 
the 2021– 7 period, which will enable Frontex to hire 10,000 core operational 
staff and purchase its own equipment, such as vessels, surveillance drones and 
vehicles, available to be deployed at all times and for all necessary operations 
(European Commission, 2018). This is a major boost for the operational 
capacities of the agency that has so far relied on the support of air, sea and land 
assets volunteered by EU member states. Frontex currently commands a fleet of 
22 ships, equipped with night- vision instruments and military radars, as well as 
medium- range, long- endurance drones, which stream real- time observational 
data to Frontex’s central control room in Warsaw (Frontex, 2018). Additional 
surveillance capacities, such as satellite images, flow monitoring and big data 
mining instruments for predictive trend analyses, are made available through 
the European Space Agency (ESA) (ESA, 2017, 2018). Finally, the automated 
identification systems (AIS), used for commercial cargo tracking, are also an 
integral part of Frontex’s situational awareness regime. These pervasive scopic 
possibilities are almost exclusively put in the service of securitisation, that is, 
for combatting ‘criminal’ activity and ‘irregular’ border crossings and not for 
identifying migrant vessels in distress or for recovering dead bodies lost at sea.
From the viewpoint of law enforcement this selective deployment of 
machine vision follows a strictly utilitarian logic. The dead are of no value 
for the purpose of border policing. They are no longer perceived as an acute 
threat, and hence there is little to gain from knowing how many people died 
and where or who they are. It is those who facilitate the journey – human 
smugglers and their middle men or possible survivors – who are of central 
concern. IOM, on the other hand, has put the use of state- of- the- art mapping 
technologies and big data at the centre of its mission to facilitate safe and 
humane migration by way of knowledge provision, humanitarian assistance 
and the coordination of international cooperation in migration management. 
The agency commands similar privileged access to the real- time flow 
monitoring and remote data- tracking capabilities of ESA. But it also maintains 
its own Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) that compiles 
all available information into two open data portals:  the Migration Data 
Portal (GMDAC, 2019), dedicated to the mapping and analysis of general 
trends in global migration, and the Missing Migrant Project (IOM, 2019), 
which tracks the number of migrant fatalities around the world. Drawing on 
these rich data resources, IOM has produced a series of reports (Ardittis and 
Laczko, 2017; Brian and Laczko, 2016; Laczko et al., 2017) that highlight 
critical gaps and weaknesses in the current state of information about migrant 
fatalities, stressing in particular the lack of systematic data collection on the 
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dead and missing that would ensure the identification of nameless bodies and 
allow for their proper burial or return to their families. The reports also make 
practical suggestions for improvement. Most notably there is a global database 
for collecting and exchanging post- and ante- mortem data, including DNA 
samples and personal identifiable information such as body marks, clothes 
and personal items, to support migrant families searching for lost relatives. 
Yet up until this point IOM has not been able to secure the necessary funding 
for such a global exchange platform, nor has it been able to promote a steady 
and effective data exchange between its member states. Part of this has to do 
with IOM’s weak institutional mandate, which severely limits the amount of 
pressure it can exert (Pécoud, 2018).
Unlike UNHCR, which operates on the basis of internationally recognised, 
humanitarian principles and laws such as the 1951 Geneva Convention, 
IOM cannot rely on a clear, internationally agreed political agenda to enforce 
policies, recommendations and demands (Pécoud, 2018, pp.  1626, 1632). 
This requires IOM to carefully balance its ambitions with the priorities and 
interests of national governments, on whose collaboration and financial 
support it depends (Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010; Geiger, 2018; Heller and 
Pécoud, 2018; Pécoud, 2018, p. 1627). A special issue in the Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies (Pécoud, 2018) summarised IOM’s ambivalent position 
as follows:
It is an intergovernmental organization, but at times seems to function 
like a private company, while also competing with civil society groups 
and NGOs. Its focus is on migration, but it also performs other tasks 
that have little to do with migration (like rebuilding regions affected by 
natural disasters). It is called an organization for migration, but does much 
against migration, for example, by returning unwanted migrants to their 
country or preventing unauthorized migration. IOM appears as a loosely 
connected network of projects and field offices, addressing a heteroclite 
range of issues, and moving quickly from one to another, according to 
opportunities and circumstances.2
In my own interview with IOM, the project coordinator for the Missing 
Migrants Project readily admits that the organisation’s efforts to improve the 
quality of data on dead and missing migrants are severely compromised by 
2 UNHCR, by contrast, maintains a far more critical and distanced approach to states hosting 
or receiving migrants and refugees. It routinely blames European states for the securitisation 
and militarisation of its borders, drawing on its vast pool of data resources to highlight direct 
correlations between Europe’s pushback policy, the criminalisation of civil society rescue 
missions and migrant deaths in the Mediterranean sea (UNHCR, 2018). IOM, by contrast, 
is far less forthcoming in critique of states for their negligence and violation of international 
law. For an in- depth critique of evaluation of IOM’s global operations see the special issue of 
the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (Pécoud, 2018).
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the hesitancy of affected states to invest in the systematic documentation of 
migrant death. However, this reluctance is not only a lack of political will but 
also a shortage of financial resources and technical expertise. Stefanie Grant 
(2016, pp. 64– 5), senior researcher on human rights of the dead, described the 
main factors preventing a proper information management of migrant deaths 
in no uncertain terms:
Local and national death registration and identification systems are neither 
designed nor adequate for the particular challenges arising in the context of 
international migration. The magnitude of migrant movements across the 
Mediterranean has overwhelmed the capacity of European border- states 
such as Italy, Greece, Malta and Turkey to deal even with the basic tasks of 
death registration and the care of the dead.
The most pertinent problems in this regard are the lack of forensic expertise, 
insufficient morgue and cemetery space, inadequate procedures and lack 
of collaboration between local municipalities, police forces, international 
organisations and home states. Added to that is the profound lack of trust and 
the fear of migrant families to engage with state institutions and the police, 
which often prevents them from requesting or providing information about 
their relatives, even if a proper system was in place.
The combined impact of mistrust, lack of cooperation and conflicting 
political, financial and strategic priorities and potentials has resulted in a 
striking imbalance between the level of detail and amount of data made 
available through the interpellating gaze of securitisation and policing, and 
the quality and depth of knowledge generated through a careful examination 
of the individual migrant body, up to a point where these gaps and blind spots 
take on profound racialising and dehumanising effects in their own right. 
This structural impossibility for the experiential surface of the body to speak 
for itself not only disintegrates the dead into a scattered assemblage of data 
fragments, spread across legal, political and administrative registers, but it 
has left the migrant body by and large unreadable and unrecognisable as an 
historical subject and also as a subject of legal and moral protection and care.
Simone Brown (2009) coined the notion of ‘digital epidermalisation’ to 
describe the dehumanising effects of technologies that cast certain kinds of 
bodies outside the order of normalcy on the basis of calculations of the textures 
of the skin. Her work builds on the alienating effects of biometric devices, 
i.e. electronic finger printing, face- recognition software or iris scans, but the 
notion of digital epidermalisation equally applies to forensic data and crisis 
maps. Building on Fanon (1967), epidermalisation provides a way of thinking 
about the ontological insecurity of the racialised body as it experiences its 
‘being through others’ (Brown, 2009, p.  133). Brown (2009) explains that 
this dissociation between self and world is experienced not least through the 
skin  – a porous surface perceptive to touch. Calculating its texture into an 
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abstract matrix of plot points mapped against normative templates or grids 
conjures up a visual economy of recognition in which variously charged 
registers of alienation – race, gender, age, ethnicity, migration –  can become 
the measuring stick for rendering some bodies as deviant or lacking, and hence 
to deny their social and political relevance. In Browns words (ibid.): ‘The body 
is dissected, fixed, and woven out of a thousand details, anecdotes and stories, 
denied its specificity’ and hence cast outside the political and symbolic order, 
the paradigmatic position of ontological insecurity (see also Fanon, 1967).
The selective reading of dead and missing migrants into and out of data, 
and indeed the refusal to verify their identity as such, can equally be read as an 
ontological displacement, albeit in the opposite direction. Here it is the refusal 
to make contact and to establish a connection with the experiential surface of 
skin, as embodied locality of the migrant’s subjectivity, that becomes the point 
of dehumanisation and displacement. It reveals a new face of racialisation, 
subalternity and erasure peculiar to contemporary data regimes. It conjures 
up an arithmetic of skin in which certain deaths no longer register and that 
renders them outside of existence, or outside the spectrum of humanity.
This structural abandonment is not a systemic glitch nor is it reducible 
to inefficiency or lack of funds. It is integral to the biopolitical calculus of 
migration and the violence of the humanitarian border regime at large. It has 
locked dead and missing migrants into an ambivalent state of ‘absent presences’ 
that powerfully evokes Spivak’s (2010) notion of the ‘subaltern’ – as the one 
placed outside the symbolic order – defined above all by its inability to speak 
on its own terms. Subalternity, it is worth remembering, is not an incapacity 
or impossibility to speak, but a failure of speech, the inability to register one’s 
voice within the surplus of reason that always already laid out the terms and 
conditions of speech in advance (Sunder Rajan, 2010). Relayed back to the 
specific context of digital speech – by way of mapping and datafication – this 
denial of enunciation is not a function of discourse or targeted exclusions on 
the level of populism and ideology, but needs to be understood through the 
non- linear transitions of the facticity of the body into and out of data and the 
specificity of muteness and inaudibility this affords.
Conclusion
The proliferation of real- time mapping and surveillance technologies in the 
management of ‘irregular’ migration is indicative of the increasing securitisation 
of the Mediterranean, both as a political and humanitarian space but also 
as a moral location. It reflects a critical shift in the biopolitics of ‘surplus 
populations’ that calls long- standing ethical commitments and legal obligations 
into question, or renders them entirely obsolete. The criminalisation of NGOs 
that have rescued migrants in recent years has shown that the commitment to 
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indiscriminate search and rescue operations at sea can no longer be taken for 
granted, nor is the principle of unconditional assistance and non- refoulement 
of persons seeking asylum consistently met. This is even more surprising as 
digital mapping technologies have enhanced the possibilities for pre- emptive 
seeing and risk calculations to an unprecedented scope and scale. In this 
chapter I have tried to show how this political space of calculability silently 
inscribes the border deep into the operational logic and protocols of crisis 
mapping that delegitimises the muted migrant body as a subject of moral and 
legal protection and care. The strategic misrecognition is indicative for the 
new faces of subordination afforded by datafication. It has produced a new 
underclass of datafied subjects – digital subalterns – whose unreadability and 
inaudibility directly reflect their ambivalent legal and political standing within 
the humanitarian bordering regimes.
The problem cannot be resolved on the level of rights to datafication. Existing 
principles and frameworks in international humanitarian law, international 
human rights law, international criminal law and international maritime 
law all confer rights on the dead, in particular the right to be identified after 
death. None, though, refers specifically to the treatment of the dead in the 
context of irregular migration (Ampuero Villagran, 2018, p. 10; Grant, 2016, 
p.  1). This resulted in a highly uneven recognition of  state responsibilities 
towards drowned and deceased corpses, enabling European governments to 
draw a clear distinction between citizens and non- citizens. Read in context 
with the historical power asymmetries and inequalities that continue to define 
the (post- )colonies of the South, one could say that the selective recognition 
of ethical and legal principles and obligations implicitly makes the figure of 
the citizen and by extension ‘whiteness’ and Europe as the invisible measuring 
stick to determine whose deaths matter and how they are made to count. In 
this regard, the systemic non- identification of migrant bodies can be read as 
the result of a double rejection and denial:  as a rejection of the ethical and 
political responsibilities towards those who openly challenge and undermine 
the political authority of the border, but also as a denial of the material agency 
of the racialised Other to give testimony and speak their truths, on their own 
terms and on their own behalf.
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7. Now the totality maps us: mapping 
climate migration and surveilling movable 
borders in digital cartographies
Bogna M. Konior
Prophecy now involves a geographical rather than a historical projection; it 
is space not time that hides consequences from us.
(John Berger cited in Toscano and Kinkle, 2015, p. 87)
In 1998, when the United States had long secured its position as a global superpower and a leader in greenhouse gas emissions, soon to be presidential candidate Al Gore delivered a speech at the California Science 
Center. In it, he painted a bright image of a digital future, where all of the 
world’s citizens could interact with a browsable, computer- generated, three- 
dimensional globe. Touching this ‘digital earth’ would activate geographically 
specific environmental and social information, allowing for a tactile relation 
to a planetary space that, if unmediated, would be too vast for humans to 
perceive. The Internet was to play a crucial part in this design, assuring that the 
project remained public and free. Gore (1998, p. 89) was dismayed that the 
vast amount of data collected by satellites had not been yet put to use:
The Landsat satellite is capable of taking a complete photograph of the 
entire planet every two weeks, and it’s been collecting data for more than 
20 years. In spite of the great need for that information, the vast majority 
of those images have never fired a single neuron in a single human brain. 
Instead, they are stored in electronic silos of data. We used to have an 
agricultural policy where we stored grain in Midwestern silos and let it 
rot while millions of people starved to death. Now we have an insatiable 
hunger for knowledge. Yet a great deal of data remains unused.
In his address, Gore proposes that an increase in the collection of 
‘georeferenced’ information would translate into the ability to conduct 
diplomacy in virtual reality, predict crime patterns with geographic information 
systems (GIS), preserve biodiversity, predict global rates of deforestation and 
other climate- related changes and increase agricultural productivity. Global 
climate change cooperation appears here as a problem that could be solved 
were the world sufficiently mapped with the latest digital tools. In the 20 years 
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since, the ‘blue planet’, beforehand perceived as the unquestionable common 
denominator that could transcend differences in social standing (Franke, 2013 
p.  14), has become an icon of ‘[the] voracious promise of integration and 
cosmic naturalisation of capital’ (Toscano and Kinkle, 2015 p. 35). The global 
economy has been entirely subordinated to the flows of finance: vast quantities 
of data, remotely collected by mobile sensors and monetised, became the 
seminal commodity of ‘surveillance capitalism’ (Zuboff, 2019). Just three years 
after Gore’s optimistic speech, in reaction to the dotcom bust, Google’s leaders 
embraced their current financial model reliant on increasing ad revenue. 
Combining their already vast computational power with unparalleled access to 
user logs, they were able to generate predictions of user behaviour and translate 
them into parameters of ad relevance. While surveillance capitalism was born 
in relation to advertising, ads no longer limit its scope. Governments, the 
military, non- governmental organisations (NGOs) and scientists seek access to 
complex predictive behavioural data traded on the ‘behavioural future markets’ 
(Zuboff, 2019, p. 45). Speculation on future behaviours, rather than scaring 
capital away, has become its feeding ground and its propelling machine. In a 
world where human behaviour is viewed as a free resource to exploit for profit, 
simulations and risk predictions are a gold mine. The territories of knowledge 
and information mapped by these markets provoke conflict. The watchers are 
‘invisible, unknown, and unaccountable’ and the watched are mere sources 
of behavioural surplus fed into the predictive machine (Zuboff, 2019, p. 67). 
Watch or be watched. Map or be mapped (Paglen, 2008).
One of the fastest- growing data sets is predictive and concerns climate- 
induced migration. For a variety of environmental, economic, political and 
cultural reasons, ‘the twenty- first century will be the century of the migrant’ 
(Nail, 2015, p. 1). While the exact definition of a ‘climate migrant’ is still up 
for debate (Biermann and Boas, 2010, pp. 62– 7), environmental change, the 
economy that triggered it and the related political turmoil provoke researchers to 
rethink the models of global governance. Whether this means ‘create[ing] new 
institutions and governance mechanisms from scratch’ (Biermann and Boas, 
2010, p. 60) or speculating on ascending forms of transnational sovereignty 
(Wainwright and Mann, 2018), this challenge calls for a cognitive remodelling 
of our planet in a hitherto unprecedented manner, one that needs to bypass 
the borders drawn on traditional maps between sovereign states. Questions 
concerning our ‘global commons’ or ‘natural resources’ are increasingly 
important, while simultaneously, as Sussman (2012) identifies, we live in 
a post- global age, where the only things that slide with ease across national 
borders are ecological calamity and finance. With that said, the border has not 
receded from sight. To the contrary, new borders are erected on a planetary 
scale. In 2009, a team of 28 scientists led by Johan Rockström coined the 
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term ‘planetary boundaries’, which has subsequently become one of the most 
cited frameworks for thinking about global sustainability (Biermann, 2012; 
Hughes et al., 2013; O’Neill et al., 2018; Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 
2015; Whiteman et  al., 2013). The nine boundaries  – atmospheric aerosol 
loading, nitrogen and phosphorus flows to the biosphere and oceans, land 
system change, freshwater consumption, ocean acidification, climate change, 
chemical pollution, biodiversity loss and stratospheric ozone depletion – call 
into place a cosmic spatiality constrained by uncrossable borders. As the planet 
is surveilled by the all- seeing eye of capital, border crossings become the key 
political problematic.
This chapter explores the connection between cartography and current 
mapping of climate migration. First it examines several existing representational 
maps and counter- maps that deal with the movable borders in the era of climate 
change, with the stipulation that these representational maps do not capture the 
essence of climate migration mapping. It subsequently proposes that the essence 
of climate migration mapping today is to be found within the infrastructure 
of satellite monitoring and security. This infrastructure, such as the European 
Union (EU) satellite monitoring project Copernicus discussed in this chapter, 
is built on the assumption that migration predictions immediately require an 
in- built early risk response system. In consequence, mapping, surveillance and 
simulation of political risk become indistinguishable, while the ‘behavioural 
surplus’ of actors in the global South is constantly mapped and analysed in 
order to ‘secure’ climate migrants before they are even tangibly brought into 
existence by environmental change. Herein lies the extension of colonial 
cartographies:  just like colonisation requires the production of humans who 
need ‘colonising’, securitisation requires the production of humans who need 
‘securing’ (Duffield and Waddell, 2006, p. 2). This demands a re- evaluation of 
what exactly ‘cognitive mapping’ (Jameson, 1990) should be in the times that 
humans are the ones being mapped rather than doing the mapping. Within the 
futurological prediction of climate- induced migration patterns, surveillance 
mapping does not restrict itself to space but encompasses ‘space- time’ and the 
future itself becomes a commodity.
Maps of the Anthropocene
Even a seemingly straightforward projection of a curved surface on to a two- 
dimensional plane is no simple matter of collecting and communicating 
information (Harley, 1989). Maps make choices about how they reflect 
the world (see Pickles, 2004; Wood, 1992). Most famously, the Mercator 
projection, created in 1569 and still used today, situates the United Kingdom 
as the centre of the world and distorts the size of continents, asserting the West’s 
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imperial position (Harpold, 1999). Today, Google generates contradictory 
maps, taking into account political conflicts (Ribeiro, 2009). Much has been 
written about the relationship between cartography and colonialism, where 
the map, rather than representing, created the territory that it sketched 
(Specht and Feigenbaum, 2018; Stone, 1988). Do maps ‘find the world or 
[do they] make it up?’ (Specht, 2018, p. 1). The partition of Africa by the 
colonisers between 1881 and 1914 is a prominent example of the latter. 
The map, based on the imperative of political economies, can summon the 
territory into existence: ‘The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it 
survive it’, but rather, ‘space is constituted through mapping practices, among 
many others, so that maps are not a reflection of the world, but a recreation 
of it, mapping activates the territory’ (Kitchin et al., 2011, pp. 2, 6). France, 
Britain and Germany saw in Africa a market that could generate massive trade 
surplus by buying more than it sold, providing free natural resources and free 
slave labour.
This overlap between colonial gaze and capitalist imperatives has been 
explored by numerous critics (Blaser, 2019; Friedmann, 2005; Larrain, 
2013; Mbembe, 2003) and kept alive not only by those who, like Zuboff 
(2019), want to understand political mutations of technological and financial 
infrastructures, but also by a growing number of interdisciplinary scholars 
clustered around the term ‘the Anthropocene’ (Haraway, 2015; Mirzoeff, 
2014; Moore, 2014; Todd, 2015). The designation has become increasingly 
popular as a way of pointing out that many ‘natural’ transgressions follow the 
spatial development of industrial capitalism and colonial history. First coined 
by the Dutch chemist Paul J. Crutzen and ecologist Eugene Stoermer in 2000 
(Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000), the term ‘Anthropocene’ gained currency in 
2007, when paleobiologist and stratigrapher Jan Zalasiewicz requested that 
the Geological Society of London’s Stratigraphy Commission review the case 
for a new geological epoch to replace the currently prevailing Holocene. It 
has since been hotly debated. Proposed starting dates include the invention 
of agriculture 8,000 years ago, the invention of the steam engine, the Great 
Acceleration and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Davis and Turpin, 
2015). Recently, however, Simon Lewis and Mark Maslin (2015) suggested 
that the Anthropocene is an extension of colonial imperialism, slavery and 
the fossil fuel trade, dating it back to the 1610 ‘golden spike’ in the geological 
record. The spike indicates that humans had made an irreversible change to 
the planet’s biochemistry in consequence of the global slave trade and the 
intercontinental transport of animals, plants, as well as microbial life forms 
across the Atlantic Ocean. Lewis and Maslin (2015) argue that the death of 
50 million Native Americans and the resulting loss of agriculture as well as 
subsequent forest regrowth altered the concentration of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere.
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There has been no shortage of computer- generated maps, crafted alongside 
the aesthetics of classical cartography, which aim to measure up to the reality 
of the Anthropocene and climate change as one of its defining parameters. Esri, 
the international supplier of geodata, GIS and web GIS, currently valued at over 
a billion USD, has recently debuted the Anthropocene Atlas, developed by the 
Wildlife Conservation Society. The website includes several interactive maps 
ordered around themes such as population density or the rise of megacities 
(Esri, n.d.). The website GIS Geography1 has compiled a list of maps, including 
the Earth Climate Change Global Map by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), the Surging Sea Map by Climate Central, the Four- 
Degree Interactive Map by the Met Office and the Sea Level Map by the National 
Geographic, which are primarily concerned with registering or even ‘proving’ 
the effects of climate change. While some scholars praise GIS as a possible 
counter- mapping tool (Kwan, 2012), it has also been the subject of intense 
critical scrutiny, focused either on its political implications for different social 
groups (Burrough and Frank, 1996; Obermeyer, 1998; Winter, 2001) or its 
(in)ability to represent local and contextual knowledge (Aitken, 2002; Elwood, 
2001; Ghose, 2001; Sieber, 2000). The obvious thing to point out about the 
aforementioned maps is that they attempt to register the pace of changes in the 
biosphere without acknowledging the uneven social conditions that produce 
them. They implicate humanity equally, an approach that has been consistently 
criticised for neglecting the specific history of the Anthropocene and its roots 
in colonial and imperialist economies (Biermann et al., 2016; Cuomo, 2017; 
Grusin, 2017). Presumably intending to address this problem, CarbonMap.org 
is an interactive map where countries are resized based on their (past, current 
and predicted) extractions, emissions, fuel burning and consumption of the 
resulting goods. These interactive cartograms (maps distorted to reflect a data 
set) were developed by an independent data visualisation company for the 
World Bank’s Apps for Climate Change competition. While they attempt to 
link social and geographical conditions, the limitation is that the cartograms 
remain organised around nation states. It could be more informative to 
distribute the data by class – a small group of the super- wealthy are responsible 
for the lion’s share of global carbon emissions (Klein, 2015). Aware of this 
uneven social and industrial history, the Atlas for the End of the World (World 
Maps, n.d.) proposes an ‘ecological cartography’ as a counter- mapping practice 
organised around biodiversity themes such as land degradation, health of 
waters or deforestation. These maps, all accessible via a dedicated website, are 
accompanied by ambitious educational essays that relate current ecological 
predicaments to social history. Optimistically, however, the authors propose 
that the problem of distortion and the resulting power dynamics of exclusion 
1 See https:// gisgeography.com.
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in two- dimensional maps will ‘largely absolve itself [due to] global positioning 
systems (GPS), remote sensing and real- time visualizations with the increasing 
ability to cheaply stream data to personal computers’ (World Maps, n.d.). They 
also argue that the key element of ecological cartography is embracing this 
process, eventually creating an atlas that would be a ‘web- based platform that 
tracks the evolution of the hotspots, if not all of the world’s 867 ecoregions 
in real time’ (World Maps, n.d.). These maps can be understood as counter- 
maps – their purpose is to destabilise or question dominant representations and 
open up the possibility of mapping the world differently (Nash, 1994; Sparke, 
1998). And yet, as if following Gore’s vision, they understand their own maps 
as sketches for the coming integrated real- time flow of ecological cartography, 
implying that the objective recording of data is able to correct imbalances of 
power inherent in the subjective selection and organisation of information in 
two- dimensional maps.
But does this comprehensive recording and processing of data resolve the 
problem of power inherent in mapping? The answer seems to lie beyond 
investigating specific representations made through maps. In an age where 
both visibility and invisibility can do equal harm, maps also exert power 
by withholding information. Architect, theorist and head of the Forensic 
Architecture research group at the University of London, Eyal Weizman 
(Weizman et al., 2014, p 72) notes that power lies also in the choice of what 
to ‘un- show’:
The resolution of commercially available satellite imagery of the kind we 
see in newspapers, such as suspected nuclear sites in Iran or destroyed 
villages in Darfur or Gaza, are limited to a resolution of half a metre per 
pixel, which means the size of a pixel is exactly the size, or the box, in 
which a human body fits. Within that logic of visibility, there is also a 
structured, built- in lacuna: the loss of the figure, or the human.
New media call for a re- evaluation of the relationship between technology 
and space. Geography’s recent communicational turn (Falkheimer and Jansson, 
2006) considers, for example, how mediation produces new spatial narratives 
or how media infrastructures are distributed spatially (Adams, 2011), as if 
directly responding to some of the most influential work in media studies, 
from Marshall McLuhan’s (1964, p. 5) electronically constructed ‘global village’ 
to Henry Jenkins’s (2004) ‘convergence culture’, where media are compressed 
within everyday spaces. Critical geographical research also considers how ‘smart’ 
technologies such as real- time spatial search apps produce rather than represent 
the territory. For example, whole working- class neighbourhoods can be 
excluded from the economic map of the city by not being sufficiently reviewed 
and promoted on Yelp (Frith, 2017). The current ‘spatial turn’ in media studies 
is increasingly preoccupied with infrastructure (e.g. Bratton, 2016; Starosielski, 
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2015) or with analysing how mediation influences how people interact with 
places (Wiley and Packer, 2010). The focus increasingly shifts from examining 
how humans represent the world through maps to how the world, that is, our 
‘accidental [technological] megastructure’ (Bratton, 2016, p. 31), maps humans. 
Jennifer Gabrys (2014), for example, describes how in the smart city, humans 
are not only constantly mapped by machines but themselves become sensors 
that, continually monitoring themselves, produce behavioural surplus that the 
machines can analyse and optimise. In some cases, the question then becomes 
not how to have the mapping machines map us better, but whether machines 
should map us at all.
This brings to mind Fredric Jameson’s famous if underdeveloped framework 
of cognitive mapping. In  Cartographies of the Absolute:  An Aesthetics of the 
Economy for the Twenty- First Century , Alberto Toscano and Jeff Kinkle (2015, 
p.  73) attempt to map the invisible economies of capitalism, arguing after 
Jameson that ‘cognitive mapping cannot involve anything so easy as a map’. To 
drive this point home, in his seminal work on the cultural logic of capitalism, 
Jameson (1991, p. 409) writes that ‘once you knew what cognitive mapping 
was driving at, you were to dismiss all figures of maps and mapping from your 
mind and try to imagine something else’. This is because, as Jason Farman 
(2015, p. 89) puts it, ‘maps tend to obscure their own authorship to deliver 
their content, thus seeming to create the interface (and its politics) entirely. 
As a result, the networks of circulation that allow maps to arrive are often 
obscured’. Instead, cognitive mapping describes for Jameson (1991, p. 415) 
aesthetic practices that can grasp the relation between the element and the 
system, specifically, ‘the Imaginary representation of the subject’s relationship 
to his or her real conditions of existence’. In simpler terms, it gestures at the 
relation between our individual understanding of the world and the totality of 
economic relations at a specific time in history. In even simpler terms, aesthetics 
that hint at the totality known as capitalism, or the totality of class relations, 
are doing the work of cognitive mapping. The problem of cognitive mapping 
bestows a task upon culture. Capitalism, Jameson (1991) argues, is essentially 
an alienating relation to space and it consequently makes it impossible for 
our psychogeography to align with the physical spaces that we inhabit. While 
‘space’ is for those living under capitalism a scrambled and incoherent territory, 
aesthetics alone have the power of hinting at the totality behind disjointed 
elements.
In light of current Anthropocene research, we could speculate whether 
climate change is a totality separate from capitalism and therefore requires its 
own type of cognitive mapping or whether mapping capitalism and mapping 
climate change are, in fact, the same process. Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009, 
pp. 219, 221) argues, for example, that while ‘the story of capital, the contingent 
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history of our falling into the Anthropocene, cannot be denied by recourse to 
the idea of species’, while at the same time asserting that nevertheless ‘the whole 
[ecological] crisis cannot be reduced to a story of capitalism’. Against scholars 
who argue that the Anthropocene is simply a decoy that diverts attention from 
the fact that capitalism had been the problem all along (Malm and Hornborg, 
2014; Moore, 2017), Chakrabarty (2009, 2017) insists that humanity must 
develop an understanding of itself as a species, a task that invalidates many 
of the current ‘humanist’ axioms of historical understanding that aid us in 
understanding humanity as social, rather than geological.
Perhaps an interactive, GIS- based installation project such as Italian Limes 
could be cognitively mapping the movable border within this new social- 
geological dynamic in the Anthropocene (Italian Limes, n.d.). Part of the 
2016 exhibition ‘Reset Modernity!’ curated by Bruno Latour, the project 
explores remote Alpine regions, where national borders between Austria and 
Italy morph due to melting glaciers and global warming. It advances a new 
media cartography that does not result in a traditional map. In the spring of 
2016, the team led by researchers from the Comitato Glaciologico Italiano, the 
National Institute of Oceanography and of Experimental Geophysics and the 
Department of Physics and Earth Sciences at the University of Parma installed 
a series of autonomic devices at the foot of Mt Similaun. The sensors allowed 
them to track the changes in the tridimensional geometry of the glacier in 
consequence of melting ice. The project’s website (Italian Limes, 2016) states:
Since 2014, Italian Limes has aimed to monitor the shifts in the Austrian– 
Italian watershed on the Alps as an inquiry into the relation of borders 
and their representation. International borders have become one of the 
most reported topics on public media. In Europe, a network of apparently 
dormant 19th- century frontiers woke up from the dream of a borderless 
continent and materialised into a 21st- century psychosis of police checks, 
barbed wire fences, migrant encampments, proxy sovereignties and 
displaced jurisdictions. Almost completely exiled into the map, borders 
have claimed back their mark on the territory, wielded by governments as 
the ultimate defence for the continuance of the nation state.
The installation is based around an interactive real- time representation 
of shifts in the border, continually measured by a grid of 25 solar- powered 
sensors, which record change every two hours. This is an automated form of 
counter- mapping that allows us to grasp the relation between the geological 
and the social. The border has been considerably altered between the 18th 
and 20th centuries, chiefly in consequences of the two World Wars, provoking 
the development of ever- more accurate border mapping tools, beginning with 
aerial surveys in the 1920s, to trigonometric networks, and finally GPS (Italian 
Limes, n.d.). Concurrently, Alpine glaciers have been melting at an accelerated 
rate, eventually provoking adjustment in the social definition of the border. 
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In a 2006 agreement between Italy and Austria, the legal term ‘moving border’ 
was introduced and alongside it the necessity of constant monitoring of 
the shifting border and the updating of state maps. The ‘maps’ that Italian 
Limes creates are not projections onto a two- dimensional plane but rather 
a projection- mapped three- dimensional reproduction of the glacier and an 
automated ‘drawing machine’, a programmed pantograph that translates 
the real- time changes into coordinated drawings. Is this a type of cognitive 
mapping or maybe, still, ‘[culture] conflates ontology with geography and 
endlessly processes images of the unmappable system [of global capitalism]? 
(Jameson, 1995, p. 4).
Perhaps because the idea of cognitive mapping dates back to the 1990s, 
Toscano and Kinkle (2015) focus on novels, photography, films, posters and – 
most interestingly – architecture. After Jameson, Toscano and Kinkle (2015, 
p.  44) argue in favour of making the invisible visible:  ‘forcing into being a 
certain kind of political visibility’ as a form of counter- mapping. They see 
in aesthetics, and especially in visual culture, an opportunity of grasping the 
totality of capitalism and therefore acting on the totality of capitalism. Is this 
not, however, similar to Gore’s imperative that more data means better action, 
more knowledge means a better world? Gary Marx (2016) sees in this the 
implicit fallacy of surveillance capitalism – ‘some information is good, more 
information is even better’. If capitalism ‘represents’ itself in the activity of 
extracting data, perhaps cognitive mapping is not necessarily an aesthetic project 
anymore? In The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System, 
Jameson writes (1995, p.  10) that postmodern capitalism is ‘inconceivable 
without the computerized media which eclipses its former spaces and faxes 
an unheard of simultaneity across its branches’. Technology thus seems to at 
least provide the opportunity for representing the unrepresentable. But in the 
current economy, as Hito Steyerl (2012) argues, we are already ‘represented to 
pieces’. So is the planet – the business of climate data and geodata visualisation 
is booming. Does the problem really lie in the fact that we cannot sufficiently 
represent the totality of climate change and capitalism? Do we possess 
insufficient visualisation tools? Are our mapping technologies not sophisticated 
or accessible enough?
If the method of surveillance technology is multiplying visibility, making 
everyone hypervisible and therefore easy to track, prepped for the harvesting 
of biodata, should we maybe consider withdrawing from mapping altogether? 
While Jameson’s (1991, p.  36) statement that technology ‘seems to offer 
some privileged representational shorthand for grasping a network of power 
and control’ remains relevant, in the context of new media, it is important 
to remember that Jameson (1990) understands representation as figuration, 
and that he understands ideology, after Althusser, as an apparatus. We do 
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not need, therefore, to restrict ourselves to analysing and producing visual 
representations but to pay attention to the specific figurations made through 
the material apparatus. In other terms, Toscano and Kinkle (2015, p.  450) 
write perceptively that commanding maps result not from a ‘representation 
of logistics’ but from the ‘logistics of representation’ – it is not (only) about 
what is in the images but about the forces that produce the images and act on 
them. This again directs our attention to infrastructures that map rather than 
the maps themselves. Cognitive mapping is no longer humans trying to map 
totality. It is the totality mapping us.
Totality maps us: surveilling climate migration
While the map of Africa created by the colonisers – and its continued reflection 
in the existing geopolitical reality  – was a blatant visual proof of economic 
power, surveillance capitalism does not expose its own logic in the same way. 
Nevertheless, Zuboff (2019) draws an explicit connection between colonialism 
and the current form of capitalism. Both define something that had previously 
not been a commodity as free or as a surplus, whether that is land, water, human 
behaviours, humans themselves or their cognitive processes:  ‘For today’s 
owners of surveillance capital the experiential realities of bodies, thoughts and 
feelings are as virgin and blameless as nature’s once- plentiful meadows, rivers, 
oceans and forests before they fell to the market dynamic [under colonialism]’ 
(Naughton and Zuboff, 2019, para. 28). The term ‘digital native’, Zuboff 
notes, is cruelly appropriate (Naughton and Zuboff, 2019).
The terms ‘environmental refugee’ and ‘climate migrant’ date back to the 
1980s, when the possibility was first suggested (El- Hinnawi, 1985; Myers 1986, 
1989). Shortly after, the alarmist discourse, based mainly in the United States, 
of catastrophic ‘waves of environmental refugees’ (Homer- Dixon, 1991, p. 7), 
‘the coming anarchy’ (Kaplan, 1994) and the 200 million- strong ‘environmental 
exodus’ (Myers and Kent, 1995) began to take hold. A decade later, mainstream 
news and pop culture caught on. In 2004, Hollywood debuted its disaster 
blockbuster The Day After Tomorrow; the Guardian ran the heading ‘Now the 
Pentagon Tells Bush: Climate Change Will Destroy Us’ (Townsend and Harris, 
2004); and David King, chief scientific advisor to the UK government, stated 
that climate change represented ‘a far greater threat to the world’s stability than 
international terrorism’ (cited in Brown and Oliver, 2004, para. 13). In 2007, 
when Al Gore received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on climate change, the 
connection between preventing climate migration and the preservation of peace 
was solidified. No wonder, then, that the most impactful (policy- wise) research 
related to climate migration right now is in security studies (Baldwin et  al., 
2014). Climate migration is there envisioned as a security threat to Europe, the 
United States and Australia before it ever happened. While climate migration 
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has been called ‘the human face of global warming’, images of projected migrants 
have been criticised as predictable extensions of colonial rhetoric. Numerous 
studies focus on analysing the dehumanising visual representations of refugees 
as a threatening mass of bodies or as racialised, docile victims of global warming 
(Bleiker et  al., 2013; Methmann, 2014; Methmann and Rothe, 2014). The 
global North feels threatened by migrants and by the instability that they are 
thought to carry within. However, there exists no clearly delineated group of 
climate migrants. Terms such as ‘migrant’ and ‘refugee’ are already contentious 
in their misuse and embodiment of existing resettlement policy (Biermann and 
Boas, 2010). Clearly discerning environmental causes for individual migrations 
becomes increasingly difficult as ‘climate refugees’ can reject being labelled as 
such (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2011).
A recent New  Yorker article paints regions that are exposed to extreme 
weather events, sea level rise, drought and water scarcity, especially sub- Saharan 
Africa, South Asia and Latin America, as the dangerous three migration ‘hot 
spots’ because they represent 55 per cent of the ‘developing world’s populations’ 
(Kormann, 2018). However, Miami, Houston, Tokyo, New Orleans, Hong 
Kong, New York and Amsterdam are also at high risk of flooding and yet the 
alarmist narrative rarely revolves around the inhabitants of these cities needing 
resettlement. They are instead commonly portrayed as citizen- saviours that need 
to fight against global warming (Baldwin, 2012), while the racialised migrants 
are envisioned as ‘an object of governance’, inherently troubling and in need 
of control, living on the ‘ground zero of global warming’ (Methmann, 2014, 
p.  425). While wealthy countries of the North may protect a share of their 
citizens through ‘adaptation measures such as reinforced coastal protection or 
changes in agricultural production and water supply management’, it is predicted 
that those living in poorer countries might need to rely on international support 
or will have no choice but to migrate (Biermann and Boas, 2010, p. 61). Long- 
term predictions are potentially catastrophic (Biermann and Boas, 2010, p. 69):
According to a number of studies, a temperature increase of 3– 4 degrees 
centigrade could lead in the worst- case scenario (high population level and 
low economic growth) to 302 million people flooded each year by storm 
surges by the 2080s, assuming evolving protection mechanisms. However, 
this would be only 34 million assuming enhanced protection, and even 
lower if lower temperature targets could be maintained. More than 90 per 
cent of these affected people will be from Africa and Asia.
At the same time, some studies predict that most citizens will choose to 
stay in their countries and migrate locally rather than internationally (Clark, 
2007; German Advisory Council on Global Change, 2006); ‘many assessments 
directly link predictions about changes in environmental parameters with the 
migration of the current or predicted population living in the affected areas … 
it is merely assumed that [all] these people will decide to flee’ (Biermann and 
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Boas, 2010, pp. 67– 8). The discursive, imagined climate migration is epic in 
scale. For now, it remains a ‘futurology’, a speculative possibility (Baldwin et al., 
2014). Both the news headlines and the security software that is increasingly 
targeted at migrants are ‘written in a future- conditional tense’ (Baldwin et al., 
2014, p. 121). Not to neglect the real dangers of climate- induced uprooting, 
the mapping of ‘hot spot’ regions is inherently asymmetrical.
Let’s take the EU Copernicus programme, a system created for earth 
observation and monitoring, as an example. Consisting of satellites and in situ 
sensors, it focuses on six main areas: land, marine, atmosphere, climate change, 
emergency management and security, and is handled, among numerous other 
national bodies, by the German Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy 
(Wiatr et al., 2016). The data are freely available and Copernicus encourages 
their use by public, private and research institutions. At the same time, two 
modules on security and early warning are built in. Drawing on satellite and 
ground station data, it not only collects information about climate change but 
measures population pressures, chiefly in African countries. These tools already 
factor in an emergency response. Environmental monitoring intersects with 
border control and maritime surveillance; in fact, Copernicus contributes to 
the European Border Surveillance System by tracking border areas. As Iraklis 
Oikonomou (2017, p. 1) writes, the EU’s flagship space projects, Copernicus 
and Galileo, ‘are characterised by an element of politico- military sensitivity 
due to non- civilian applications that both projects involve’. He urges us to 
consider that satellite monitoring is currently ‘planned, organised and funded 
by industrial actors whose primary motive is the maximization of profitability’, 
thus echoing Zuboff’s argument about ‘future behaviour markets’ that 
surveillance capitalism produces (Oikonomou, 2017, p. 2). The EU promotes 
and popularises its space programmes through a security and common benefit 
rhetoric: ‘Space assets and offered services are today indispensable enablers for 
a wide spectrum of applications to answer societal challenges in fields such as 
climate change and environment, transport, development and competitiveness 
in Europe and beyond’ (European Security Research and Innovation Forum, 
2009, p. 166). However, while the official policy reports clearly indicate that 
the programmes fuel military needs and stakeholder interests, the popular 
rhetorical impulse is to present them as public, civilian research projects 
(Oikonomou, 2017, pp. 3– 5). Through such coaxing, a symbiosis between the 
public and the military becomes naturalised (Marx, 2016) as public and private 
interest are presented as interchangeable (Dwyer, 2016).
These predictive mapping tools are at the same time the tools of 
implementation – the presupposed climate migrants are controlled, both in their 
bodily movements as in the images that the media create of them. An existing 
migrant can be tracked from point A to B by existing state surveillance tools, 
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but a ‘climate migrant’, not in existence yet, summoned to presumed existence 
by yet- unknown catastrophes, has to be mapped by predictive surveillance. 
The explosion of a climate catastrophe is a projection- as- implementation tool 
that legitimises the tightening grip of security technologies along the existing 
axis of power. Such mapping extends the ‘view from above’, or what Michel 
de Certeau (1984, p. 92) describes as ‘looking down like a god’, into a pre- 
emptive strike, where the world, seen from above by military and information 
industries, is chiefly a safety problem (Steyerl, 2011). For Zuboff (2019), 
knowledge and information created through surveillance are thus the main 
territories of power and contestation. Felix Stalder (2018, p. 336) adds that 
predictions that emerge as a result of such surveillance are a type of magical 
knowledge – the prediction itself can never be verified because it has already 
been acted on and therefore the reality submitted to the prediction has 
already been altered:
Outside of rapidly shrinking domains of specialized or everyday 
knowledge, it is becoming increasingly difficult to gain an overview of the 
world without mechanisms that pre- sort it. Users are only able to evaluate 
search results pragmatically; that is, in light of whether or not they are 
helpful in solving a concrete problem. In this regard, it is not paramount 
that they find the best solution or the correct answer but rather one that 
is available and sufficient. This reality lends an enormous amount of 
influence to the institutions and processes that provide the solutions and 
answers.
In the futurology of climate migration mapping, time itself becomes a 
weapon. Monitoring tools are spells that call into being what they want to 
prevent. This is meltdown culture, the volume of data analysis tools and 
thermal- imaging cameras rising as ice glaciers are melting. Even though climate 
change is our ongoing, mundane reality, the discourse narrates a coming great 
disaster, barren lands, starvation and thirst. Surveillance, which touches not 
just specific information anymore but ‘life in general’ (Lyon, 2010, p. 327), 
grasps it an eschatology. Within an increasingly mediated experience that we 
have of the world, incomprehensible climate narratives, despite their scientific 
reality, migrate to the realm of what previously might have been called the 
fictional, the simulated or the otherwise designed (Jasanoff, 2010). While we 
can observe changes in weather, we cannot observe climate change within 
the bounds of human perception. We know about climate change through 
a cluster of statements, headlines on the news and other attempts to make 
vast data sets understandable. Essentially, as far as our experience is concerned, 
climate change is statistics and simulations. This would mean that speculation 
and prediction is very much ‘the real’ today. The maps of climate migration 
might be speculative but this does not mean that they are not real. In fact, they 
are so real that they become reality.
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This finally returns us to the question of Jameson’s cognitive mapping and 
his assertion that each historical stage of capitalism generates a space unique 
to it following the ‘quantum leaps in the enlargement of capital in the latter’s 
penetration and colonization of hitherto uncommodified areas’ (Jameson, 
1990, p. 348). As Daniel de Zeeuw (2011, para. 5) summarises:
Jameson traces the need for cognitive mapping back to the historical 
moment when a gap was first produced between the ‘existential data’ 
and empirical position of the individual observer and the unlived and 
abstract socio- economic or geographical system in which it is embedded. 
This moment largely coincides with the invention of technical mediators 
for colonial sea trade, whose function it is to coordinate the individual’s 
existential data and the geographic totality (for example: the compass and 
the [sextant]).
If the tools of surveillance capitalism colonise and commodify futures, mapping 
is a question of space- time rather than just ‘space’. While humans increasingly 
need to be secured and locked within delineated borders, both on a national and 
a planetary scale, capital flows freely and the ‘escape velocity [that it generates] 
turns [all of ] us into deportees of a new kind’ (Virilio, 2010, p. 13). Paul Virilio 
(2010) writes about the current space of capital as the space of ‘geocide’, delineated 
by the creation of zones of free capital through which humans constantly move, 
continually inserted and expelled, no longer simply restricted in movement but 
forced into the logistics of behavioural commodity extraction. The surveillance 
apparatus stratifies, the conditions of uneven access it creates foreclose not only 
information but the future itself. Integrated with the commercial aspects of the 
futurology of surveillance and security, digital cartographies hail from the future, 
retroactively creating the territories that they map.
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8. The rise of the citizen data scientist
Aleš Završnik and Pika Šarf
In surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2015), surveillance is often monetised to the detriment of the masses in order to benefit the few and exacerbate existing inequalities. Digital forms of surveillance are part of our everyday 
life and we cannot opt out of them easily as surveillance has become ingrained 
in smart cities, automated mobility and e- government services, in work places 
and consumption routines, in payment systems and entertainment. Since the 
world of massive information infrastructure underpins all social processes, 
it is impossible to escape the surveillance gaze. The economic rationale of 
‘digitising in order to increase efficiency’ is being progressively enforced on a 
legal basis, for instance when attempts to avoid facial recognition technology 
in public space by covering one’s face is legally labelled ‘disorderly behaviour’ 
(Malik, 2019). This represents a fundamental turn from ‘innocent until 
proven guilty’ as avoidance of surveillance itself becomes a transgressive act.
The use of surveillance technologies to reverse the surveillance gaze has 
gained certain traction in theorising ‘the gaze from below’. Authors have made 
significant contributions to the other side of surveillance and the potential 
thereof by attempting to answer a number of quintessential questions: How 
can individual autonomy and dignity, fairness and due process, community 
cooperation, empowerment and social equality benefit from surveillance? What 
are the ways in which those who are subject to surveillance manage, negotiate 
and resist the spread of surveillance? The ‘new surveillance’ (as defined by Garry 
Marx, 2002) is forming complex networks of power relations and resistances 
(Green, 1999). Objects of surveillance have become empowered agents, not 
the passive and powerless parties they used to be (Ball and Webster, 2003). 
They are growing into active entities that reflect on surveillance practices 
and try to escape and avoid them or draw public attention to illegitimate, 
discriminatory or otherwise unfair practices. Resistance and counter-measures 
were labelled and conceived very differently in the literature, for example, 
as ‘counter- surveillance’ (Monahan, 2006), ‘surveillance and empowerment’ 
(Monahan et  al., 2010), ‘inverse surveillance’, ‘sous- veillance’ (Mann et  al., 
2002) and the ‘hijacking’ of surveillance (Koskela, 2006, 2009). Mann 
et al. (2002) deem ‘sous- veillance’ to occur when objects of surveillance use 
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oppressive tools against the oppressors themselves. According to Monahan 
(2006), ‘counter- surveillance’ as a form of tactical interference often results 
in surveillance technologies working against themselves, in order to redress 
institutional power asymmetries.
The assessments of the power of the ‘gaze from below’ have been 
mixed:  Andrejevic (2007) wrote about ‘lateral surveillance’ in his seminal 
book iSpy and claims that the use of surveillance technologies replicates the 
underlying logic of the ‘all- seeing’ or ‘sensor’ society and produces a flood 
of images that the information technology (IT) industry encourages. The 
trend of peer- monitoring networks has amplified and replicated the power of 
government or corporate surveillance in a climate of perceived risk and savvy 
scepticism (Andrejevic, 2005). On the other hand, lateral surveillance can have 
an empowering potential. Koskela (2006), for example, claims that interactive 
webcams and citycams, whose detailed real- time streaming video is used to a 
promote space, have empowering roles.
The development of information and communications technology (ICT) 
coupled with the rise of big data and algorithms brought the promise of 
unprecedented citizen empowerment through both active engagement as 
well as passive oversight of the governance of the state. The new technologies 
were supposed to return power to those to whom it belongs in a democratic 
society – the citizens (Gigler and Bailur, 2014). However, reality has failed 
to live up to that promise as it is becoming increasingly clear that the mere 
application of new technologically supported tools does not stimulate citizen 
engagement by itself, at least not in all parts of the society (at the same time). 
The digital divide between the underprivileged members of society – whether 
individuals, groups or entire countries – that do not have access to computers 
and consequently the Internet, and the wealthier, privileged members that 
fully enjoy the opportunities ICT offers has been widely discussed (Compaine, 
2001; Norris, 2001; van Dijk, 2006; Warschauer, 2004). The emergence of 
big data and artificial intelligence (AI) has created a further divide among 
the technological ‘haves’ as only a fraction of those with access to computers 
also have access to databases, processing power and storage, on the one hand, 
and the knowledge and expertise to put them to use, on the other. This has 
created a new class described as ‘big data rich’ (as distinct from ‘big data 
poor’) (Boyd and Crawford, 2012), which has monopolised these powerful 
tools for decision- making and prediction to the detriment of the majority 
of the population. The statement of Google executive and Egyptian activist 
Wael Ghonim in the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution that, ‘If you want 
to liberate a society, just give them the Internet’, no longer holds true, as 
regular citizens cannot comprehend the sheer amount of data it now provides 
(Rao, 2011).
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As the trend towards the paradigm of ‘open data’ gains traction, it becomes 
necessary to ask how much emancipatory potential this paradigm actually 
carries. Since the public sector generates a large amount of data, an important 
prerequisite to bridging the existing data divide is the availability of open data, 
that is (governmental) data that anybody can access, use and share. Numerous 
stakeholders on both national (data.gov, data.gov.uk, govdata.de, dati.gov.it, 
podatki.gov.si) and international levels (EU Open Data Portal, UNdata, World 
Bank Open Data) have in recent years made their data sets freely available 
online with the aim of ensuring public transparency and accountability, 
stimulating democracy and citizen participation and improving public sector 
efficiency.
It is not enough that the data are only available; they also need to 
be meaningfully organised and presented in order to encourage citizen 
participation. In this process of extracting meaning for various social ends, 
infomediaries (i.e. third parties that analyse and visualise open data made 
available by the government) are becoming more important than individuals 
who usually have neither the knowledge nor the capabilities to transform the 
‘raw’ data into understandable and socially meaningful actionable information 
that produces knowledge. Mayer- Schönberger and Zappia (2011) illustratively 
ask whether we ‘will see the rise of a new caste of intermediaries that hold 
the key to making sense of the seas of data now accessible’. Infomediaries are 
gaining power over the data and the way in which they visualise, map and 
present them to citizens may shape the way they perceive them. The question 
then is how much power ‘the new caste’ absorbs and whether the new ‘citizen 
data scientist tools’ (CDSTs) can democratise surveillance capitalism.
In ‘Four Critiques of Open Data Initiatives’, Kitchin (2013) concludes that 
‘we lack detailed case studies of open data projects in action, the assemblages 
surrounding and shaping them, and the messy, contingent and relational ways 
in which they unfold’. This chapter provides an informative analysis of specific 
CDSTs in a specific post- socialist country. The open data initiatives that have 
triggered the rise of the citizen data scientist (with the exception of Zlovenija, 
which uses Facebook users’ posts) have much to offer, but we ask who possesses 
the data, what ends their analysis and visualisations serve and who is empowered 
by them.
In this chapter we present several CDSTs used in social practice in 
Slovenia and evaluate them according to common criteria:  the type of tool 
(e.g. non- governmental organisation (NGO) based, state based, intended 
for the implementation of an international initiative); who or what are the 
targets and end goals of the tool; datafication intensity (the use and reuse of 
data, what the data sources of the given tool are); the type of resistance (the 
force of the tool, ranging from passive avoidance to active subversion); and 
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the empowerment dimension (who is empowered). The concluding section 
provides an analysis from a more nuanced perspective of the empowerment 
of CDSTs. Methodologically, the chapter is based on a review of many more 
CDSTs than presented herein and that are up and running in Slovenia and 
beyond, but we decided to narrow our focus to locally informed CDSTs in 
order to reveal context- specific uses of data and their potential to empower 
users. The findings from the review were double- checked and substantiated in 
semi- structured interviews conducted with the anonymous author of Zlovenija 
and with Matej Kovačič, one of the designers of Supervizor (subsequently 
Erar), the head of analytics and information security at the Commission for 
the Prevention of Corruption of the Republic of Slovenia (CPC) at the time 
the tool was set up.
Case studies of CDSTs
Erar: monitoring public spending
In 2011 the CPC started a project named (in translation) Transparency, of 
which Erar,1 an online application for monitoring the expenses of public bodies, 
is an important part. The rationale behind the tool is that the transparency of 
financial flows between the public and private sectors increases the level of 
responsibility of public office holders for effective and efficient use of public 
funds, facilitates debate on adopted and planned investments and projects, 
decreases the risk of illicit management and abuse of office and above all limits 
systemic corruption, unfair competition and clientage in public procurement 
procedures (Kovačič, 2016). Erar’s predecessor, Supervizor (Supervisor), was 
awarded a ‘United Nations Public Service Award’ in 2013.
The online application enables simple browsing through the financial 
transactions of public sector bodies, government spending and a graphical 
presentation thereof. Users can view all monetary transfers from a selected 
budget user, for example an agency or public primary school, or even all 
money transfers from a budget user to a selected company. Data can also 
be presented for a specified period of time. The application also shows data 
about public procurements and business entities in Slovenia along with 
their management and ownership structure and information from their 
annual reports. An important part of the application is a subsection that 
presents a list of publicly owned companies and information about them (see 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2).
1 Initially called Supervizor, see https:// erar.si.
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Copy of data is available
for download in machine-
readable form
Dodatne informacije o uporabi iskalnika, vsebini podatkov
in samem projektu.
Iskalnik*
Searching the supervizor database
Podatki
lzpiši transakcije javnih organov s poslovnimi subjekti.
Izpolnite vsaj eno polije.
Organ (PU):
Prejemnik:
* Za izpis transakcij ni potrebno izpolniti obeh polj.
Davčni dolžniki prejemniki javnih sredstev: 25. 2. 2014,
25. 1. 2014, 25.12. 2013, 25. 11. 2013, 25. 10. 2013,
25.  7. 2013, 25. 3, 2013.
User can enter the name
of the budget user ...
... or a legal entity
(company), or both
A list of tax debtors that are
receiving funds from the public
sector at the time when they have
an outstanding tax debt
Poišci transakcijeˇ
Figure 8.1. Supervizor search engine (Kovačič, 2016).
Figure 8.2. Financial flow analysis of public spending enabled by Erar (Kovačič, 2016).
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About data sets
Several authorities provide nine types of ‘open- data’ data sets, on which the 
application is based:
1  The Public Payments Administration (PPA) provides payment services 
to direct and indirect budget users. Erar includes PPA data on the 
financial transactions of budget users from 1 January 2003 onwards.
2  AJPES (the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records 
and Related Services) provides:
(a)  ePRS Slovenian Business Register – the central public database on all 
business and legal entities, their subsidiaries and other organisations’ 
units located in Slovenia (public and private institutes);
(b)  eRTR – the register of legal entities’ bank accounts; and
(c)  JOLP  – the public posting of annual reports, enabling users to 
review annual reports submitted to AJPES.
3  Data from the Central Securities Clearing Corporation on securities.
4  The Register of Taxpayers.
5  The Register of Budget Users (RPU).
6  Data comes from the database of public procurements, including low- 
value procurements (published on the public procurement portal).
7  The accounting entries of payments to direct budget users from the 
MFERAC (Ministrstvo za finance enotno računovodstvo (Ministry of 
Finance Unified Accounting)) database maintained by the Slovenian 
Ministry of Finance (from 1 January 2003).
8  Data on tax debtors (published online by the Tax Administration of 
Republic of Slovenia).
9  Data on financial transfers to so- called favourable tax environments 
(‘tax havens’), published online by the Office for Money Laundering 
Prevention.
Some types of data are not incorporated in the application, such as transactions 
where the purpose is the payment of a union membership or transactions made 
by intelligence agencies.
Use cases
Erar can be used for several investigative purposes and  – despite being the 
tool of a government agency – it has contributed to the substantial public and 
political outrage since its inception. At the municipal level, the use of the tool 
has enabled the discovery of several misappropriations made by accountants 
in municipalities. At the state level, other agencies such as tax authorities 
have admitted that the tool has enabled them to perform investigations more 
effectively. It has also helped trigger government change.
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In 2013 the CPC issued a report with the claim that a ‘strain of corruption 
risk’ existed within the sphere of the then prime minister Janez Janša. By using 
the Supervizor tool and merging data, the Commission identified the prime 
minister’s significant wealth of unexplainable origin, which led three coalition 
partners to leave the government. A majority of the members of the parliament 
then passed a vote of no confidence and the government was subsequently 
dismissed on 27 February 2013. The collapse of the government was not a 
consequence of a criminal conviction, or sole use of the Supervizor tool. Rather, 
it was a result of the new idea taken up by the CPC leadership, with Goran 
Klemenčič as president of the CPC, that public data should be more extensively 
correlated in order to prevent corruption among the highest public officials. 
Moreover, the tool triggered direct changes at the ministry level. When in 2015 
Supervizor published data on budgetary payments to individuals that were paid 
in addition to their salaries, it revealed that relatively large amounts were paid to 
the elite of the higher education system. In 11 years, more than 1 billion euros 
of budgetary funds were spent on such additional payments to the educational 
elite, representing more than one- tenth of Slovenia’s annual budget. The then 
minister of education, science and sport, Stanka Setnikar Cankar, was forced to 
resign as it was revealed that as the former dean of the Faculty of Administration 
of the University of Ljubljana, she earned on average EUR 4,000 per month in 
addition to her salary, totalling EUR 636,000 in 11 years. However, the legal 
battle between her and the CPC due to irregularities concerning the publication 
of the data resulting in a violation of her privacy rights is not yet finished.
The Erar tool enables the detection of direct violations of restrictions on 
business activities due to a conflict of interest (Article 35 of the Integrity and 
Prevention of Corruption Act 2010). Such a conflict exists when a public sector 
body or organization that is obliged to conduct a public procurement procedure 
in accordance with the regulations or that carries out a procedure for granting 
a concession or other form of public–private partnership (such as ordering 
goods, services or construction work), enters into a public–private partnership 
or grants a special or exclusive right to an entity due to specific personal ties. The 
prohibition enters into effect when a public official or a family member thereof 
participates as a manager, member of management or legal representative in the 
company at issue, or has more than a 5 per cent level of participation in the 
founder’s rights, management or capital. Contracts awarded in breach of Article 
35 are void. Public bodies have to report potential restrictions of the business 
activities of their office holders by means of an online form within one month of 
assuming office and no later than eight days after any change thereto.
When it entered into operation, Erar enabled the swift detection of 
violations of restrictions of business activities as links were established between 
the database of restrictions of activities and the database of payments from 
public bodies (in order to detect prohibited business activities) and the 
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Slovenian Business Registry (in order to detect which officials should have 
reported business restrictions but failed to do so). Kovačič (2016) compiled 
a list of suspected violations of restrictions on business activities in 2012 and 
showed that violations took place in 68 cases (429 contracts) and the total 
value of illicit business amounted to EUR 1,436,208.28. The CPC repeated 
the analysis and no violations were found a year later (Kovačič, 2016).
Another use of Erar is to compare the public procurement success of 
companies in periods with different governments:  Is there a link between 
individual governments and the disbursement of funds to particular companies? 
Or, to put it differently, are companies significantly more successful in public 
procurement procedures during a particular government, and vice versa? 
Kovačič (2016) showed that there are significant differences not only in the 
success of particular companies, but also with regard to particularly vulnerable 
sectors. ICT companies providing equipment to public authorities multiply 
their profits under one government while their business comes to a halt 
altogether when the government changes (see Figures 8.3 and 8.4). Such high 
inflexibility of the market was established especially regarding ICT services, 
pharmaceutical products and construction work. Some companies are highly 
dependent on financial transfers from direct budget users as they receive a great 
amount of their income only from budget users, which constitutes a noticeable 
risk of corruption (Kovačič, 2016).
Summary monthly payments to 252 companies
Financial flow analysis (Supervizor database)
Change of government
EUR 30.000.000.00
EUR 25.000.000.00
EUR 20.000.000.00
EUR 15.000.000.00
EUR 10.000.000.00
EUR 5.000.000.00
EUR 0.00
2003
1 3 5 7 911
20052004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 911
Figure 8.3. Financial flow analysis in relation to the change of government (Kovačič, 2016).
 
 
 
 
 
 
193THE RISE OF THE CITIZEN DATA SCIENTIST
Who Influences? (Kdo vpliva?): monitoring lobbying
The platform Who Influences?2 was devised to provide insight into lobbying 
processes in Slovenia through visualisations of two different kinds of networks: (1) 
the network of contacts between private enterprises and their lobbyists, on 
one hand, and politicians, political parties and governmental institutions, on 
the other; and (2)  the network of transactions between companies in which 
lobbyists are legal representatives. The online visualisation shows a network of 
interconnected dots of various sizes, in which every dot represents either a lobbyist, 
an organisation or a company, a lobbied institution (e.g. the Government of the 
Republic of Slovenia, a ministry, the National Assembly or a local community) 
or an individual decision- maker. The size of the dot increases with more lobbying 
contacts – the more active a participant is, the bigger the dot becomes. Clicking 
on a dot provides the user with further information about the time, location 
and purpose of the lobbying activity and organisations that have established 
connections with a particular decision- maker (see Figure 8.5).
The platform Who Influences? is based on publicly available data on 
lobbyists and lobbying activity that have to be reported to the CPC on the 
basis of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act. Consequently, its 
quality and accuracy depend entirely on self- reported data, which in the case 
of some ministries and municipalities is lacking or even completely non- 
existent. It is possible that some areas of government are not interesting for 
Summary of monthly payments to 65 companies
Financial flow analysis (Supervizor database)
Change of government
EUR 1.800.000.00
EUR 1.600.000.00
EUR 1.400.000.00
EUR 1.200.000.00
EUR 1.000.000.00
EUR 800.000.00
EUR 600.000.00
EUR 400.000.00
EUR 200.000.00
EUR 0.00
2003
1 3 5 7 911
20052004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 5 7 911
Figure 8.4. Financial flow analysis in relation to the change of government (Kovačič, 2016).
2 Slov.: ‘Kdo vpliva?’, see https:// www.kdovpliva.si.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.5. Who Influences? Visualisation of the network of lobbying contacts (Kdo vpliva? (https:// www.kdovpliva.si, accessed 15 July 2019).
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lobbyists at all; however, it is far more likely that some partakers fail to comply 
with the requirements of the law and do not report lobbying activities to the 
Commission.
Parlameter: monitoring parliamentary activities
Parlameter is a parliamentary informatics tool that ‘facilitates monitoring 
of the National Assembly’s working process through an analysis of voting 
and transcripts’.3 Similar digital visualisation tools have been developed to 
provide parliamentary oversight in numerous countries worldwide as well as 
on the international level (e.g. Vote Watch Europe monitors the activity of 
the European Parliament). Parlameter therefore follows the growing trend in 
parliamentary monitoring known as ‘parliamentary informatics’, that is, the 
application of ICT to monitor parliamentary work and legislative procedure. 
A recent study showed that among 191 parliamentary monitoring organisations 
(PMOs) monitoring more than 80 parliamentary bodies, including national 
parliaments, sub- national parliaments and international legislative bodies such 
as the European Parliament and the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
approximately 40 per cent use parliamentary informatics and in most cases 
ICT technology is employed to provide a user- friendly visualisation tool 
(Mandelbaum, 2011).
Parlameter provides a user- friendly instrument for exploring the legislative 
procedure by searching for information about: (1) individual members of the 
National Assembly (hereafter MPs (Members of Parliament)); (2) the political 
parties represented in the National Assembly; (3) plenary and extraordinary 
sessions of the National Assembly; and (4)  legislative proposals. First, 
Parlameter enables monitoring of individual MPs, a feature it shares with a 
majority of other PMOs, since it promotes accountability and more effective 
public scrutiny (Granickas, 2013; Mandelbaum, 2011). Apart from MPs’ 
demographic data (age, education, previous employment, number of terms 
of office, party affiliation) and links to their social media sites, Parlameter 
also provides indicators of MPs’ (in)activity in the legislative procedure, for 
example MPs’ attendance records, committee memberships and the number of 
parliamentary questions posed and speeches given per parliamentary session. 
Users may also view how each MP has voted on a particular legislative proposal, 
while comparison tools enable users to easily identify MPs with similar or 
different voting preferences. Additionally, Parlameter analyses parliamentary 
discourse, which significantly distinguishes it from other PMO tools. It does 
not just facilitate access to MPs’ speeches during both plenary and committee 
sessions, but it identifies the words most commonly used by a particular MP 
3 The name of the tool is a wordplay on a measuring device for length (Slov.: meter) and the 
common name of Slovenia’s National Assembly (Parliament). See https:// parlameter.si.
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and positions him or her according to the diversity of his vocabulary used 
in parliamentary discourse. The tool also conducts a stylistic analysis of the 
language used in parliamentary discourse by measuring three features: the use 
of euphemisms, colloquialisms and stylistically marked words.
Second, Parlameter provides a very similar set of information on the 
political parties represented in the National Assembly:  general information 
about the party (the leader of the parliamentary group and his or her deputy, 
the list of elected MPs); the voting records of the parliamentary group; the 
number of parliamentary questions posed and proposed amendments; and an 
analysis of parliamentary discourse, including transcripts of all speeches, the 
most commonly used words, the diversity of language and a stylistic analysis.
Third, the subsection on the legislative process provides information about 
proposals that went through the legislative procedure, which is accompanied 
by a short summary, voting on amendments and the legislative proposal as a 
whole and the current status of the proposal (adopted, rejected or still in the 
legislative procedure).
Additionally, Parlameter provides a variety of tools: ‘Parliamentary Compass’, 
which positions all MPs in a two- dimensional virtual space based on their 
compatibility of views (MPs with similar views are placed closer together); 
‘Groups of Words’ shows how often an MP or a party mentions a particular word 
or group of words during the sessions of the National Assembly; and ‘Parlameter 
Notifications’ sends a notification to users via email when a selected word is 
used in the National Assembly. Parlameter’s newest feature is ‘Commentality’, a 
tool designed to measure public opinion by sending feedback, similar to liking 
on social media sites, regarding statements referring to legislative proposals (see 
Figure 8.6). Its aim is to keep the audience engaged without enabling users to 
comment on a particular proposal (Commentality, 2019).
To sum up, Parlameter is primarily a convenient tool for researchers and 
journalists, but at the same time its goal is more far- reaching:  it pursues 
the aim of making the legislative procedure of the National Assembly more 
transparent, accessible and therefore understandable to the general public 
(Gligorović, 2016). When Parlameter was introduced in December 2016, the 
president of the National Assembly, Milan Brglez, noted that ‘more intensive 
and user- friendly familiarisation with the work of the National Assembly is 
a necessary prerequisite for a better understanding of its work … Such tools 
enable inclusive democratic oversight and present the potential for more diverse 
and intense political participation’ (cited in Gligorović, 2016).
Although information on the working process of the Slovenian National 
Assembly is publicly available on its official website, it is published in a form 
that is difficult for a regular user to effectively use, which severely complicates 
or even undermines parliamentary monitoring by civil society. Parlameter, on 
the other hand, provides information in an accessible, understandable and 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6. Parlameter search engine (https:// parlameter.si, accessed 15 July 2019).
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searchable format. It is the new infomediary for extracting meaning from data 
for the wider public.
Legislative Activity Violation Counter
The Resolution on Legislative Regulation (2009) establishes principles 
regarding the legislative procedure, guidelines for the assessment of the effects 
of new laws and guidelines for consultations with relevant stakeholders in the 
course of preparing legislative proposals. The Resolution targets members of 
the National Assembly and seeks to increase the overall quality of legislation. 
Inter alia, the Resolution also determines minimum standards for consultations 
with the public by establishing a minimum threshold for consultations ranging 
from 30 to 60 days.
In order to test the effectiveness of the Resolution, the national NGO 
umbrella network Centre for Information Service, Co-Operation and 
Development of NGOs (CNVOS) designed the Legislative Activity Violation 
Counter (CNVOS, n. d.) to measure how often the Resolution’s public 
consultation provisions are violated. The Counter (see Figure 8.7) covers all the 
regulations for which the Resolution determines a minimum period of public 
consultation and all other acts for which such consultation is envisaged by the 
Rules of Procedure of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia.
The Counter’s website collects data on the total number of violations and 
presents these by individual ministry, with an indication of the names of the 
regulations for which the prescribed minimum period for public consultation 
was not observed and the number of deviations. The website also shows a list 
of proposed regulations with an unspecified deadline for the submission of 
comments and those proposed regulations without any invitation to submit 
comments where a draft regulation was simply published on the website of a 
ministry.
Žvižgač.si: the Slovenian whistle- blower portal
‘Žvižgač’4 is an online portal that enables users to submit public interest 
information anonymously and safely, without fear of being exposed to their 
family, friends, employers and the media. Since in most countries (including 
Slovenia) whistle- blower protection is still not regulated legislatively, 
individuals that decide to speak up and expose corruption, fraud or other 
cases of misconduct risk numerous negative consequences, including public 
humiliation fear of retaliation, job loss or even criminal prosecution. Protection 
of their identity is at this point the only way to avoid undesirable negative 
impacts due to whistle- blowing. With this aim in mind, various open- source 
software applications have been developed since around 2018, for example, 
4 Translated as ‘whistle- blower’ in English, see https:// zvizgac.si.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.7. Legislative Activity Violation Counter (https:// www.cnvos.si/ stevec- krsitev, accessed 15 July 2019).
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GlobaLeaks, AdLeaks and SecureDrop. Žvižgač is based on the latter, which 
was created by Aaron Schwarz and has now been adopted by established 
international media (e.g. Forbes, the Guardian, Financial Times, New  York 
Times).5 Before being disclosed to the wider public, all information and tip- 
offs transmitted to the portal are independently verified and assessed as to 
whether the publication is in the public interest (Žvižgač, 2019). Potential 
whistle- blowers may also find useful tips on how to use Tor software or how to 
legally safeguard their position on the Žvižgač website, for which it provides a 
comprehensive tool for informing and combatting corruption or similar illegal 
or undesirable practices.
iSee: paths of least surveillance
iSee is a web- based and wireless application based on a database updated in 
real time that allows any user to programme urban routes with the smallest 
exposure to surveillance cameras (IAA, n.d.). Developed by the Institute for 
Applied Autonomy (IAA), iSee charts the locations of closed- circuit television 
(CCTV) surveillance cameras in Ljubljana, Slovenia (as well as in New York 
and Amsterdam, the Netherlands) in order for users to find routes devoid of 
public space surveillance or with the least surveillance. The programme uses 
starting and destination points and calculates the shortest distance without (or 
with the fewest) security cameras (see Figure 8.8).
The idea behind iSee, as explained by its designers, is as follows:
Given heightened awareness of public safety and increased demand for 
greater security in the face of the growing threat of terrorist violence, 
projects that undermine systems of social control may seem to some 
viewers to be in poor taste. It is the Institute for Applied Autonomy’s 
position that such times all the more strongly call for precisely these kinds 
of projects. (IAA, 2004)
While the aim of the application is not to directly interfere with the 
surveillance apparatus of cities, the project was launched in the aftermath of 
the September 11 attacks and was extremely pertinent as to raising awareness of 
the increasing overreaction of security apparatuses around the globe.
Mapping the public space without surveillance was a realistic and practical 
alternative in the early 2000s in Ljubljana, but with the proliferation of 
the monitoring of public space in the 2010s, when the number of cameras 
skyrocketed,6 it has become impossible to avoid the prying eyes of CCTV 
cameras and users can now only find routes with the shortest distance and the 
fewest security cameras.
5 See https:// securedrop.org.
6 On CCTV in Slovenia see Završnik (2014).
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The iSee project triggers pertinent question related to ‘renegotiating the 
limits of private and public domains’ (Nakashima et al., 2010, p. 295). The 
proliferation of surveillance of public space with CCTV cameras (increasingly 
augmented with gunshot detection systems, or face, gate and other similar 
biometric recognition systems) triggers a dilemma associated with the 
traditional view that a person cannot reasonably expect privacy in public space. 
iSee reflects discomfort with blurring the lines of anonymity in public space 
in a similar vein as mosaic theory. The latter builds on the insight that when 
combined with other data, information about a person becomes much more 
telling and suggests that an expectation of privacy exists (or at least should exist) 
even in public space, due to the way people live their lives in the digital age 
(Završnik and Križnar, 2018). While not radical in its approach – compared 
to other projects that aim at destroying cameras7  – the project nevertheless 
renders visible the larger pattern of surveillance proliferation and calls into 
question its purpose, agenda and effects (Monahan, 2006).
Figure 8.8. Map of Ljubljana with the locations of the CCTV cameras (iSee project).
7 See, for example, Stallwood (2013).
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Redaar: traffic- ticket monitoring
The traffic- ticket monitoring mobile app Redaar, freely available at GooglePlay, 
maps past infractions and helps drivers avoid parking in locations where and 
at times when they are more likely to be ticketed. Slightly fewer than a million 
traffic violations occurred between the beginning of 2012 and September 
2014. Given that there are 1,300,000 registered vehicles and 1,400,000 active 
driving licences in Slovenia, this is a relatively high number (Plahuta, 2015). 
The great majority of the traffic violations were parking and toll tickets, which 
shows how they have become a major source of revenue for municipalities.
The idea of the app is to simultaneously monitor minor offence authority 
activities and empower users to escape enforcement for parking violations. 
Drivers can set the app to show the following issued traffic citations: parking, 
speeding, driving while using a mobile phone, ignoring safety belt laws, unpaid 
tolls, driving under the influence (DUI) and traffic accidents (Virostatiq, 2015). 
The app, created by data scientist Marko Plahuta, is based on the analysis and 
visualisation of two years of traffic violations data. Data sources were obtained 
from: the traffic warden service in Ljubljana; the national police; the Motorway 
Company of the Republic of Slovenia (DARS d.d.), which manages state roads; 
the public undertaking ‘Ljubljanska parkirišča’, which manages car parks in the 
capital; and the local traffic warden services of several Slovenian towns. Given 
the temporal data for each issued ticket, the app shows on which streets drivers 
are more likely to be ticketed in the morning, at midday or in the evening (see 
Figure 8.9).
Similar applications for mapping traffic violations are focused on 
crowdsourced speed- camera alerts (e.g. in the Slovenian context, ‘BrezKazni.
si’ and ‘Radarji in Hitrostne kamere’, available at GooglePlay). For instance, 
the speed- camera mobile app Traffic Light Cameras (designed by bigDream) 
maps fixed and mobile speed cameras and includes extensive country- specific 
information on fines for speeding.
‘Zlovenija’: policing ‘from below’ or vigilantism?
Zlovenija8 was a response of civil society to the hatred directed at migrants 
in public posts on Facebook that emerged at the peak of the migrant crisis in 
2015. The idea was simple: the most brutal, extreme, outrageous, vile comments 
posted on Facebook were exposed on a Tumblr page and supplemented with 
the name and enlarged profile picture of the person posting them. The authors 
of Facebook comments could request the removal of the post if they deleted the 
original comment and apologised. The apologies subsequently replaced reposted 
8 The title Zlovenija is a wordplay on the country’s name Slovenia (Slov.: Slovenija) and the 
Slovenian word for evil ‘zlo’, combining the two in one word, so- called ‘Evil- venia’.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  8.9. Map of Ljubljana marking the frequency of traffic ticketing (Redaar, http:// virostatiq.com/ slovenija/ prometni- 
prekrski- 2012– 2014/ index- en.html, accessed 15 July 2019).
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Facebook posts on Zlovenija. Tumblr is a visual microblogging website that is 
easy to use and crowdsource new content, thus it provided a perfect platform 
for displaying the faces of hatred to the widest audience possible (Oblak Črnič, 
2017). This initiative, which started as a spontaneous response to the hatred 
infecting the country, became a powerful tool in the hands of civil society in 
a matter of just two weeks (Interview with Zlovenija, 2018). What was at first 
just an overlooked Tumblr page became a pillory with the mission of initiating 
discussion on the issue of hate speech, reminding people that the Internet is 
a public space and that words have meaning and consequences, holding up 
a mirror to society and condemning all intolerance and violence (Zlovenija, 
2015). Zlovenija triggered mixed responses. On the one hand, a part of the 
general public agreed with and even admired the objectives Zlovenija was trying 
to achieve. On the other hand, it was condemned for being too extreme, no 
better than what it was trying to expose, and comments often raised questions 
as to both its legality and legitimacy.
The T- shirt in Figure 8.10 reads (in translation): ‘Run. Do good’, followed 
by a comment stating:  ‘On to trains. That is, freight trains and directly to 
Dachau’ (referring to the concentration camp Dachau) (Zlovenija, 2015).
Zlovenija differentiates from the other visualisation tools mentioned since 
it was created by civil society not to monitor those in power, but to expose 
immoral (if not illegal) acts of members of society. Therefore, it cannot be 
understood as a form of either sous- veillance or counter- surveillance, but rather 
as an act of digital vigilantism, a practice described by Trottier (2017, p. 56) 
as ‘a process where citizens are collectively offended by other citizen activity, 
and respond through coordinated retaliation on digital media’. However, the 
phenomenon of Zlovenija shares numerous characteristics with sous- veillance 
techniques as they (1) use the technology to hold up a mirror to society; (2) put 
an empowerment tool in the hands of civil society enabling active participation; 
and (3)  endanger the right to privacy of the exposed individuals. All of the 
above- described sous- veillance tools are based on publicly available data (open 
data) provided by the government. In the same vein, all posts published on 
Zlovenija were taken from publicly available (‘open’) profiles on Facebook, 
regarding which one cannot reasonably expect privacy.9 The method Zlovenija 
used nevertheless seems more severe, since it exposed ordinary individuals, not 
public figures (see Table 8.1).
9 Under Facebook’s ‘Statement of Rights and Responsibilities’, when publishing content or 
information using the public setting, ‘you are allowing everyone, including people off of 
Facebook, to access and use that information, and to associate it with you (i.e. your name 
and profile picture)’ (Facebook, 2018).
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On the benefits of open data for CDSTs
Open data has entered mainstream discussions, as the example of the Open 
Data Charter signed by the G8 (Group of Eight) leaders testifies. The Charter 
establishes several principles that all G8 members should observe in order to 
‘help unlock the economic potential of open data, support innovation and 
provide greater accountability’ (G8, 2013). The benefits of open data have 
been well documented in the literature and include contentions that open data 
(1)  leads to increased transparency and accountability with respect to public 
bodies and services; (2)  increases the efficiency and productivity of agencies 
and enhances their governance; (3) promotes public participation in decision- 
making and social innovation; (4) fosters economic innovation as well as job 
and wealth creation (Kitchin, 2013); and (5) has an important internal value 
for the public sector itself as it gains access to data held by its other parts, or 
Figure 8.10. Example of a post on Zlovenija: enlarged Facebook profile picture accompanied 
by a hateful comment expressed by that particular individual (Zlovenija, 2015).
 
 
 
 
Table 8.1. Citizen data scientist tools
Citizen data scientist 
tool
Purpose Initiator holder 
funding
Target Source of data Tools and data 
management intensity
Who is 
empowered
Scale of 
empowerment
Type of resistance
1 Erar Monitoring 
public spending, 
transparency
State Recipients of 
budgetary funds
Nine open- source 
databasesa
User- friendly 
data presentation, 
intensive
National 
authorities, 
private 
individuals
Active subversion
2 Who Influences? Monitoring 
lobbying, 
transparency
NGO Lobbyists, lobbied 
individuals and 
institutions
Data reported to the 
CPC
Visualisation tool, 
intensive
Private 
individuals
Monitoring, has 
the potential for 
active subversion
3 Parlameter Monitoring 
parliamentary 
activities
NGO MPs, political 
parties
Open- source data 
(available from the 
National Assembly’s 
website)
User- friendly 
data presentation, 
intensive
Private 
individuals
Monitoring, has 
the potential for 
active subversion
4  Legislative Activity 
Violation Counter
Monitoring 
parliamentary 
activities
National NGO 
umbrella network 
(CNVOS)
Legislative proposer 
(ministries)
Open data Violations counter, 
moderately intensive
Private 
individuals
Monitoring
5 Whistle- blower 
portal Žvižgač
Whistle- blower 
protection
NGO Corruption, 
malpractice
N/ A Submission portal, 
simple
Private 
individuals
Vigilantism
6 iSee – CCTV CCTV monitoring Engaged individual(s) CCTV locations N/ A Visualisation tool, 
moderate
Private 
individuals
Passive avoidance
7 Redaar Traffic- ticket 
monitoring
Engaged individual Automotive radar 
locations
N/ A Visualisation tool, 
intensive
Private 
individuals
Passive avoidance
8 Zlovenija Revealing, mapping 
hatred
Engaged individual(s) Individuals Public Facebook profiles Public pillory, simple Private 
individuals
Vigilantism
aFor a complete list of all nine open- source databases and a detailed description, see the Erar section, ‘About data sets’ earlier in the chapter.
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can make new use of its own structured data, improved by feedback from the 
public (Janssen, 2012, p. 4).
The analysed CDSTs to some extent reflect the benefits of open data. For 
instance, the creators of the web application Erar claim that the tool’s goals are to 
increase the level of responsibility of public office holders for effective and efficient 
use of public funds, to facilitate debate on adopted and planned investments and 
projects, as well as to decrease the risk of illicit management and abuse of office 
and to limit systemic corruption, unfair competition and clientage in public 
procurement procedures (Kovačič, 2016). Similar benefits can be established 
for the tools Who Influences?, Parlameter and the Legislative Activity Violation 
Counter as they all shed light on the operations of state officials and bring state 
power under increased scrutiny. Similarly, the immediate end of the whistle- 
blowing portal Žvižgač is to make those in power accountable for their actions.
However, such claims as to the benefits of CDSTs can hardly be made for the 
other analysed tools, i.e. iSee and Redaar. While iSee remains merely a tool for 
avoiding the surveillance gaze of the state and corporate sphere that does not 
directly contest the surveillance apparatus, Redaar goes even further and does 
not augment the accountability of the state, but undermines its effectiveness 
in pursuing the legitimate aim of penalising disorderly behaviour. Moreover, 
the CDST Zlovenija differs from the other analysed tools as it is not based on 
open government data (OGD) but on public Facebook posts. While it pursues 
a similar goal, which is to hold users accountable for their hateful comments 
about the migrants, it nevertheless is differentiated from the other CDSTs 
addressed in this chapter in one important aspect. The method of modern- day 
pillory that Zlovenija used was troublesome, and so were the targets it aimed to 
expose, as it was directed towards individuals for whom a public interest in the 
disclosure of personal data does not exist. Even Zlovenija’s authors agree that 
‘it should not exist’, since it could have immense negative impacts on the lives 
of the exposed individuals, therefore raising both legitimacy as well as legality 
concerns. Although its authors ultimately decided that the goal was worth the 
risk, this played an important role when deciding to discontinue Zlovenija’s 
activities and ultimately led to its hibernation (Interview with Zlovenija, 2018).
Critiques of CDSTs
Kitchin (2014) outlines four critiques of open data: (1) it lacks a sustainable 
financial model; (2)  it promotes a politics of the benign and empowers 
the empowered; (3)  it lacks utility and usability; and (4)  it facilitates the 
neoliberalisation and marketisation of public services.10 Let us examine these 
critiques in relation to the analysed CDSTs and add a few more.
10 See response to the critique in Eaves (2013).
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The first argument, which refers to the sustainability of funding in the 
absence of direct governmental support, could be further developed by 
distinguishing between financing the initial publishing of open data and 
funding subsequent open- data projects enabled thereby. One step is to make 
data accessible, yet another is to extract meaning from data, the role assumed 
by infomediaries. The second step is particularly problematic, especially if the 
tools are developed by NGOs and engaged individuals that – in the absence of 
financial support from the government – are completely dependent on private 
funds, which is the case for the majority of the presented CDSTs in Slovenia 
(Erar being the only exception). The economics of creating sustainably funded 
initiatives is quite evident in the iSee and Redaar tools, which are no longer 
available to users. The Redaar application also shows how insufficient funding 
can lead to the end of the development of a particular tool. It has to be taken 
into account, however, that the aims Redaar attempted to pursue might be 
considered illegitimate, therefore resulting in significant obstacles to securing 
private funding in the first place. At the other end of the spectrum, Erar, the 
only state- funded CDST examined, is still up and running, albeit in a modified 
version due to power struggles over the balance between the public interest in 
access to information on public spending, on the one hand, and personal data 
protection, on the other.
In his second argument, Kitchin (2013) rejects the premise that everyone 
can access and use open data, leading to more engaged citizen participation 
and empowerment of society. On the contrary, he argues that this process is 
conditional upon: first, the means of processing large data sets (hardware and 
software); second, the knowledge and skills needed to analyse and interpret 
them; and finally, public support and the political will to enable policy change. 
Kitchin (2013) further noted that ‘even if some groups have the ability to 
make compelling sense of the data, they do not necessarily have the contacts 
needed to gain a public voice and influence a debate, or the political skill to 
take on a well- resourced and savvy opponent’. From all of the analysed CDSTs, 
the importance of the latter is particularly obvious in the case of Parlameter. 
Although its developers have both the means and skills to make sense of the 
information about the parliamentary process, there is little evidence that the 
tool actually had any impact on either political participation or oversight 
regarding the procedures of the National Assembly. In fact, Erar was the only 
analysed CDST that facilitated change on the national and regional levels in 
Slovenia. At the same time, it is also the only tool developed and financed 
by the government, which entirely supports Kitchin’s claim that open data 
empowers the empowered.
Open- data protagonists view data as neutral and not something embedded 
in the wider political, social and cultural contexts and contaminated with 
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existing antagonisms. However, the open- data endeavour is never politically 
neutral or inherently a good thing. The politics of the data matters, and it is 
important to ask what the data reveal, how they are then used and in whose 
interests. In various contexts, the critical big data approaches have revealed 
how big data carries the allure of objectivity. For instance, in the predictive 
policing context, Joh (2017, p.  294) rightly observes that the police still 
have a creative role in creating inputs for automated calculations of future 
crime:  ‘Their choices, priorities, and even omissions become the inputs 
algorithms use to forecast crime’. In his analysis of the politics of statistics, 
Desrosières (2002, p.  2) claims that even formalised synthetic concepts, 
such as averages, standard deviations, probability, identical categories or 
‘equivalences’, correlation, regression, sampling and so on, are ‘the result of a 
historical gestation punctuated by hesitations, retranslations and conflicting 
interpretations’. Data are never ‘clean’, that is, devoid of social, cultural and 
economic circumstances.
It is then utopic to expect that open data will systematically and consistently 
over a longer period of time harm those in power. As our analysis of the Erar 
tool shows, the tool was able to cause political turmoil only in the short term. 
After the revelations regarding the risk of corruption in relation to the prime 
minister and one of his ministers, it ceased to include ‘dangerous’ data sets 
regarding the political elite and even the leadership of the CPC Commission 
was soon forced to resign due to political pressure.
Third, closely connected to this argument is the question of the utility 
and usability of the published data, since websites providing open data are 
often reduced to data dumps that instead of unveiling previously undisclosed 
information only provide a place to hide among the incomprehensible amount 
of published open data. Moreover, CDST developers in Slovenia are facing 
severe obstacles related to the quality and quantity of data. For example, 
Parlameter is based on data published by the National Assembly in a non- 
machine- readable format, which severely complicates CDST development. 
The challenges this presents are huge, but not insurmountable. On the other 
hand, Who Influences? is completely dependent on self- reported data, that is, 
the data reported to the CPC, which are incomplete or even entirely lacking 
with regard to some stakeholders.
Fourth, Kitchin (2014) claims that open data facilitates the neoliberalisation 
and marketisation of public services. The argument opens up the question of 
the context of data policies, that is, the question of the time and place of 
the implementation of open data. These determine how open- data policy is 
understood and how its meaning is attached and dependent on other social 
and political circumstances. While OGD started as a mainly UK and US 
driven initiative (Janssen, 2012), it has increasingly gathered attention in many 
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other countries and international organisations, including the Organisation 
for Economic Co- Operation and Development (OECD), which had a pivotal 
role in ‘persuading’ other countries to adopt the initiatives. However, in other 
countries the idea of open data attaches itself to the specific political and 
societal processes thereof. The contextualisation of specific CDSTs in space 
and time provides insight into the implementation of an abstract notion 
of OGD.
In the Slovenian case, open data has had a specific meaning and is clearly 
attached to the transition process from socialist autocracy to capitalist 
democracy. OGD was even more enthusiastically embraced than elsewhere, 
as it has been taken up by the specific politics of transition with the aim 
of achieving specific political ends and signifies much more than open data 
actually can deliver. The argument underpinning the open- data paradigm in 
Slovenia has typically been as follows: due to the fact that in the autocratic 
socialist system government data were systematically concealed from the 
public and secrecy was the norm, now, under a democratic regime, the 
state must provide the data it gathers. By doing so the government will 
almost automatically become more democratic, more accountable and less 
tyrannical. Open data hence carries a liberation sprit of breaking with the 
‘old and ugly’ autocratic system. Moreover, open data is coupled with the 
ideal of a market- oriented political system as it symbolises not only a turn 
towards democracy vis- à- vis autocracy, but also towards capitalism and away 
from socialism. Open data is supposed to make the newly developed state 
more capitalist. The state bureaucracy, the argument goes, was a burden for 
society and a parasite on the economic sector. The government must become 
lean, ‘vital’, more efficient and subject to market economy laws. Its assets, 
including data, must be monetised. In such a system, transparency is also a 
means of economic growth. In the post- socialist transition, open data then 
serves a specific political end. This is ‘the train’ (a metaphor particularly 
frequently used in political discourse) that society must embark on in order 
to escape its haunting past. In such a sociocultural context it is not common 
to find critiques of open data. Critiques are politically perceived as belonging 
to the demonised past, as open data is the means of transforming the country 
into a ‘normal’ democratic capitalist state.
Our analysis, nevertheless, does not suggest abandoning the move towards 
opening up data. We assert that open- data initiatives are political per se 
and that they attach to specific policies already existing in a particular time 
and space. Such initiatives flourish because they attach to other political 
and economic processes, which they in turn help amplify. Open data, as 
any other sociotechnical system, is inescapably political in its uses. By 
protecting, for example, environments characterised by social, political and 
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economic inequalities, it can reinforce the conditions already at work there, 
to the detriment of social equality, justice and social cohesion. From such 
an understanding of open- data initiatives, we can observe how each of the 
analysed CDSTs requires that we be mindful of what data are being made open 
and how they are being funded, how data are made available, how they are 
being used and who is empowered by open data.
Turning to the analysed CDSTs, Supervizor is a pivotal example of how 
its power, which triggered a change in government, raised concerns due to 
destabilising the political status quo. However, Supervizor also provoked 
fear of ‘going too far’ with open data. It is not surprising, then, that in the 
years after the change in government in 2013, Supervizor was renamed Erar 
and the disputed data about budgetary payments in addition to individuals’ 
salaries – and that led the minister of education, science and sport to resign – 
were removed from the application. The privacy commissioner changed the 
interpretation of the conflicting values at stake: personal data protection now 
overrides the public interest in knowing how public funds are spent.
In our analysis we identified an additional critique of open data. Thus, 
fifth, open data may often infringe upon other competing values and step into 
an ethical borderland. The examined CDSTs reveal how the publication of 
some types of data sets poses a risk to personal data protection and a threat 
to individuals’ safety. The Zlovenija website went into hibernation relatively 
quickly, just 14 days after setting up the mentioned Tumblr page containing 
hateful Facebook comments, due to public pressure from the relevant public 
opinion makers (e.g. the eloquent former information commissioner) to 
protect the ‘culprits’ and not employ a vendetta or an ‘eye for an eye’ modus 
operandi. According to its authors,11 they themselves were afraid for the life and 
limb of the exposed Facebook users. Moreover, the users themselves massively 
expressed apologies for their reckless trolling and requested that the Zlovenija 
moderator remove their posts on Tumblr with an explanation that the original 
Facebook posts had been removed.
Redaar and Zlovenija show how empowering CDSTs can quickly slide 
into an ethical grey area. On the one hand, Redaar was primarily used not to 
empower – in the sense of encompassing positive change, legal compliance or at 
least progressive social ends – but to breach the law by circumventing parking 
regulation enforcement. On the other hand, Zlovenija shows how the shaming 
of shamers can trigger clashes between human rights. The transparency of the 
shamers’ comments, either voluntary or not, may conflict with their security. 
While it is unconvincing to claim that social media users who publicly post 
hateful messages have a reasonable expectation of privacy, there are legitimate 
11 Interview with one of the authors under a pledge to maintain anonymity.
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safety concerns when exposing them not only in online settings but also in the 
physical environment, as others have started to print out online comments 
and physically post them at various locations throughout the capital city of 
Slovenia, Ljubljana. Hateful comments exposed in different settings may 
trigger another wave of hatred, which goes in both directions: either targeted 
towards migrants, that is, the initial haters’ targets, or targeted towards the 
haters themselves.
Conclusion
Open data is often seen not just as a building block of citizen empowerment, 
but as the only prerequisite to achieving active participation, leading to a 
transparent and accountable governance regime. This optimistic view goes 
hand in hand with the big data ideology that we just have to collect enough 
data and ‘let them speak’ (Mayer- Schönberger and Cukier, 2013) as they will 
solve problems by themselves. However, this perspective is overly simplistic 
and entirely overlooks the fact that open data is not by itself neutral and 
is not used in a social vacuum, but will be weighed against the current 
political, economic and social background by the respective stakeholders, 
who may use it either as a tool to facilitate democracy, transparency and 
accountability, or to pursue their own contingent – possibly illegitimate or 
even illegal – agenda.
The work of the citizen data scientist is political. The data need to be 
processed, analysed and interpreted in order to give them their ‘true’ meaning – 
what that is will ultimately be decided by the CDST developers who have the 
power to present the data in a way that best suits their own perception of the 
world and the aims they are trying to pursue. It remains less clear how much 
power the political work of data scientist projects entails. While some of the 
projects funded and supported by the government, such as Erar and Supervizor 
before it, have gained significant political power in Slovenia, the remaining 
tools did not have comparable results, either in the form of political change or 
in the consequent engagement. Regarding the latter, we are learning that open- 
data tools in general do not activate otherwise passive citizens, but rather they 
provide a new tool for the already engaged. The question therefore remains, are 
CDSTs bridging or deepening the ‘data divide’?
As with any other technologically supported tool, CDSTs can be used 
either way. They could deepen the divide between the ‘big data poor’ and 
the ‘big data rich’ (Boyd and Crawford, 2012) and empower the elites to 
the detriment of the majority of the population, or they can genuinely serve 
as a catalyst of societal change. Moreover, when we look at the data, there 
is always a question of what we are looking at and what we are looking for. 
When you work with data there is always a story behind the processing of 
them. There always a question of normativity: what should and should not be 
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there for us to find. Finally, rather than as the interpretations of information 
that they are, we too often see them simply as representations and descriptions 
of objective reality.
The authors are grateful to the reviewers for their comments. Special thanks are 
also owed to the funding Slovenian Research Agency, under research project 
‘Automated Justice: Social, Ethical and Legal Implications’, no. J5-9347.
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9. Modalities of united statelessness
Rupert Allan
Uganda hosts the largest population of refugees in Africa, and has a progressive ‘open- door’ refugee policy. Uganda’s refugee settlements are not fenced- in camps. They constitute huge tracts of land,1 in 
which refugees are encouraged to farm, make a living and trade with hosting 
communities (see Figure 9.1). Many of these settlements contain ‘old caseload’2 
from as far back as the 1950s, from events such as the ‘Acholi Wars’ and the 
Rwandan genocide. In settlements near remote borders, arriving ‘new caseload’ 
refugees are typically instructed to go to certain hillsides in huge designated 
areas and settle on a plot 50 metres square. These areas are – by definition – just 
wilderness, and for decades refugees have been settling in this way relatively 
peacefully. So nobody thought to record where they were.
Documentation: the problem of population
In 2016, violence in South Sudan created a sudden mass influx of refugees 
across the border into Northern Uganda. The world looked on as the refugee 
coordination responded, adapting areas and opening new settlements. One of 
these – BidiBidi – became famous at that time as the largest refugee settlement 
in the world. With this event came the realisation that decision- making in both 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Uganda’s 
Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) were under- informed. Of the 500,000 or 
so new arrivals, who knew what communities were where in relation to water, 
medicine, sanitation, education and security? These issues were exacerbated as 
another mass refugee influx followed less than six months later from the west 
(the Democratic Republic of Congo).
By January 2018 refugee figures were reported at 1.4 million in Uganda, 
but this was still an estimate. It was becoming increasingly acknowledged 
1 Designated land acquired by the OPM, through various historically complicated agreements. 
Freehold and leasehold tenure systems create diverse claims that are debated by forums such 
as the North Uganda Land Platform (NULP). See https:// uri.org/ what- we- do/ resource- 
library/ mitigating- land- based- conflicts- northern- uganda.
2 ‘Old caseload’ is an official term used by the UNHCR to describe refugee populations from 
previous major influxes (UNHCR, n.d.).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1. Uganda refugee settlements, March 2018 (OSM/ Overpass Turbo).
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that, despite decision- makers having said that there was some state- of- the- art 
interventional technology at their disposal, they were not sure how it worked 
and thus how it could be adapted to the increasing complexity of the situation. 
In the capital (and even field offices) nobody seemed to know what was really 
out there. In February 2018 several officials were suspended over what arguably 
amounted to a long- term lack of engagement with data (Okiror, 2018), as 
some of the financial discrepancies between funding and delivery started to 
become undeniable.
In response, by late 2018, a registration of refugee individuals, using 
biometrics and other top- down digital methods, was published by the UNHCR/ 
OPM response coordination (UNHCR/ OPM, 2018). Authorities could now 
approach a realistic estimate of refugee numbers in Uganda (at the time of 
writing, officially 1.2 million). But evidence suggested that this technique of 
enumeration was only partially useful. The ambiguities of the term ‘hosting’ are 
geographically complicated: Are internally displaced persons (IDPs) refugees? 
What if refugees had been born in Ugandan settlements? The multiple variables 
of cultural/ gender, diverse medical needs and compounded geographical 
unknowns within and without settlements still made it almost impossible to 
allocate resources, stop disease outbreaks and control intertribal or international 
violence in the districts hosting incomers. And so the old problem of the ‘last 
mile’ (Balcik et al., 2008) remained obscured, as designated resources still failed 
to actually arrive on the terms under which they were originally provisioned.
UN sector challenges: formal and informal 
infrastructure
United Nations (UN) bodies carefully merge their systems as much as possible 
with national government, but humanitarian coordination over the decades has 
also become increasingly sector led. These sectors are traditionally split: water, 
sanitation and hygiene are dubbed ‘WaSH’, hospitals are ‘health’ and schools 
are ‘education’. Sectors such as ‘energy and environment’ may at first seem 
non- emergency but disease and famine are immediate when unregulated 
deforestation, for example, causes populations to run out of wood that is much 
needed for sanitation and cooking. Equally, market and supermarket locations 
(cash- based intervention  – CBI) have been notoriously vital for emergency 
response in sudden- onset disasters such as earthquakes or tsunamis. That police 
outposts fall under ‘social amenities’ but also under ‘protection’ (a sector that 
touches on all other sectors) demonstrates how this framework is in itself a 
work in progress.
The concept of a complete set of statistics on refugees implies many 
assumptions (not least the fundamental anomaly that statistics describe a 
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pursuit of ‘stasis’, and migrants are inherently mobile). For example, refugees 
are sometimes rich, they frequently return home and often they do not live 
in settlements where they are registered, let alone on their plot. Refugees may 
try to move house, often do business outside of settlements or even outside 
Uganda.3 In other words, they are human. To this day in West Nile, the 
situated challenge of the human factor prevails and as the emergency response 
becomes one of development, authorities in advanced response modes still lack 
sufficient intervention information.
The accumulating mass of humanitarian institutional growth has made 
it difficult to operate holistically across or outside these sector frameworks 
and accommodate refugee complexities. The UNHCR established the 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Coordination (CRRF) to assist in the 
coordination of better inter- sector communication.
The digital landscape in Uganda
Historically, there has been a lot of data gathered in Uganda to try to tackle the 
issue of refugee management:  information on people’s needs, access to food, 
water and medicine. Because of the geographical and financial scale of the 
response, this has, almost exclusively, been sampled qualitative data from key 
informants representing scattered community views. Due to sheer numbers, 
Uganda has long been a global case study for the challenges and successes of 
refugee management. When the Northern Uganda influx peaked, the holes in 
this data became a part of the crisis.
After the mass influx, it was clear that much of the data being generated 
were not capable of accommodating important home- grown local priorities. 
Informal micro- resources, such as thousands of small rural wells and 
village doctors, were not being compared with official (and expensive) 
geospatial records gathered by scores of different ‘implementing partners’, 
non- governmental organisations (NGOs) which worked under the refugee 
coordination. Even if UNHCR were able to curate all the partners’ data 
on their interventions, this data, gathered under multiple standards and 
partitioned by sector, could never prevent bore holes from being dug in areas 
already full of natural wells or health centres from being located too far from 
populations in need. In short, resource allocation was a fragmented mess 
unless it could incorporate empirical, comprehensive, up- to- date information 
on everyday community resources.
3 Information reported by surveyors Harriet Bakole and Micheal Yani, HOT Uganda Offices, 
Kampala, 20 January 2019.
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Data siloing and proprietary data: Plug and Play
The humanitarian sector creates a sometimes fetishistic drive for innovation. 
Uganda is inundated with well- meaning technological solutions, and these 
include digital information collection and data management projects. Both 
NGOs and UN agencies have the unfortunate habit of hiring independent 
commercial (for- profit) consultants for tech- enabled interventions, rather than 
allotting the time of their own staff. Reasons are complex, but include heavy 
workload and lack of in- house capacity- building methods.
Another problem is that funding and support is predicated on (often digital) 
innovation, so hard- pressed humanitarian sector organisations might choose 
to pursue technology over social engagement. For many NGOs, innovation 
around data can result in information becoming locked or siloed within 
proprietary software because it is often in the interests of the consultants to 
restrict or deny access to content (and even methodology). With an eye on 
cutting costs, very few NGO- contractor terms of reference stipulate extended 
or indefinite sharing of data (e.g. uploading information to technically 
accessible open platforms) at the end of these projects. The resulting data 
sets are sometimes declared ‘open’, but may stipulate that the data must be 
accessed through a controlled private website. The passive mode of openness 
here is effectively artificial, because it compromises access through systemic 
exclusion (conditions on sharing/registration of other data, for example).
Governing authorities in Uganda believe that the way to sustain effective 
humanitarian intervention is to initiate a handover to local and national 
authorities. In some instances, this is made more difficult by the constant push 
for aid-linked innovation. Rather, funding for internal system reinforcement 
might prove more helpful where the skill of local authorities also faces 
practical obstacles enshrined in a history of non-adaptive improvements, 
which still proselytize ageing or obsolete technology environments: network 
electricity-dependent workstations; software licences with ‘use-by’ dates, 
and ‘helplines’ rather than global community support; software licences that 
need maintaining; electricity needs to be reliable for desktop computers; 
traditional office systems have been set up, under which staff are dependent 
on commercial helplines for support.
Innovation overload
Across the world, the responsibility upon everybody to engage with data is 
becoming increasingly inevitable, even if simply for self- protection. Whether 
the world likes it or not, it seems that avoiding the demands of the digital 
can have worrying implications. We love ‘plug and play’ products, and as Tim 
Ingold writes (2011, p. 26), it is
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objects themselves that capture our attention, no longer the materials of 
which they are made … It is as though our material involvement begins 
only when the stucco has already hardened on the house front or the ink 
already dried on the page. We see the building and not the plaster of its 
walls, the words and not the ink with which they were written.
New humanitarian products are frequently remotely conceived, initiated 
and deployed by a ‘telepresent’ and commercially interested society. Digitally 
enabled entrepreneurs serving the humanitarian sectors usually work from 
remote and insulated positions. Digital humanitarian solutions are sometimes 
created with little conception of (or interest in) the complexities of field- centred 
ontology. Further, through constraints of aptitude or time, there often seems to 
be a failure by responders to engage with the workings of these technological 
products and the communities on the ground. The speculative nature of some 
designs can even create a situation of need where there was none before. In 
precarious settings, inappropriate but well- meaning innovations can be at best 
‘litter’ and at worst even life- threatening. The unused software and data in this 
landscape could start to resemble the obscene and redundant surplus hardware 
from notorious ill- judged humanitarian interventions (like the eventually over- 
provisioned ‘Live- Aid’ project of 1985, whose trucks and planes still litter the 
runway at Lokichoggio supply airstrip in northern Kenya). But this ‘useless 
litter’ is sometimes data, sensitive data. Worldwide, technological hardware 
continues to emerge, but with decreasing ‘hard- wired’ improvement between 
generations. Nowadays, accessible technology in sub- Saharan Africa is arguably 
matching this ceiling and it is often amply fit for purpose.
The expectation for ‘plug and play’ solutions can create a disinclination to 
understand the actual components of a problem, or attend to the semantics 
of site- specific issues – the ‘ink’ of the intervention. Granular- level data are 
demanding and difficult to deal with, but if the labour of engagement is 
not applied to technology  – by commissioning decision- makers as well as 
technicians – the life- saving imperative to make the humanitarian landscape 
more accountable could degenerate into even deeper states of disconnectivity 
than ever before.
Technological ethics
There is growing ethical discussion of ‘the digital’ in humanitarian action, 
and mapping in Africa has always been a techno- colonial exercise (Dirk et al., 
1996). Enthusiastic mappers declaring a commitment to map every corner 
of Africa should beware of the adage that ‘maps are never value- free images’ 
(Cosgrove and Daniels, 1989, p. 278). Critical writers from David Harvey 
(2009) to Edward Said (1978) clearly make the case that when we map there 
are preconditions embodied within the process. The exploitation of personal 
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data is well reported. On African consumption of technology, Nanjala Nyabola 
(2016, p. 158) writes:
Data analytics tied to social media is one of those industries that wouldn’t 
exist if it weren’t for the millions of people who use social media every day 
to catalogue almost every facet of their lives. Firms like CA [Cambridge 
Analytics] take the millions of terabytes of personal information freely 
given by individuals and weaponise it for political interests.
Lessons can be learned, too, from other reports of self- interested 
participations in ‘publicised’ data transparency, as can be seen from D’Angelo 
and Ranalli’s (2019) critical view of information politics in and around the 
US electoral process. Freedom of information and transparent data access can 
potentially evolve into unethical commercialisation of information, which can 
damage the best interests of democracy.4
Nevertheless, geographic information systems (GIS) are a vital tool when 
dealing with dispersed populations in need:  digital technologies generally 
enable NGOs to outstrip previous reporting frameworks in terms of accuracy, 
granularity and field intimacy. With the mention of ‘technology’ and ‘data’, 
many humanitarian donors are satisfied with the promise of clearly improved 
intervention feedback. But many of these data still only partially represent the 
wealth of community engagement and field accountability that could be available.
HOT pilot: crowdsourcing non- settlement refugee 
data in the West Nile
In certain ways, the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT) could 
claim to be different. Important open- source ethos holds that important apps 
and software for managing information in resource- poor settings have been 
available (for free) for many years. And the ethos accompanying the technology 
is fully, and inclusively ‘non-profit’. And free. For OpenStreetMap (OSM), this 
is in the form of Maps. Me, OSMAnd, QGIS and ODK (Open Data Kit)/ 
Kobo. So this makes the problem one of better application of basic digital 
tools, rather than the introduction of new technologies: adaptation, rather than 
innovation. Previous socio- economic blockers to digital inclusion are quickly 
dissolving with the market proliferation of significantly powerful and available 
smartphone handsets. Therefore in Uganda a HOT intervention seemed highly 
feasible, but it needed to be different from other data projects.
4 ‘By diminishing secrecy, they opened up the legislative process [of US election] to a host 
of actors – corporations, special interests, foreign governments, members of the executive 
branch – that pay far greater attention to the thousands of votes taken each session than the 
public does’ (D’Angelo and Ranalli, 2019).
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A funding call was posted, and the relevance of the open- data ethos to the 
situation (and to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)5 themselves) 
was recognised by the US State Department funders. So in March 2017, HOT 
initiated a pilot project in Northern Uganda titled ‘Crowdsourcing Non- 
Camp Refugee Data’, with a sister project in Istanbul. In Uganda, this became 
specifically framed to address the challenges that the UNHCR identified: resource 
allocation, host- community engagement, community inclusion and affordable – 
yet sustainable – information management. The project was to experiment with 
capacity- building using community- owned smartphones, crowdsourced data and 
open- source GIS. Although very different, both the Uganda and Istanbul projects 
proposed to expose self- identified community needs in precarious populations, 
and in Uganda, to present a ‘common operational picture’ to UNHCR (Wolbers 
and Boersma, 2013). HOT, whose short but avid history had encountered 
equivalent crises, reckoned that inclusion of previously undocumented 
‘informal community resources’ would provide improved understanding of vital 
infrastructural realities on the ground.
Open- data format works across, within and without sectors, but working 
from the bottom up is very different in nature from the compartmental ‘sectored’ 
traditions of humanitarian information management. Mapping teams uniquely 
do not conduct the surveys themselves, rather they teach OSM methodologies 
to community members, who themselves become the surveyors. Donors and 
responders are then increasingly able to see life- saving data changes clearly pictured 
on OSM. The potential for the allocation of essential resources per refugee family, 
even per capita, is compelling. With everybody collaborating and working together, 
mapping both inside and outside of settlements, this could also be a way to address 
issues of inequality and conflict between refugee and host communities. As an 
independent self- organising movement,6 HOT could see a solution in Uganda 
that existed independently from the restrictive legislation of top- down ‘owned’ 
information. Once funded, HOT was able to citizen- activate mapping teams, 
disregard the constraints of information politics and, based on nothing more than 
a fundamental right to internet access, start collecting data. Community- mobilised 
‘motorcycle mapping’ techniques (which had proven effective in the 2014– 16 
Ebola outbreak in West Africa)7 would play a central role in this intervention.
OSM origins and history
HOT’s global agenda is characterised by the (self- )representation of underserved 
and hidden communities. It focuses on empowering people within their own 
5 Notably ‘reducing inequality’, ‘sustainable cities and communities’ and ‘responsible 
consumption and production’, see https:// sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ ?menu=1300.
6 William Connolly (2013) discusses resilience of such distributed networks of society as self- 
organising processes, responding to scales of politics below and beyond the state.
7 For specific use of OSM and motorcycles in the Ebola response, see Cassano (2014).
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communities to take control of how they are represented, mapped and seen by 
the outside world, so the authorship and ownership of data remains with – and 
can be used by – the participants themselves. Communities can be empowered 
to use this citizen- generated GIS as a way to have the local voice heard. At the 
same time as joining a socially cohesive global and local movement of OSM, 
they can also use the platform for small business and personal navigation (like 
a more complete, publicly authored version of Google Maps). Importantly, this 
model is sustainable and free. Intrinsic to it is the creation of a local workforce 
that could, in this instance, join in on implementing and maintaining data 
themselves. And so, in these sudden influx conditions in Northern Uganda, this 
data project, initiated as a pilot, only a ‘proof of concept’ at the time, rapidly 
became the source of high- quality, actionable information for emergency use.
OSM can be imagined as a global creative collaboration platform, a publicly 
authored ‘wiki map’. The project finds its heart not in the technology or tools it 
uses, or commercially interested organisations backing it, but in the OSM map 
itself. It can also work offline. OSM launched in 2004, when a 24- year- old 
entrepreneur, Steve Coast, set up ‘a collaborative project to create a free editable 
map of the world’ (Wikipedia, 2019b), inspired by the success of Wikipedia 
and the predominance of proprietary map data in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere. Since then, it has grown to over two million registered users, who 
can collect data using manual survey, global positioning system (GPS) devices, 
aerial photography and other free sources.
OSM can record and geolocate images, sounds, web links, videos and all map 
data, and is free to use under community principles of mutual inclusion. It is 
supported in the online learning environment at https:// learnosm.org and the 
global community platform https:// www.wiki.osm.org. This resource (which in 
March 2018 recorded its 30 millionth edit) has for some years been harnessed 
by the global humanitarian community to assist in connecting community 
needs with resources in both response and development settings around the 
world. It was first notably used by humanitarians in Haiti in 2006, and again 
in the 2010 earthquake, in order to rapidly create accurate and current digital 
maps showing critical factors affecting the local population. During this and 
subsequent years, a humanitarian OSM organisation dedicated to creating 
‘fast- cycle’ missing maps (Johnson et al., 2010) for humanitarian emergencies 
was conceived. The HOT/ Missing Maps community worldwide is now made 
up of over 100,000 humanitarian OSM practitioners (see Figure 9.2).
As one of the three founders of the Missing Maps project with the American 
Red Cross (ARC) and Médecins sans frontières (MSF), HOT has been making 
and delivering geospatial digital (and paper) maps to assist in response to 
humanitarian crises since 2010. This humanitarian OSM movement can be 
seen as both a resource, a methodology and a philosophy. HOT shifts its 
shape to suit different contexts and the humanitarian OSM team has bilateral 
modes of distributed community network. A blank map continues to evolve, 
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as remote mappers gather at group ‘mapathon’ events to focus on disaster sites 
by using field- informed crisis mapping tasks. These are posted and coordinated 
on the HOT online ‘tasking manager’ and contributors select individual grid 
squares to hand- digitise and outline buildings, roads and infrastructure (e.g. 
hospitals, schools, markets). The OSM- user communities on the ground 
download the map, add values to the points (features), lines (roads/ rivers) 
and shapes (fields, swamps, forest). They use open- source smartphone apps 
and other analogue tools, such as hard- copy annotated maps,8 to record and 
reupload this information.
Reception of these methods by government authorities and NGOs
Painstaking efforts have been made in Uganda by UN coordination to 
account for partners’ intentions (i.e. commitments to help by humanitarian 
coordinators), but in 2017, the picture of field realities and activities on the 
ground was fragmented. Aspects of refugee life were clearly being missed by the 
traditional UNHCR approach, as witnessed by HOT field surveyors in the field, 
who, once deployed, were repeatedly met with surprise: NGO staff had often 
never been seen in plots lying more than a short distance from major supply 
roads – not only in the surrounding areas, but inside the refugee settlements.
Uganda community mapping was to yield impressive results. In the first 
12 weeks of surveying West Nile, ten HOT- supervised community surveyors 
recorded 8,300 public amenities in the Arua District, as well as community 
Figure 9.2. OSM participatory triangulation (Courtesy of Missing Maps).
8 For example, field papers, see http:// fieldpapers.org.
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verifying the few existing geotagged features. This took only two field staff 
and two managers to coordinate and the performance was further replicated 
and scaled into other districts. The cost, in terms of humanitarian budget, 
was minimal. The investment value in useful data points was huge. From 
this intervention, information on many features could be analysed and local 
authorities were to report major engagements with the data for resource 
allocation at district, sub- county and village level.
Even simple maps at this level of detail proved arresting (see Figure 9.3). 
By colouring nodes (surveyed points on the map) at which the answer 
to ‘Is this functional?’ was ‘No’, around 30 per cent of the 3,500 water 
features mapped in the first two months could visually be identified as 
non- functional.
Once the community had been mobilised en masse, this type of visualisation 
was simple to produce. But when these maps were first shown to UN sector 
leads they were met with mistrust. A  common reaction to the ‘open’ part 
of OSM is a fear that all data will be made public:  ‘Who had collected the 
data?’ ‘How could they be trusted?’ ‘How come they show so much more data 
than “official” maps?’ and most of all, ‘These “non- functional” reports can’t 
be correct!’ But HOT’s information not only confirmed all existing UNHCR 
data, but additions, updates and corrections were enthusiastically corroborated 
by UNHCR field officers on the ground.
Figure 9.3. Waterpoints in Arua, non- functional showing in red (OSM/ Overpass Turbo).
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Community data, open data
Michal Givoni (2016, p. 1025) describes crisis mapping as ‘a new modality 
of participatory humanitarian action in which global publics are mobilised to 
trace digital maps of disaster- stricken sites and to classify, verify, and plot on 
maps big data produced by disaster- affected people’. Participatory mapping 
enables cheap and accurate resource allocation and data de- siloing, mainly 
because of the time invested by the international community. It has been 
possible for some years to ensure that data on individuals (e.g. consented 
medical details) never leave the hard drives of the partner implementing the 
surveying. But demographic data (such as population numbers per site) can 
be shared and downloaded via the Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX) by 
humanitarian organisations registered and vetted by the United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). From this, OSM 
uploads can be chosen with precision at any stage in the process. But these 
‘commits’ should always acknowledge accompanying responsibilities towards 
ongoing data stewardship of currency, ownership and social relevance.
The concept of openness of data is better explained by the concept of open 
and complete control. No third parties mediate the data collected, and the user 
is never compromised in this. But with total control comes total responsibility. 
The will for this existed in Uganda, but it needed to be matched by specific 
commitment to engage with fast- evolving changes in global concepts of formal 
validation (and the growing acceptance of movements like OSM). OSM 
is open and editable by those engaging with it and is governed by the self- 
policing community. OSM does not have the potential to be exploited for 
mass marketing because, under the Open Database Licence (ODbL) laws, 
those exploitative bodies are required to reciprocally share all of their own data 
if they use open data. OSM is systemically protected by this caveat. However, 
that does not necessarily make digital recording of populations intrinsically 
humane and some of the ethical nuances and responsibilities feature clearly in 
the HOT Uganda project.
HOT Uganda participatory mapping process: how 
it works
HOT Uganda project design leverages the (perhaps unexpected) fact that in sub- 
Saharan Africa, mobile network is prolific. Almost every community in even 
the remotest locations in Uganda has – alongside the basic tools of existence 
(hoes, jerrycans, cooking pots) – a smartphone. Connectivity is everything and 
refugee settlements are clearly commercially viable for telecom installations, as 
evidenced by the plentitude of ‘booster masts’. Every dusty village has a highly 
effective informal and dynamic mobile- based economy. Wooden shacks are 
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hand- painted with ‘MTN’ and ‘Airtel’ signs. ‘Mobile Money’ can be exchanged 
for airtime and mobile data can be exchanged for cash.
Community recruitment
The Uganda OSM project was built on a familiar model: training teams arrive 
in an open community environment, such as a marketplace or commercial 
centre, identify the busiest and best- equipped smartphone servicing trader and 
ask the (inevitably well- connected) dealer/ repairer to round up 20 smartphone- 
literate acquaintances. But they must each have a smartphone. Smartphone 
possession encodes a number of characteristics about an individual: they can 
communicate, they are aspirational, technically engaged, sociable, and often 
represent an informal community group around the shared village computer.
Practice survey forms will have been written in a spreadsheet and uploaded 
using the simple coding of XForms to an online open- source server, to be 
deployed as app- readable page- swipe surveys (converted to Extensible Markup 
Language (XML) format at the server). Each person who has assembled then 
enters a race to first clear space on their phone, then download the necessary 
OSM- compatible apps (OSMAnd and ODKCollect). A  survey is the next 
item to be downloaded and some mock interviewing of local people ensues. At 
each stage, eventual surveyors are identified on the basis of their aptitude. This 
shortlist of candidates is eventually selected to be the mapping group.
Uganda- specific practice
Uganda is a low- to middle- income country and decentralising leadership 
to local levels and promoting community self- sufficiency is a priority for 
the response coordination. The training of local administration in Uganda 
is coordinated with local community leaders. The HOT model implements 
training for all comers (including district officials) and is conducted in 
community/ administrative centres. ‘Sensitisation’ campaigns with the local 
district and council authorities sound formal, but the benefits of making such 
comprehensive local data so openly available are always very warmly welcomed. 
Through this collaboration, community mapping can be legitimised within 
all- important local ‘community entry’ mechanisms. HOT inclusively adopts 
compatible tools like Microsoft Excel and ODK/ Kobo to integrate (in fact, 
local government is informally run using tools such as WhatsApp). HOT also 
tries to engage stakeholder NGOs and host communities in collaboration, to 
allow both individuals and groups to create maps.
Part- time and occasional staff from local district administration often get 
deployed by HOT as surveyors, so that the experience can help them in their 
own institution. They will take new skills back to their work colleagues, as 
globally supported OSM members. Refugee and local hosting communities 
commonly work together, mapping the difference in services inside and outside 
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of refugee- setting geographies. This common training environment also places 
NGO staff (often decision- makers) next to the beneficiaries they serve, and all 
participants are learning by doing (see Figure 9.4).
The socio- economic exclusivity of smartphone ownership is of utmost 
concern. There is a strong lending culture in Uganda (and many sub- Saharan 
settings), and it has been found that, invariably, people will find a way to 
be connected. Surveyors often turn up with a bad smartphone, but with 
good skills, and these people are subsidised by ‘project- loan’ smartphones.9 
Technological inclusivity is acknowledged (and tackled) at the heart of HOT 
interventional planning. Depending on project- loan phone availability, field- 
budget funds will be diverted to enable device sharing; ‘earn- a- device’ schemes 
(per data output) have been initiated and analogue OSM tools will also get 
used, such as field papers. The need for subsidised devices continues, and 
solutions to the issue of digital access and inclusivity are constantly found on a 
location- by- location basis.
Classroom training
The first morning of a ‘capacitation’ (training) event is usually chaotic. There 
are generator breakdowns, technical glitches, computer viruses and cracked 
screens. Almost every training is chronically oversubscribed, but in the 
Figure 9.4. Training at UNHCR (Arua):  local sub- county councillor, MSF worker, local 
teacher and refugee learn open- source GIS together.
9 Donated, in Uganda’s case, by the excellent ‘NetHope’ Foundation, see https:// nethope.org.
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scrummage to learn, it is preferred to train as many as possible in OSM, despite 
the limited number of selections who will graduate as full- term surveyors.
The first exercise after assembling and registration is the presentation of the 
blank map, containing at this point only satellite- traced shapes, from remote- 
mapping sessions (in London, New York, Heidelberg, for example). This image 
can already be seen online (in Maps.Me and OSMAnd smartphone apps), but 
is printed out at this point. Participants are encouraged to write their name on 
a post- it note and stick it in the vicinity of their dwelling (see Figure 9.5). This 
is a good way to assess and introduce map literacy, but also gives an idea of 
where people come from and is used for local contact when later moving field 
surveying into that area.
This introduction emphasises how GIS information as OSM enables the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance in the form of engineering, medical and 
cultural intervention in areas generally considered inaccessible and precarious. 
There is a lot to be overwhelmed by on this first day. Not least is the task 
of bringing people through the digital revolution in one day. Clarifying the 
usefulness of OSM for the longer- term advantage for business development, 
personal enterprise and other socio- economic projects is also a challenge. All 
this with intermittent mains power, usually from an unreliable local market 
generator on an extension, involving bare wires wrapped in carrier bags for 
insulating tape. So much is inevitably improvised and the venue is usually a 
shack, tent or hall. Participants often have not used computers before and 
in some cases cannot speak a language common to one of the HOT trainers 
Figure 9.5. Surveyor Philliam checking the OSMAnd App and his ODK surveys, with the 
blank paper map at hand.
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(however, surveys are translated into local languages and OSM itself exists in 
many international languages).
In the next stage, all trainees are signed up to OSM, using phone- tethered 
laptops (hard- wired infrastructure is always fragile in sub- Saharan Africa and 
wired telephones are scarcely used, 4G being more reliable than Wi- Fi service).
OSM is the online platform. Signing up, as with Facebook, gives the 
candidate sudden (if not yet conceived) access to OSM membership. This 
membership represents access to a huge online learning resource, with 
several professional- level curricula in modern GIS, all lodged on the ‘OSM 
wiki’ (Wikipedia, 2019c). More importantly, the new OSM member now 
has a potentially direct link to every OSM contributor – the expertise, skills, 
influence and assistance of hundreds of thousands of like- minded people, on 
essentially cash- neutral terms.10
WhatsApp groups
At the end of each training, a WhatsApp follow- up group is established, 
by which ongoing support can be given to the trainees and further training 
opportunities can be established and circulated. This is much more than a 
social group, however. For those selected as surveyors in this training, a second 
WhatsApp group will be formed. In a similar model to how local administration 
uses WhatsApp in Uganda, this will be the coordination tool used for future 
field- mapping. Outlying surveyors use WhatsApp to send map pins of their 
position (using OSM for Android/ OSMAnd), important feedback relating 
to marginalised communities and also to transfer digital documents like their 
GPX (GPS Exchange Format)11 tracks (collected in the OSMAnd app as they 
move). These will later be uploaded to OSM as roads/ paths (sometimes roads 
are obscured from mapathon- goers by trees/ clouds in satellite imagery).
Field training
This second day is an intensive day of field communication technique training 
with the best candidates selected from the day before. Real pre- prepared 
UNHCR/ HOT surveys get workshopped and adjusted according to the 
area- specific services and hazards feedback gathered during the previous 
day’s training. Surveyors are split into groups of three  – an interviewer, an 
interviewee and an evaluator. The groups do a round of rehearsal in each of 
these roles and then a feedback session is held, where comments are shared 
about the sessions and also about the forms that they will now depend upon 
(and suddenly have much more commentary on!). Certain questions are now 
10 Unless monetised by humanitarian funds, the process of mapping exists robustly around the 
world in ‘open’ collaborations between developers, philanthropists and business people.
11 GPX is an XML schema designed as a common GPS data format for software applications 
(Wikipedia, 2019a).
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understood to be irrelevant, inappropriate or badly worded (and get updated). 
One such adjustment was made when selected surveyors came back on day 
two and described survey changes that needed making:  in Uganda, refugees 
are formally assigned blocks  in refugee settlements. But in many instances, 
the question ‘What block is this?’ needed adjustment from ‘block’, to ‘tank’, 
because water tanks – installed albeit temporarily – had taken on community 
significance as meeting points and community identifiers. The survey was duly 
changed and a new global OSM convention was proposed. The focus of HOT 
Uganda’s work is partly on the collection of data, but also the communication of 
the terms attached to the universal spatial language of the map – the ‘legend’ – 
an arbitration of signifying systems by society; a dynamic connection of ‘text 
with technology’.
HOT trainers often learn techniques from these ever- resourceful locals, 
particularly smartphone tricks. Sophisticated techniques develop out of 
resource- poor necessity. Community surveying is an exercise in dramatic role 
play, and the most productive of all the sessions. It is also the first time that the 
importance of local semiotics of tagging and taxonomy is discussed.12
After some more rounds, surveyors go on foot into the surrounding area, 
accompanied by a trainer, and conduct surveys in the local village/ block. 
When they return, their data (which in their survey app has been configured 
to automatically ‘send when finalised’), can now be seen on the online server 
(data collection and visualisation web page), with timestamps and locations 
attached. It can be viewed as a map, graph, list and many other options. 
This is when, for many of the trainees, the transparency and accountability 
of the process is revealed. They can claim that they asked a certain question 
in a certain place, but if the server places their geo- point somewhere else on 
the map, their colleagues can see otherwise. Initially, surveyors do not expect 
their work to be so visible and this can lead to a lot of hilarious interactions. 
Surveyors also manually report their surveys on the team WhatsApp group, as 
well as regularly checking in with a location pin to show where they are (live 
information is sometimes necessary for team security around border areas). As 
soon as the reports match the data seen by the field coordinators on the Kobo/ 
ODK server, the remote mappers are paid for that day’s work, using another 
local technology, ‘Mobile Money’ (the mechanism for most personal banking 
in Uganda) (Wikipedia, 2018).
12 WikiProject Uganda (Wikipedia, 2019c) also outlines the tagging conventions specifically 
negotiated by OSM contributors with the OSM Federation, as a new language of 
address between refugee and hosting communities on the ground, and common to the 
community of ‘open’ geography worldwide. These terms now serve as a refugee- context 
tagging taxonomy in emerging refugee environments being mapped around the world (e.g. 
Rohingya).
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Motorcycle mapping
To optimise the speed at which this data can be collected, local forms of 
transport infrastructure are employed. At the end of this second day, 
surveyors are introduced to their new partner: the boda boda (motorcycle) 
rider. Motorcycle riders are selected, under supervision, by the surveyors, 
on the basis of geographic/ local knowledge, language knowledge and 
professionalism. The two- person team then works together to strategise 
and navigate the region they are mapping. The robust security and logistics 
network of commercial boda boda fraternities is brought to the campaign 
by this partnership. With motorcycle mapping, collaboration takes place 
as occupational engagement between all participants, while the boda boda 
riders themselves are encouraged to learn and participate in the OSM 
process, bringing a number of fundamental assets, meanings and geographic 
practices to the table. Not least of these assets is the mobile infrastructure of 
the boda boda itself – particularly the battery, which is used to charge the 
team’s smartphone (see Figure 9.6).
(In)Formal field ontology: walking the walk
Northern Uganda fieldwork is punishing. It takes hard work and surveyors 
physically visit every single feature of every single village. It cannot be 
done using short cuts, or ‘telepresence’. The essential core of the project is 
a collaborative attitude and the ability to communicate. This will be what 
Figure 9.6. Local people, local tech: mobile infrastructures are more resilient. Smartphone 
charging in the field.
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gets a field surveyor the data (and the acceptance) they need. Fieldworkers 
will be badly received in the rural communities if they cannot convey why 
HOT’s survey is different from the other hundreds of surveys more accessible 
communities regularly answer. To make data under the OSM orthodoxy 
useful to humanitarians, the data model remains continuously collaborative 
between HOT and UNHCR sector leads (Wiki OpenStreetMap, n.d.), in 
an attempt to maintain optimal alignment between OSM tags and UNHCR 
indicators. Local geospatial indicators apply to all of the humanitarian 
sectors. The surveyors, communities and interviewees all (ideally) continue to 
modify and collaborate on these as well. Five surveys are performed on each 
community, and then linked together by a sixth, introductory community 
profile survey that is carried out on arrival in each village or refugee block. 
Surveying is not an isolated event and happens in community discussions of 
how local priorities can be recorded.
The result of OSM mapping is a combination of both the official coordination 
data requirements and how the refugee community want to identify their needs 
Figure 9.7. Surveyor: Harriet uses WhatsApp to report local detail and takes a geo-tagged 
photo of a riverbed, dug-out in desperation by drought-ridden villagers, as an informal 
public amenity. OpenStreetMap Key and Tag conventions will be attributed: ‘man_made’ = 
‘unprotected_well’. Locals, who will hold situated knowledge about their shared resource, are 
encouraged to contribute to attribution details in OSM.
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for themselves. So informal interventions are also mapped; traditional healers 
get mapped and tagged as ‘health features’ alongside large NGO hospitals; dug- 
out wells in dry riverbeds (WaSH) are mapped and detailed (see Figure 9.7) 
alongside formal bore- hole installations (see Figure 9.8).
Mapping all features that are tagged as ‘non- functioning’ precisely 
identifies service deficiencies, but integration of WaSH and education cross- 
sector information can be visualised in walking distances to water points and 
schools to predict school truancy (children are traditionally the household 
water collectors). Maps that can show flooding wells lying close to flooding 
latrines have a very real impact on cholera outbreak control. A well- known 
cross- sector analysis of data in context is on unlit latrines (UNHCR, 2017a). 
Women (a large proportion of the population13) report sexual violence 
when using services at night and these hotspots can now be geographically 
pinpointed (REACH/ UNHCR, 2018). Resources such as trauma care 
Figure  9.8. This (Formal) Public Amenity – a borehole with handpump (`Bush Pump’) 
would be ‘coded’ in OpenStreetMap with the conventions of Key and Tag respectively. In this 
instance, ‘man_made’ = ‘water_well’, and ‘pump’=’yes’.
13 Reports by the UNHCR in 2017 that ‘more than 85 per cent of South Sudanese refugees 
in Uganda are women and children under the age of 18’ seem unfeasible, but numbers are 
understood to be large (UNHCR, 2017b).
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.9. Community-witnessed data on water supply in the Bidibidi settlement, Yumbe, Northern Uganda.
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(health) and lighting (physical planning) can be allocated to latrines/ wells 
(WaSH), per location (protection).
These combinations of data are endlessly useful (see Figure  9.9) and the 
potential basis for future disaster preparedness (an Ebola outbreak, for instance) 
is provisioned for. This kind of data is received with open arms by local field 
offices, and at this point, the project shows an openly compatible geospatial 
platform connecting historic geospatial records and new community  witnessed 
data with the outside world: connecting the ‘specific’ to the ‘universal’).
Mission accountability and financial transparency
Field- mapping campaigns can continue for weeks and months, with 
diminishing need for on- site supervision, as new leaders emerge in the teams. 
HOT have scaled projects into new areas by transferring increasingly skilled 
community members to lead. Many of the refugee and host participants come 
from violent and mendicant cultural settings where, after generations of (cross- 
border) war, the value of long- term planning let alone job security is seldom 
experienced. Surveyors can be put off by the exacting nature of the role, but 
a very satisfying work ethic often starts to evolve as daily wage payments stay 
transparently regular and ‘their’ map gets visually filled in and becomes visible 
on their smartphone app. As the surveyors graduate into fieldwork, they also 
start learning data cleaning from coordinators.
Accountability is conceived in other directions too. For humanitarians, it is 
fundamentally a transparent, cost- neutral project by which donors can engage 
and collaborate with their field counterparts, giving time rather than money to 
support the production of commonly owned visualisations from satellite and 
field data. Remote mappers as ‘donors’ in far- off mapathons see features that 
were simple shapes, lines and points getting names and attributes attached and 
indicating ground- truths.
This hyper- local accuracy demands participation. It involves surveyors and 
their communities in making decisions. Data collected in the field by HOT 
in Uganda enjoy strict data cleaning and total control at source. OSM can 
only share geographical and technical information about features themselves. 
However, certain data such as population or numbers (and locations) of disease 
cases may comprise vital narratives for responders. Surveys are therefore split 
by column of data type in a spreadsheet and human and demographic data are 
carefully anonymised and secured with different permissions. This separation 
effectively secures the system. It is how HOT are able, in conjunction with local 
police, to securely manage victim self- reporting of female genital mutilation in 
Tanzania.14
14 See HOT Tanzania on YouTube,  https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=QfprlqTk6i8.
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The argument for lo- fi tech in humanitarian 
interventions
HOT has no direct competition in tackling the many geospatial issues faced by 
the UNHCR (digital inclusion, community engagement, cultural integration, 
accountability). But is OSM digital humanitarianism? Can its post- digital 
capacities offer insights into disentangling the problems of humanitarian digital 
telepresence? Or is HOT’s brand of crowdsourced innovation just another 
contributor to the problem of innovation overload? Certainly, the revolutionary 
nature of device- based participation is not a catch- all humanitarian solution.
Glasze and Perkins (2015, p. 144) argue that ‘researchers might also deploy 
mixed and ethnographic approaches, in order to learn more about particular 
moments of mapping practice’. HOT’s data are technically accurate (up to 0.6 
metres current smartphone accuracy and locally triangulated survey checks), but 
it is not 100 per cent ‘true’. Nor does it claim to be. The process of collaborative/ 
collective mapping is a strong ‘legible’ example of how technical solutionism 
can form an important consensually agreed situated knowledge between two 
or more cultures. Open data is ‘in process’: it is iterative and reiterative. Field 
mapping involves constantly changing versions of the map areas to be printed, 
used for navigation, adjusted and updated through digital upload again; then 
redownloaded and used for planning and navigating once more.
OSM is not made of software short cuts. In fact, it explicitly relates to the 
physical. It is by no means intrinsically digital,15 but a some- time analogue, 
post- technological interpretation of everyday surroundings, a creation of 
human connections within communities in need. Without physical presence, 
HOT could never hope to have the impact it has. On the ground in Uganda, 
HOT’s mantra is ‘Local people, local tech, just add knowledge’ (HOT, 2018). 
OSM has important analogue tools that use post- digital locally inclusive 
technologies such as pen and paper. ‘Field papers’ – A4 printouts of sections 
of OSM maps – print QR (quick response) code geolocators on to each of the 
map sheets. Once hand- drawn and written information is noted on the paper 
in the field, a photo or scan of it can be digitally geolocated by OSM editor 
software (e.g. Java OpenStreetMap Editor – JOSM). Editing can then be done 
between the paper image and the satellite image and merged as edits to OSM.
Cross- fertilising qualitative and quantitative data
There are various ways to check qualitative data and the ideal is to combine it not 
only with quantitative data, but with diverse approaches and opinions. Highly 
efficient dispersed consensus is reached by using the community themselves, 
15 Or even the ‘Internet of things’.
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having them work together and cross- check each other’s work. One key 
component of the Uganda community mapping project is the process of returning 
paper maps to settlement zones and sub- counties where the data originated, for 
review, further input, cultural ownership and continued participation.
To mitigate for misinformation (e.g. indiscriminate denial of any services 
in a community, to leverage more NGO finances), debate is triangulated 
by the surveyor in the public outdoor space of the village/ settlement. Data 
are then cross- checked later through other local sources, and callbacks are 
conducted (using the contact number collected with the geo- point). This 
makes for a triangulated quality- checking process. In OSM, data are there to be 
contested, interacted with, then corrected; then updated again, then contested, 
ad infinitum. The terms, or ‘taxonomies’, are proposed for and agreed by 
consensual majority.
Individuals will sometimes give misinformation that they believe is 
expected, or for personal gain. HOT’s ability to comprehensively map 
every single feature on the ground in every community has meant that real 
numbers and percentages can be cross- referenced with reported attitudes 
and perceptions of these realities projected from quantitative sample surveys. 
OSM- engaged NGOs are asked for their input as an organisation and often 
share qualitative data with the team.
Extrapolations from qualitative data are extremely useful for all aspects of 
humanitarian decision- making. The mass smartphone- enabled quantitative 
data allows not only evaluation of this, but radically changes the spectrum 
of possible analytics. Very basic data analysis can reveal extremely accurate 
numbers of people affected in exact locations, by assessing qualitative data on 
population per household and remote- mapped shelter imagery. In an ideal 
world, both qualitative and quantitative formats of data are used in tandem 
like this, for a rich and informed picture. Data are useless without analysis, 
and again, the truly useful information is to be found in the contest between 
the two types of data. Questions arise such as: ‘Why are these data different?’ 
and ‘What issues are we missing here?’ Qualitative data may express or 
contradict a narrative clearly visible in physical quantities (e.g. of patients near 
hospitals, teachers per schoolchild, refugees per settlement), and quantitative 
data should always be analysed in terms of what qualities they convey.
In all instances of humanitarian crisis, fieldworkers unanimously agree 
that any data is better than no data at all, and the ‘rapid- cycle mapping’ 
(Johnson et  al., 2010) work of projects such as HOT/ Missing Maps 
comprises an invaluable resource for most emergency data needs – even when 
incomplete. In practical terms, open data arguably benefits from its own self- 
professed fragility and this contest leaves important space for empathy and 
interpretation.
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Principles of contest and consent: choice and 
community protection
The evolutionary nature of the ongoing and dynamic map is a major part 
of the HOT message in Uganda. Surveys collaborated for the community 
(by the community) adopt local terms to identify hyper- local assets. Unlike 
authoritative data, it is mobile, interactive and free from the requirement to 
claim fixed accuracy. That it claims no reassurances makes for the argument 
of a safer system in terms of credibility, trustworthiness and expertise.16 
OSM demands interaction, and is available on smartphone apps (Maps.ME, 
OSMAnd), by which it can be endlessly updated. Surveyors see new uploads 
as soon as the latest updates appear online. The reciprocal relation between 
local and global technologies and local and global communities is key. It is 
processual and internationally collaborative. It is a conversation.
Whether or not the participatory nature of OSM positively recolonises the 
map and its users, it does at least engage the users in a debate of its own maps 
and the proverbial ‘ink with which they were written’. The personal ‘epistemic 
disobedience’17 afforded to each human participation to OSM is a highly 
important component of protection and representation. The participant becomes 
invested. People can delete their data on OSM. Hyper- local accuracy demands 
participation and it involves surveyors and their communities in making decisions.
This physical human choice is vital to mediate the digital machine at either 
end. The imperative to intervene has been encountered by HOT in other 
settings, where under changing political landscapes, undocumented immigrant 
data can fall into different hands over time. OSM data can be dangerous too. 
For example, in an informal settlement in Zimbabwe, local knowledge of 
500,000 unofficial residents was mapped, but accuracy was restricted to only 
neighbourhood- level resolution. This vulnerable undocumented community 
needed representing, but although OSM was technically capable of identifying 
individuals house by house, mapping them would potentially expose them as 
well as represent them. The last few metres of tracing individuals was done by 
spoken word, ultimately maintaining anonymity.18
The capacity for participator feedback is key to responsive and responsible 
mapping. What cannot be forgotten is the physicality of communities and 
people in the field, and the difficult but rewarding work of the surveyors in 
16 This form of ‘consensualised’ accuracy is effectively assessed by Muttaqien et al. (2018, 
p. 1324) as ‘aggregated expertise’.
17 ‘Epistemic disobedience’ is touched upon by Walter Mignolo (2009, pp. 7– 8) as one of the 
conditions of ‘decolonising’ identities.
18 Missing Maps, Zimbabwe, MSF, 2014, see https:// wiki.openstreetmap.org/ wiki/ Epworth_ 
Mapping_ Project#Neighbourhoods.
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translating this reality. Dayan, now HOT field team leader for West Nile, 
reported diplomatic discussions in which refugees, living in often bullet- strewn 
border communities, fear being surveyed, ‘since most of them are traumatised’. 
He explains that the nature of the mapping work finds that ‘many [of the rural 
villagers] are political or military’. He went on to report:
Before I left that village that day, I had to address questions of what we 
were doing … to give them a very clear picture of what HOT does … 
Because they ran away from violence, they receive me in a hostile way … 
We have to take time, so that they will understand that what we are doing 
will help them to have access to those facilities on the map.19
Textuality, addressing, semiotic coding
Paglen (2009, p. 1) writes that: ‘In a nutshell, the production of space says that 
humans create the world around them and that humans are, in turn, created by 
the world around them.’ As ‘poster- child fetishism’ or ‘disaster tourism’, static 
snapshots can quickly come to misrepresent. The concept of ‘address’ as verbal 
text quickly comes to have a lived (interventional) impact in humanitarian 
information management. So it is imperative that the interactive nature of digital 
mapping can represent – but also protect – those it serves. Open Data Kit (ODK) 
digital survey forms are a way of linking words to objects in a coded material 
way. OSM mapping practice seems to show that chosen words, descriptions and 
explanations are just as important as technological empowerment.
As mentioned above, communities under survey sometimes express answers 
that clearly reflect how they would like to be seen and perhaps not how they 
actually appear to an outsider. OSM allows for plural expressions of reality 
on the ground and often finds communities preferring more unexpected 
indicators. An example is local insistence on anglicised – not tribal – spellings 
of village names. The reason for this pedantry is the desire for information to 
be known and trusted in the right way by decision- makers, which may have 
a visceral impact in life- threatening situations of emergency administration.
Reality, representation and counter- mapping
In The Freedom of the Migrant, Wilem Flusser (2003, p.  86) writes that ‘the 
creation of new information depends on the synthesis of prior information. Such 
a synthesis consists in an exchange of information … One can therefore speak of 
creation as a dialogic process, in which either an internal or an external dialogue 
takes place’. Texts such as Mythologies (Barthes, 1973) questioned the existence of 
a singular extrinsic reality, and this (and other) studies of semiotics investigated 
19 Interview with Dayan Amandou, field team leader, 22 Feb. 2019, HOT Country Office, 
Kampala.
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how ordered relations (codes) of significance create their own meaning. The 
deconstruction of this idea that humans are subject to only one (dominant) 
reading of meaning created, in both philosophical and practical terms, space to 
effectively reinvent meaning. The social constructivist project of OSM enacts this 
conception through address, creating a language of action and meaning within 
tagging conventions. OSM discourse tries to accommodate plural ontologies of 
place, but convey a unified meaning (even if that is characterised by contest). 
Interpretation happens in the construction of relevant survey questions, but also 
in the collection of those data. A transposition of ‘the virtual’ to ‘the real’. As 
Barnes and Duncan (1992, p. 6) put it: ‘A landscape possesses a similar objective 
fixity to that of a written text … [becoming] detached from the intentions of 
its original authors … various readings of landscapes matter more than any 
authorial intentions … [are] constitutive of reality, rather than mimicking it.’
Through the creation of the ‘legend’20 of the OSM map, we can infer that 
participants are subjects, auto- ethnographers and authors, simultaneously. 
OSM sets up the map landscape as an ‘interrogative text’, ‘disrupt[ing] the 
unity of the reader by discouraging identification with a unified subject of 
the enunciation’ (Belsey, 2003, p. 91). Meaning- making in OSM presents a 
condition of contest and consent, but it is vital that this interrogative feedback 
loop be maintained.
Satellite gaze: power, smoke and mirrors
In the years leading up to the launch of GPS, thinkers like Foucault ([1966] 
1970) popularised disruptive readings of spatial intersubjectivity, rewriting 
object– subject relations in cultural sites of ‘gaze’ such as Diego Velázquez’s 
painting Las Meninas, an interrogation of dynamic politics of intersubjective 
gaze in art and contemporary cultural theories. Mass production of GPS 
made available a technology that could similarly politicise the shifting gaze 
of international intelligence. So substantial has been this ‘prospect-shift’ that 
eventually the preoccupation with ‘who is looking at whom’ arguably diverts 
even heads of state themselves from linear notions of truth or news and they 
can become associated with ever- receding versions of populist reality.
Byung- Chul Han (2017, p. 1) writes that, ‘Today, we do not deem ourselves 
subjugated subjects, but rather projects’ (original emphasis). Expansions of 
Jacques Lacan’s ‘real’ into ‘symbolic real’ (Žižek, 1999, pp. 222, 276) debate 
how media constructions of consensual and interactive reality influence 
contemporary understandings of ‘the self ’. Certainly interactive media overtly 
exploit ambiguities in ‘mapped truth’ (e.g. the Pokémon GO computer game 
using OSM), thereby positing a version of reality altogether different from 
20 Indeed, the very word ‘legend’ implies shifting mythologies around definitions of fixity.
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the version that traditionally presides.21 Consent lies in the ‘common land’ 
of a space, but in a world in which terms like ‘augmented reality’, the ‘real’ 
and ‘the hyper- real’ are now in slippage, critics like Žižek (1999) contend that 
interaction, or a Foucauldian address process, secures credibility of truth: space 
has become a process, rather than an object.
Studies of human production of space have traditionally associated the 
perception of landscape texts with social and political manipulation. Jay Appleton’s 
(1975) analysis of landscape poetics describes how estate landowners during 
periods of imperial growth in Britain demonstratively implied dominance by 
installing elevated buildings and watchtowers on landscaped grounds. This spatial 
aesthetic of cultural dominance over estate was coined ‘prospect theory’. It features 
in subsequent writings on territory and colonial gaze (Fitter, 1995; Turner, 1981). 
Prospect theory was interestingly extended by Appleton (1975) to the concept 
of ‘indirect prospect symbols’: viewpoints overlooking (imaginary) territories at 
the peripheries of large country estates. According to Appleton (1975, pp. 80– 1), 
these ‘symbolically invite the speculation that they command a further field of 
vision’. Through this extension, not only do you govern all you can see, but by 
implication, all that can be seen from your outlying viewing positions.
So how does this apply to satellites and their cameras? Discussion becomes 
interesting when ‘selfie’ culture is applied to the placement of the satellites as 
a technological entity and the semiotics of ‘indirect prospect’ take on an extra 
dimension. According to Senft and Baym (2015, p. 1589), the selfie is a
cultural artefact and social practice. A selfie is a way of speaking and an object 
to which actors (both human and nonhuman) respond … Selfies function 
both as a practice of everyday life and as the object of politicizing discourses 
about how people ought to represent, document, and share their behaviours 
… also a practice – a gesture that can send (and is often intended to send) 
different messages to different individuals, communities, and audiences.
As a GIS, the OSM community effectively sees itself through its own satellite 
cameras. Humans, in selfies, look at imagery – effectively of themselves – but 
through the lens of their own machine. And that gaze becomes modified by the 
act of looking. The communication of prospect here, too, becomes reciprocal 
between subjects and objects, and exploits that which (traditionally) has 
exploited it. In Bidibidi, the example of community agency was documented in 
the BBC series Equator from the Air.22 The feature concerned itself extensively 
with the reciprocal relation between recording and creating the peri- urban 
order that is coming to signify ‘Bidibidi the city’.23
21 Lacan’s psychoanalytic writings on the ‘mirror stage’ of individuals have been developed into 
a politics of self- reflexive (inter)cultural identity.
22 Africa: Equator from the Air, BBC2, London, 26 May 2019, Network/ National Television 
and online.
23 See Henri Lefebvre’s discussion of the ‘right to the city’ (Lefebvre, 1968).
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Subject, object, fetish and factish
The language of address and self- address in the theatre of crisis has long made 
reality itself a contest, with the process of its creation becoming increasingly 
inclusive. According to Scott Blinder (2012, p.  4), ‘public opinion toward 
immigration is directed toward “pictures in our heads” of immigrants rather 
than immigration per se’. If the communities in Uganda own each survey data 
set, images from the field may, under the OSM rubric, reappropriate ‘disaster 
tourism’. The representation of the subject in humanitarian intervention is 
something in which persons of concern take a keen interest. Selfie culture has 
become an intrinsic part of the media production– induction– consumption 
loop, but what may seem a superficial product of northern hemisphere 
narcissism is, not only ubiquitous but culturally contingent.24 Loaned 
smartphones return from the field full of surveyor selfies.
The underlying message of the OSM processes in Uganda is one of 
reclaiming the map, with situated knowledge as a fundamental practice. 
‘Language is the medium through which a hierarchical structure of power is 
perpetuated, and the medium through which conceptions of “truth”, “order”, 
and “reality” become established … such power is rejected in the emergence of 
an effective post- colonial voice’ (Ashcroft et al., 1989, p. 7). This voice finds 
itself decolonial in OSM (Mignolo, 2009). The data of the community belongs 
to – and in – the communities that it represents. With an open market on 
digital engagement itself, the responsibility to engage can now tackle real- time 
issues of misrepresentation, engaging with ‘voluntourism’ – and even cultural 
appropriation25 – in the process.
OSM advocates could argue that, possibly for the first time, the subjects of 
disaster mapping may hold full control (and consent) over the artefacts of their 
own data. Bruno Latour’s (1999, pp. 1– 23) exhilarating discussion of cultural 
appropriations of myth in ‘the slight surprise of action’ opens up this meaning- 
making and ownership process a little further. It contemplates fetishisations as 
sites where collisions of object and of place seem inevitable. Latour discusses 
‘fetish’ becoming ‘factish’ in the contest of cultural appropriation and iconoclasm. 
Ultimately, he argues that the object gains meaning only once that very meaning 
is challenged by the iconoclast. Paradoxically then, the iconoclast enables the 
meaning s/ he objects to: a cyclical generative and degenerative process.
Latour uses the example of the Nepalese legend of the Jaggernath and 
the magic stone, in which the teacher (Jaggernath), seeks to emancipate his 
24 Google reports that in 2014, people took approximately 93 million selfies per day on just 
Android models alone (Brandt, 2014).
25 This is something to consider even in the work of MSF ex- patriot workers, as Redfield 
(2013) and Givoni (2011) remind us.
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community from subjugation in the worship of an untouchable stone (the 
saligram). The protagonist breaks the taboo of the saligram26 by picking it up 
and forcing the awestruck community members to touch it too. The action 
provokes a revulsion not towards the controlling myth of the stone (which 
remains, if anything, more untouchable and sacred), but towards the attempted 
emancipation of the myth- busting process itself. Most of all, the essay describes 
the dehumanising of the iconoclastic protagonist, Jaggernath. And so, 
identifying components of meaning- making here (or to refer to Tim Ingolds 
(2011), the ‘ink with which it is written’) may not be what the community 
wants. Equally, post- structuralist camps might argue that society depends on 
consensual mythology to maintain social cohesion, and that there exists an 
intrinsic dependence upon ‘legend’ for meaning as a whole.
An iconographic parallel may be found in the representational politics of 
an installation in the Namibian desert, in which a solar- powered sculpture, 
with an MP3 player embedded, plays a sound reproduction of Toto’s 1982 hit 
‘Africa’ on a loop: ‘The artist set up an installation called Toto Forever, made up 
of six speakers attached to a blue MP3 player – whose only song is Africa, set 
to play on an infinite loop – all standing atop white rectangular blocks set up 
in the sand. The installation, Siedentopf writes on his website, runs on solar 
batteries “to keep Toto going for all eternity”’ (Aratani, 2019).
The song ‘Africa’ by the band Toto is a cultural appropriation of some 
distinction, which seemed to smooth out the squalor, injustice and discomfort 
of a ‘real’ Africa for a 1980s pop music audience. The song is noted playing 
in African bars by some who spent enough time there to remember how 
this romanticism of Africa from afar seemed incongruous with the realities 
of Ethiopian famine, apartheid dissolution and the West African civil wars. 
However, played in bars it is. And owned and loved by Africans, too. There is a 
‘reterritorialised’ capacity to this, one could argue, in which its semantic script 
has been rewritten. And like the installation in the desert, the iconography 
has come to define the continent that, contested by all who engage, wilfully 
claims its right to a decolonial description or ‘tag’. And this seems disobedient. 
Ironically, the main visual feature in Toto’s pop video from the same year is – 
wait for it –  a map.
Mobility, resilience and united statelessness
A conception of ‘home’ as a ‘place’ (rather than a ‘process’) implies threat to 
many in the world who do not self- identify as refugees. But mobility of meaning 
does not seem here to challenge social cohesion, but rather make it stronger, 
26 Note that the taboo itself is not the same entity as the object.
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through a debate of reciprocated relativist self- professed fragility. Stability in 
this territory comes from aggregated risk, resilience from connectivity and 
impact from participation.
Contemporary debate on the grey area between enforced and voluntary 
migration ‘must account for the multi- causality of population movement’ 
(Parater et al., 2019). Although traditional assumptions link displacement with 
disadvantage, global societies increasingly question the idea of home as a place, 
citing various reasons for embracing geographic fluidity. Questions around 
choice in itinerance are found across cultures, and these cultures are beginning 
to demonstrate connections. Digital nomadism is prized by some as an uber- 
class luxury in non- disaster settings, and in fact the ethos of this nomadic 
practice favours similar values of creativity, improvisation and community self- 
governance, which seem missing from the contemporary mainstream. OSM 
potentially connects these groups across cultures.
Discussion in this chapter has been concerned with mobility:  mobile 
meaning, mobile infrastructure and mobile networks (in more than one 
sense). The lack of formal infrastructure in many sub- Saharan African 
settings is rapidly emerging as something of an advantage in a sociopolitical 
environment of mobile lifestyle (and even mobile meaning). Resilience derives 
from adaptability. Some might say that the historical fragility in many parts 
of Africa renders populations adaptable, immune to reliance on hard- wired 
infrastructure (e.g. copper telephone lines) so counted on by the global North. 
Mobile networks (commercially viable on a free market) make itinerance 
relatively dependable. Although settlement environments are deemed 
precarious, reliability is something that is immediately visible by line of sight 
(booster masts are prolifically installed). Here, network is physically present, 
not a blind function of unseen bureaucracy. And here, too, commercial interests 
can be legitimately hacked for social advantage.
Conclusions
Perhaps OSM collaborators create terms that challenge inevitable subjectivity, 
where the very fact of intersubjective expression can empower a liberated 
language of action. The terms afforded by OSM are owned by the local 
communities and their spokespeople. In Sierra Leone, motorcycle mapping 
has revealed villages self- identifying their particular locations as under one 
chiefdom even though the territory itself is spatially isolated from the main 
geographic body of that chiefdom: an island of local geopolitical significance.
Nobody  – and yet everybody  – owns OSM. The auto- ethnographic 
distributed quality of OSM is, perhaps, a coping mechanism in a world where 
truth is increasingly fragile. One of the engagements that has helped OSM to 
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be accepted in Uganda is ongoing HOT collaboration with Uganda’s National 
Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) (Allan, 2018). Serious efforts are now afoot to 
undertake the next national census using OSM tools. If this is implemented, 
it would make Uganda a global pioneer in the adoption of these accurate, 
cost- effective and sustainable methodologies (and, in a cartographic sense, the 
most plurally inclusive nation on earth). It is clear that Uganda has a need 
for a robust, self- reliant and sustainable infra- structural system using OSM, 
which can have shared and minimised cost. This need is demonstrated through 
support from the World Bank and various UN agencies, but intervention 
methods used in Uganda need to merge with – rather than disrupt – existing 
local administrative systems. Responsibility needs devolving across citizens and 
sectors alike. For this, the accountability and granularity of OSM needs to be 
seen as enabling, rather than threatening.
OSM has been called a ‘do- ocracy, meritocracy, technocracy, and bureaucracy 
… a radical change that is significantly different from other digital mapping 
projects’ (Glasze and Perkins, 2015, p. 153), and it does seem a viable model 
for practical social constructivism. Solutions to crises are perhaps to be found in 
more human engagement with technology, but traditional social mechanisms 
seem able to reboot too, in this emerging post- digital mode. OSM’s dealings 
with fragility firmly locate it in the realm of the self- organising systems which 
Connolly (2013, p. 119) identifies, of ‘plural assemblage … composed of those 
sharing affinities of spirituality across differences of creed, class, gender, sexual 
orientation, and ethnicity’.
Innovative technical solutions (hacktivism, liberation technology) 
increasingly find post- digital recognition in self- governing communities like 
OSM, thereby making the ‘radical desire to change the world’27 less and less 
restricted to the economically privileged. A future where borders, boundaries 
and terms like ‘alien’ become redundant envisages global mobility, post- 
capitalist inclusivity and peer- to- peer pro- poor social cohesion becoming part 
of everyday existence. In the light of actor- network theories of social cohesion, 
those preoccupied with containment of territory and displacement may learn 
from the more resilient models of cooperative and adaptive community 
interventions to define mobility in its gathering global momentum as an 
inclusive expression of defiant and united statelessness.
27 A characteristic of ‘boatpunks’ – digital nomads who typify aspects of this global ‘neoclass’, 
see https:// www.thelifenomadik.com/ blog/ tag/ boat- punk.
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